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INTRODUCTION
On May 26, 2018, media from across the globe descended on the
courtyard of Dublin Castle, Ireland.1 They had traveled to capture the scene
of thousands of Irish people celebrating the results of the Irish abortion
referendum, where a landslide majority of 66.4% voted to repeal the 8th
amendment to the Irish Constitution.2 Inserted in 1983 by a formidable antiabortion lobby, the 8th amendment equated the right to life of the "mother"
and the "unborn child" in the Constitution.3 This amendment translated into
a legal ban on abortion in all cases except where abortion was necessary to
avert a substantial risk to a pregnant woman’s life. Women who had abortions
outside of the permitted exception, and anyone who assisted them, faced up
to 14 years in prison.4 As a result of these restrictions, approximately 4000
women traveled from Ireland to other jurisdictions to have abortions every
year.5 Another 1500 took abortion pills (illegally) at home.6 An unknown
number of women maintained unwanted pregnancies. But in May 2018, the
people's vote provided a mandate to repeal the 8th amendment and end its
punitive impacts on women. Followed by the Irish President’s signing of the
1 In this dissertation, “Ireland” refers to the Republic of Ireland in contrast to the geographical naming of the
island.
2 GOV’T OF IR., Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government Referendum Results 1937-2019,
https://electionsireland.org/results/referendum/refresult.cfm?ref=201836R.
3 Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 40.3.3; Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013, §§7–9 (Act No.
35/2013) (Ir.) [hereinafter, PLDPA].
4 PLDPA, id. at §22(2).
5 The Irish Family Planning Association estimates that from 1980 to 2017, at least 173,308 women traveled from
the Republic of Ireland to the UK for abortions, Irish Family Planning Association, Abortion in Ireland: Statistics,
IRISH FAMILY PLANNING ASSOCIATION www. ifpa/Hot-Topics/Abortion/Statistics. These estimates do not
include women from Ireland who traveled to other countries, for example, the Netherlands or Spain.
6 See, Abigail A. Aiken, Experiences and characteristics of women seeking and completing at-home medical termination of pregnancy
through online telemedicine in Ireland and Northern Ireland: a population-based analysis, 124 (8) AN INT. J. OF OBSTETRICS
AND GYNECOLOGY, 1208 (2016) [hereinafter, Aiken, Online Telemedicine).
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Abortion Referendum Bill,7 The repeal enabled the Oireachtas (parliament)
to legalize abortion, and per its pre-referendum pledge to the public, the
Oireachtas enacted a model permitting abortion, without restriction as to
reason, up to 12 weeks into pregnancy, with a 72-hour waiting period.8
Between 12 and 24 weeks, the model legalizes abortion in three situations:
where the pregnancy is non-viable when it risks a woman's life or where it
seriously endangers her health. After 24 weeks, abortion is legal only in cases
of "fatal fetal abnormality."9 10
Amongst the crowds of women and men celebrating the Repeal in Dublin
Castle, international reporters wondered how the island that had long been
considered Europe's conservative (and Catholic) outpost could have endorsed
such a drastic change for reproductive rights. Nascent editorials, radio shows,
and podcasts attempted to provide a definitive answer to the question "how
the Yes vote was won," almost all providing a different rejoinder. To be fair,
many factors influenced abortion law reform in Ireland: the diminished
authority of the Catholic Church; increased public attention to the tragic
stories of women denied life-saving abortions and women forced to carry nonviable pregnancies to term; the election of a younger and more diverse
parliament; recognition that increasing numbers of Irish women were taking
abortion pills in their own homes; international condemnation; a high youth
voter turnout; and a poorly organized 'Vote No' campaign. Critically, the
singular force that brought these elements together to deliver Repeal was the
Irish abortion rights movement.
The repeal of the 8th amendment resulted from more than three decades
of work by Irish pro-choice groups, most of which was carried out in a social
and political environment that was deeply hostile to abortion rights. In 2018,
pro-choice activists carried the 'Yes' vote high on the shoulders of a majority
across the entire country — every constituency but one voted for reform. But
for those who had long battled against the 8th amendment, the public scenes
of joy following the referendum results were a far cry from the animosity
directed towards pro-choice activism in years prior. For decades, the State
dismissed their advocacy at every turn — in the courts, the legislative
chamber, the voting booth, and the streets. The Catholic Church publicly
denounced pro-choice activists. Women who had abortions (usually abroad)
stayed silent in fear of enmity.11 And even when the Church’s moral
7 President Higgins signed the 36th Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2018 on December 20, 2018. His
signature officially changed the Constitution.
8 The Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy Act) 2018 (Act No. 31/2018), [hereinafter, Abortion Act
2018].
9 The dissertation uses the term 'fatal fetal anomaly' to refer to pregnancies that suffer from fatal conditions. Such
pregnancies are highly unlikely to survive to term or have a very short post-birth life. It is not an exact medical
term.
10Abortion Act 2018, supra note 8 at §10-11.
11 The shame surrounding abortion in Ireland, and the impact of that shame on women, played a fundamental
part in the Irish abortion story. See infra Chapter 3 at 165-170. See also Christine Zampas, Ireland: She is Not a
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monopoly dramatically declined in the late 1990s and 2000s, campaigners for
abortion rights struggled against entrenched social stigma and unwavering
political inaction.
Following two decades of defending against anti-choice attempts to enact
even more abortion restrictions, in the early 2000s, pro-choice campaigners
began planning a proactive challenge to the 8th amendment. Unable to get a
proper hearing in the Irish legal system, they looked beyond Irish shores and
took their claims to the European Court of Human Rights.12 While their
litigation was largely unsuccessful in securing abortion rights in Ireland, their
efforts in Strasbourg gave their campaign political and legal traction.13 And
as activists challenged the State on the international stage, human rights
advocacy also empowered and legitimized the movement at home.
Strengthening the force of their demands and generating pressure for
liberalization both inside and outside the country, international human rights
advocacy elicited government concessions, increased mobilization, and
bolstered the possibility of success.14
Notwithstanding its role as a lever for change, international human rights
advocacy for abortion had some notable limits. From a pro-choice
perspective, the scope of international human rights protection for abortion
is lacking. The law has yet to affirm the right of a woman to choose abortion;
instead, it requires states to decriminalize abortion and legalize abortion in
cases where a pregnancy risks a woman's life or health, if a pregnancy is a
result of rape, or in situations where the fetus has a fatal anomaly.15 To be
sure, legalizing abortion in such circumstances would have been an
improvement on Ireland's total ban, but by the time the movement had
gained enough legitimacy amongst national actors to secure a referendum for
repeal of the 8th amendment, international human rights law — and its
limited recognition of abortion rights — ran short as a resource. Offering
much narrower protections for abortion rights than the guarantee of "free,
safe and legal abortion for all" sought by the movement, human rights lost
much of its liberating power.
This dissertation interrogates international human rights law's limits on
abortion rights from a feminist perspective. From a women's rights
perspective, the law's protection gap — the lack of recognition for abortion
access as an affirmative, unqualified right — is a problem in and of itself. And
from a feminist perspective, the gap is also indicative of a structural flaw in
Criminal: The Impact of Ireland's Abortion Law, AMNESTY INT., (June 9, 2015),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur29/1597/2015/en/ [hereinafter, Zampas, She is Not a Criminal].
12 A, B & C v. Ireland, 53 Eur. HR Rep. 13 (2011) [hereinafter, A, B & C v. Ireland] For discussion of this
litigation, see infra note 221 and accompanying text.
13 See infra Chapter 2, Human Rights in Action.
14 Id.
15 Id.
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international law. This dissertation argues that the law is, for the most part,
gender-blind and, as such, is ill-equipped to deal with the inequalities
represented in, and engendered by, abortion restrictions. Exploring how the
law fails to address the role of gender in both the purpose and effects of
abortion restrictions, this dissertation critiques the doctrine's inattention to
the biases underpinning abortion-restrictive regulation and the subordinating
harms such laws inflict on women.16 And by masking the ways that antiabortion regulations institutionalize gender hierarchy, international human
rights law runs the risk of sanctioning a power structure that disadvantages
women.
Feminist scholars have long claimed the abortion right as de rigeur for
gender equality. Some scholars contend that abortion restrictions constitute
de jure discrimination against women because there exist no impediments to
men seeking and obtaining any required medical intervention to protect their
lives, health, and quality of life, i.e., women's rights are abridged in a way that
men's are not.17 Another version of this argument is that denying abortion
involves the bodily co-optation of women for “the use and control of others”
in a world where law and policy do not make similar demands of men’s
bodies.18 Others contend that such laws are based on traditional assumptions
about the "proper roles" that men and women should play in society — that
women are responsible for children and the home while men's duties lie in
the world of work and politics.19 Enforcing these stereotypes through law
engenders many equality concerns. First, mandating that women become
mothers irrespective of their individual desires negates women's autonomy, a
right necessary for women's recognition as equal agents in society.20 Second,
some feminists argue that by coercing women into motherhood — a social
role that limits women’s ability to participate as equals in the public sphere
— abortion restrictive regulation constrains women’s ability, as a class, to gain
economic, political, and social power on an equal basis with men.21 Under
See infra Chapter 3.
See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy),
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29-44 (1992). The author acknowledges that abortion restrictions can significantly impact
men who are transgender and non-binary persons. But as the dissertation will demonstrate, abortion restrictions
are animated by and perpetuate gender hierarchy between women and men. It is necessary for an equality
theory on abortion to address the social category of women rather than a non-gendered personal form. The
author hopes that just as Catharine MacKinnon's theory of sexual assault is of use to gender-diverse persons, the
gender theory of abortion rights in this dissertation addresses the harms suffered by gender identity minorities
who cannot realize their reproductive freedom.
18 See, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971); Andrew Koppleman,
Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 480 (1984).
19 See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992) [hereinafter Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body]. Reva Siegel, Equality and
Choice: Sex Equality Perspectives on Reproductive Rights in the Work of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 25 COLUM. J. OF GENDER &
L. 63 (2013); For an in-depth discussion, see infra Chapter 3.
20 See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 409, 417–18 (2009) [hereinafter Sanger, Decisional Dignity]
21 See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 20.
16
17
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this view, anti-abortion laws impair women's equality not only because they
subject women to a prescriptive role but also because the particular role in
question—motherhood — comes with high costs to women's personal,
educational, economic, and political lives. Such impacts are often heightened,
depending on the context, for women of color, migrant women, and women
in lower socio-economic circumstances.22 The theory asserts that the
cumulative ramifications of these associated with motherhood costs ensure
that women — as a class — cannot gain the power and authority necessary
to upend gendered inequalities.23
Notably, the social and legal history of abortion law in Ireland reflects
much of this theory in practice. A gendered ideology drove the 8th
amendment with women's role as mothers at its apex.24 For most of the 20th
century, establishing Ireland's status as a pious, patriarchal State required
Irish women to adhere to strict rules about their sexuality and roles.25 Deeply
entrenched in law and policy, the status quo rarely faced challenges. As such,
when women secured modest gains on contraception access in the late
1970s26 The backlash was swift. Led by anti-choice politicians, segments of
the Catholic hierarchy, and prominent members of the medical
establishment, conservative forces mobilized to insert the 8th amendment into
the Irish Constitution as a way to reassert women's obligation to bear and
rear children.27 To prevent what they saw as any further liberal
encroachments on the “traditional order” that defined their aspirations for
the nation, the 8th amendment and its recognition that the “unborn’s” life was
equal to that of the “mother” placed a constitutional barrier in the way of
women’s status as equal citizens.
Notwithstanding the many parallels, the Irish abortion story departs from
the abortion narratives offered by feminist theorists in some critical ways. Irish
women who sought abortions for any reason other than their imminent death
could not have one in Ireland. But they could legally travel abroad to have
one. As such, Irish abortion restrictions did not, in the majority, subject
women to the harms of forced motherhood (though this indeed happened in
some cases) just described.28 Rather, the law communicated to all women that
22 See, e.g., Risa Kaufman State ERAs in the New Era: Securing Poor Women’s Equality by Eliminating Reproductive-Based
Discrimination, 24 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ 190 (2001). The dissertation examines the discriminatory intersectional
impacts of restrictive abortion laws in Chapter 3. See infra Chapter 3, pp 164-166.
23 Reva Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56
EMORY L.J. 815, 823-24 (2007) [hereinafter Reva Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments]. See also, Neil Siegel, The New
Textualism, Progressive Constitutionalism, and Abortion Rights, 25 (1) YALE JOUR. OF LAW & THE HUMANITIES, 55
(2013).
24 See infra Chapter 3 pp 150.
25 See generally, LISA SMYTH, ABORTION AND NATION: THE POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION IN CONTEMPORARY
IRELAND (2005); Siobhan Mullally, Gendered Citizenship: Debating Reproductive Rights in Ireland 27(1) H RTS. Q., 78
(2005).
26 McGee v. Att’y Gen., [1974] IR 284 (Ir.) [hereinafter, McGee]. See also infra note 61 and accompanying text.
27 See infra Chapter 3 at p.150.
28 See supra note 20-23 and accompanying text.
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the nation did not respect their autonomy and that they needed to leave if
they wished to assert it; in addition to rejecting women's autonomy, forcing
women abroad inflicted burdens of stigma and shame on thousands of
women. 29 Generating a climate of fear and recrimination, the law drove
women to conceal their actions and be silent about their abortions and their
defiance of Irish laws. Censoring a striking legacy of women's resistance to the
gendered State, the 8th amendment — and the punishing stigma it
engendered — redoubled its efforts to suppress women’s agency.30
In this way, the efforts of the Irish abortion rights movement can be seen
as a struggle for the recognition of women's equality. They sought to "remove
the shackles of abortion restrictions."31 And say goodbye to an Ireland that
brutally suppressed women. Repeal was less about whether abortions should
be legally procurable in Ireland — with more than twelve Irish women having
abortions every day, abortion was already very much an ingrained part of
Irish reality — and more about delivering upon years of campaigning for a
society of equals. The thousands who cried in Dublin Castle following the
referendum results did so in delight, relief, and (dis)belief that such a society
was in sight.32
Using the story of abortion law in Ireland as a contextual framework for
its arguments, this dissertation studies the law and practice of human rights
on abortion. An in-depth study of how Irish pro-choice campaigners used (or
did not use) international human rights over the lifetime of the 8th amendment
(1983 - 2018) offers timely insights for scholars, advocates, and policymakers
seeking to understand the reach and influence of international human rights
standards on abortion. This case study provides insights into the conditions
under which the power of international human rights advocacy is amplified
or stifled.
Concluding that international human rights law’s equivocal recognition
of abortion rights inhibited its utility as an emancipatory tool for abortion
rights, this dissertation proceeds to its primary inquiry: an examination of the
gendered limits of human rights law on abortion. Applying a feminist lens to
current human rights law doctrine on abortion, the dissertation suggests that
despite significant international law developments on abortion rights in the
past 20 years, the relative invisibility of gender analysis is a critical limit on
the law's transformative potential. The doctrine avoids scrutinizing the
gender inequalities that animate abortion restrictions and provides an
The dissertation develops this theory in Chapter 3.
Id.
31 Maeve Taylor et al., The Irish Journey: Removing the shackles of abortion restrictions in Ireland 62 BEST PRACT RES
CLIN OBSTET GYNAECOL 36 (2020).
32 See The Irish Times view on the referendum: This belongs to the women of Ireland, IR. TIMES (May 27, 2018),
https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/editorial/the-irish-times-view-on-the-referendum-this-belongs-to-thewomen-of-ireland-1.3510518?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pw-origin=.
29
30
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incomplete account of the gendered effects of abortion restrictions. Moreover,
in the cases where human rights law affirms women's abortion rights, this
affirmation appears to depend on a woman's ability to fit the gendered mold
of a powerless victim.
To foreground this dissertation's case study, Chapter 1 chronologizes the
legal and political developments that shaped Irish abortion law. Beginning
with the colonial import from Britain in 1856, the chapter documents both
pro and anti-choice efforts to define abortion in Irish law right up to the postrepeal legal framework. Outlining the many political battles, the many
constitutional referendums and a limited number of cases involving women
who suffered under the 8th, and litigation and advocacy campaigns, the
chapter describes the development of Irish abortion law, including its political
and organizational dynamics.
Chapter 2 delves into these dynamics, focusing on the role of international
human rights law in the Irish abortion law reform movement. The chapter
first places abortion within the context of international human rights law by
analyzing the origins and doctrinal development of international law
standards on abortion. Following this analysis, the chapter maps and critically
positions the use of international human rights advocacy over the 35-year
lifespan of the 8th amendment. Adopting a longer view of Repeal than the
referendum campaign, this analysis does not try to explain how "the Yes vote
was won." Nor does it set out to prove that international human rights law
was dispositive in delivering the referendum result. The study establishes the
points at which human rights advocacy affected the movement and its goals
— both transformative and ambivalent.
Chapter 3 contains the critique of international human rights law as
gender-blind. The chapter first places abortion rights within feminist thought
on the relationship between abortion rights and gender equality. To
concretize and expand this line of feminist theory, the dissertation revisits the
political and social history of abortion law in Ireland. Probing the roots of the
8th amendment and its considerable impacts on the lives of Irish women, the
chapter exposes the gender stereotypes that undergirded the Irish law and the
inequalities engendered. The concrete and status-based harms to women's
autonomy are identified as critical subordinating impacts, while Ireland's
censorship of women's resistive agency is highlighted as a previously
unexplored feminist critique of abortion regulation. Building on this analysis
and feminist critiques of international law, the dissertation examines the
distinct ways that human rights law misses the gendered dynamics of abortion
rights. First, the critique describes the law's overly deferential approach to
national authorities in abortion cases and shows how it routinely leaves
harmful abortion restrictions unscathed. Second, acknowledging the inroads
that the doctrine has made in identifying many of the egregious impacts of
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abortion restrictions on women, the critique asserts that the harms recognized
to date are overly narrow - leaving fundamental equality concerns
unaddressed, human rights law appears blind to the gender subordination
perpetuated by abortion restrictions. Third, the critique establishes that the
law trades in narratives about women and abortion that appear to condition
women’s recognition as rightsholders on their powerlessness. Including a
brief discussion of how a gendered approach could be incorporated into
human rights law in practice, the chapter suggests that rather than being
overly radical, linking the abortion right with gender equality may have
strategic as well as theoretical benefits.
The dissertation attempts to conclude by balancing the hopeful and
critical lessons about human rights. Reminding the reader international
human rights law helped propel Irish abortion law reform, the conclusion
reiterates the empowering legitimizing, and mobilizing influences of human
rights for reproductive rights movements. The dissertation suggests that this
makes it all the more important for human rights law to remedy its gendered
discords. Additionally, the author forewarns that a gendered human rightsbased approach to abortion may prove especially important amidst the
ascendency of transnational anti-gender equality politics. As movements
seeking to roll back protections for women and LGBT+ persons proliferate,
international human rights law needs to confront rather than conceal the
politics of gender.
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METHODOLOGY
To explore international human rights law and practice on abortion, this
dissertation combines several scholarly approaches: doctrinal analysis,
historical research, feminist legal methods, and an assessment of "law-inaction."33
A case study of the law, politics, and impacts of Ireland's abortion law
concretizes the dissertation's analysis of international human rights and law
and practice. To anchor the dissertation’s reliance on the Irish abortion story,
Chapter 1 uses legal and historical research — drawing from secondary
literature, parliamentary debates (dating back to the formation of the State),
judicial decisions, newspapers, and discussions with historians — to provide
the necessary contextual background on abortion law and politics in Ireland.
Chapter 2 distills international human rights law standards on abortion
from an in-depth analysis of international and regional human rights treaties
and the jurisprudence emanating from the human rights monitoring
mechanisms established under these treaties, namely regional courts and UN
Treaty Monitoring Bodies.34 This "jurisprudence" consists of case law and
interpretive guidance from UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies in the form of
"General Comments" or "Recommendations," which provide detailed
interpretation of specific treaty provisions and "concluding observations" on
States' compliance with the Treaty in question. Included in the assessment of
the development of the normative standards on abortion are relevant
international consensus documents and certain reports from UN Special
Procedures. When analyzing certain case-law and the claims of the parties,35
The author also used insight from her experience working as a human rights
attaché with the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs from 2014-2015.
Similarly, in-person experience informed her assessment of the CEDAW
Committee's application of human rights law standards. Monitoring the
CEDAW's review of Ireland in 2017 in Geneva and "off-the-record"
discussions with CEDAW Committee members helped the author clarify (and
later conceptualize) the Committee's approach to abortion.
Chapter 2 of the dissertation goes beyond looking at the content of
international norms to focus on how activists used the norms in different
spaces and contributed to forming the law. By studying archival campaign
materials, judicial opinions, submissions to UN Treaty monitoring bodies,

Rebecca L. Sandefur, When Is Law in Action? 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 59 (2015)
Treaty Monitoring Bodies are established under most UN human rights treaties to monitor State compliance
with their treaty obligations.
35 Mellet v. Ireland, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 (2016) [hereinafter Mellet v. Ireland] and Whelan v
Ireland, UN Doc CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014 (2017) [hereinafter Whelan v. Ireland]
33
34
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over 42 interviews with advocates,36 newspapers and other media sources, the
case study identifies who used human rights, when, where, and why.
Providing a detailed qualitative and quantitative examination of the use of
international human rights advocacy by pro-choice advocates during the 35year lifespan of the 8th amendment, this "Human Rights Law in Action" study
identifies the relative impacts of human rights strategies in the Irish context,
both radical and moderate. The author situates this analysis within
international relations and international law debates about the legitimacy and
effectiveness of human rights law, institutions, and movements.37 as well as
social movement theories more broadly. The contextualized multidisciplinary study contributes to these bodies of literature, particularly
theories that emphasize social movements and activists as the entrepreneurs
of human rights change.
Chapter 3's multilayered critique of human rights law on abortion relies
on a number of feminist methods and insights. The chapter used feminist legal
theory —primarily anti-stereotyping theory and anti-subordination theory —
to explain why abortion restrictions are fundamentally a matter of gender
inequality. Similar theoretical approaches inform the chapter's critique of
international human rights jurisprudence, which also draws on long-standing
"feminist international law critiques."38 And while the dissertation devotes
little attention to Catharine MacKinnon's insights on abortion rights, her
methods — uncovering the gender of ostensibly neutral processes and
demonstrating how that purported neutrality legitimates inequality39 — are
an edifice for much of this dissertation.

36 The author interviewed individuals from leading non-governmental organizations, members of grassroots
organizations, representatives of anti-choice organizations, lawyers involved in different cases, journalists,
politicians who publicly advocated for abortion rights, government officials, and service providers, including
those who helped women travel abroad or distributed the abortion pill. These interviews were in-person in the
following locations: Dublin, Ireland, in June - July 2016 and June 2018; Belfast, Ireland in May 2016; Geneva,
Switzerland in March 2017; and New York, USA in July 2018. Some advocates were interviewed twice, in JuneJuly 2016, and following the referendum result.
37 See infra Chapter 2.
38 See infra Chapter 3.
39 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE [hereinafter CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON]; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8
SIGNS 635 (1983) [hereinafter MacKinnon, SIGNS 1I].
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CHAPTER 1: THE IRISH ABORTION STORY: LEGAL AND POLITICAL
TIMELINE

As in many nations that Britain once colonized, criminal prohibition on
abortion in Ireland dated back to the British Offences Against the Person Act
1861. The Act codified a common law criminalization of abortion40 and
made it a criminal offense — punishable by life imprisonment —for a woman
to procure her "own miscarriage."41 Persons who assisted a woman seeking
an abortion could also be convicted of a felony.42 Though Ireland became a
“free state” in 1922, the 1861 British act was carried over and remained on
Irish statute books.43 In 1983, the Irish people voted to enshrine in the
Constitution a right to life for the fetus, which held equivalence with the right
to life of the pregnant woman (the 8th amendment). In 2013, the Oireachtas
(the Irish legislature) legislated on abortion for the first time, not to change
the law, but to clarify that in cases where a pregnant woman's life was at risk,
the criminality of abortion subsided.44 Five years later, in May 2018, the Irish
people voted by referendum to remove the 8th amendment and replace it
with a text permitting the Oireachtas to legislate for liberal abortion access in
Ireland.45 In January 2019, a law to permit abortion access without restriction
as to reason up to the 12th week of pregnancy came into force in Ireland.46
This chapter charts the events that culminated in such a significant reform.

40 At common law, abortion of the “quickened fetus” was considered a “heinous misdemeanor.” WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES, 129-130 (4th ed. 1771). This misdemeanor became a felony in 1803 under Lord
Ellenborough's Act 1803. See also SPUC v. Open Door [1988] IR 593, 597 (H.Ct.) (Ir.).
41 §58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 provided that: "Every woman, being with child, who, with
intent to procure her miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious thing or shall
unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, and whosoever, with intent to
procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she be or not be with child, shall unlawfully administer to her or
cause to be taken by her any poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other
means whatsoever with the like intent, shall be guilty of a felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable to be
kept in penal servitude for life."
42 Under § 59, assisting with the procurement of abortion was also criminal. The move to criminalize abortion in
the UK was in part due to the efforts of the (male-dominated) medical profession to control reproductive
medicine. See generally COMPLAINTS AND DISORDERS: THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF SICKNESS (Barbara Ehrenreich
eds., 1974).
43 Before 1922, Ireland was part of the United Kingdom, which governed the territory by direct rule. In 1921,
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland partitioned the island into two selfgoverning polities: Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland. Six counties in the north remained part of the United
Kingdom while the other 26 counties on the island gained limited independence, becoming the Irish Free State.
In 1949, the Free State became the Republic of Ireland.
44 PLDPA supra note 3. This Act reaffirmed abortion as an illegal practice in Ireland and retained the
punishment of a maximum of 14 years in imprisonment for procuring one in Ireland. The Act sets out specific
incidents where termination was legal under the 'mother's life-at-risk' exemption.
45 The Thirty-sixth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2018 (Act No. C36/2018) (Ir.) stated that “provision
may be made by law for the regulation of termination of pregnancy.”
46 Abortion Act 2018, supra note 8.
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A. Law and Abortion in the Irish Free State 1922-1983
As in all jurisdictions where abortion is restricted, women in Ireland with
unwanted pregnancies tried to end them.47 In a State that also banned the
import and sale of contraceptives until 1979, at which point it became legal
only for married women,48 the number of unplanned pregnancies was likely
very high. For many Irish women, this prohibitive regime around family
planning meant a reproductive lifetime of becoming pregnant year on year,
giving birth to a child after child once married.49 Others, however, challenged
this fate, and while the data is limited, there exists a hushed history of illegal
abortion, along with infanticide, birth concealment, and self-harm when
pregnant.50 For those who aborted their pregnancies, most did so without
ever coming into contact with authorities by relying on an underground
network of ‘handywomen’—self-trained abortion providers— or taking pills
and potions at home.51 Several abortion providers, however, faced criminal
sanction; records from 1922 to 1968 indicate a small flow of prosecutions
under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 for those who assisted with
or carried out abortions.52 One provider was even sentenced to death when
a woman died after receiving an abortion from her.53
Legal developments in mid-century Britain gradually helped provide a
safer and legal alternative for women seeking to end their pregnancies. In
1939, Rex v. Bourne provided a defense for assisting with or carrying out
abortion under the Offences Against the Person Act, where the Act was done
"in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother."54 The
Court distinguished between "unlawful abortion" as prohibited by sections 58
47 Countries with stricter abortion laws have higher abortion rates than countries with liberal laws. The abortion
rate is 37 per 1,000 women in countries that prohibit abortion altogether or allow it only to save a woman's life
and 34 per 1,000 in countries that allow abortion without restriction as to the reason. See, Guttmacher Institute,
Unintended Pregnancy, and Abortion Worldwide (2020) https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/induced-abortionworldwide.
48 Irish Statute Book: Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1935 (Pub. Stat. No. 6/1935) § 17) 17(1) provided that “It
shall not be lawful for any person to sell, or expose, offer, advertise, or keep for sale or to import or attempt to
import into Saorstat Eireann for sale, any contraceptive." Historian Sandra McAvoy contends that this law was a
response by the Free State to purported contraception access and suspected abortifacient use. See Sandra
McAvoy, From Anti-Amendment Campaigns to Demanding Reproductive Justice: The Changing Landscape of Abortion Rights
Activism in Ireland, 1983–2008 in JENNIFER SCHWEPPE, THE UNBORN CHILD, ARTICLE 40.3.3 AND ABORTION
IN IRELAND 15-27. [hereinafter, Sandra McAvoy]
49 CIARA MEEHAN, A JUST SOCIETY FOR IRELAND? 1964-1987, 167 (2013) (Kindle Reader) [hereinafter, CIARA
MEEHAN].
50 See, e.g., Pauline Conroy, “Dúirt bean liom," 'A woman told me,' Punishing the productive and the reproductive in, THE
ABORTION PAPERS, VOLUME 2 (Aideen Quility ed., 2015) 34, 40 (describing how the State’s prohibition on
abortion and contraception led to women adopting other means of “fertility control” including Magdalene
laundries for women pregnant with an illegitimate child, infanticide, birth concealment, and illegal abortion).
51 See, e.g., Cara Delay, Pills, Potions, and Purgatives: Women and Abortion Methods in Ireland, 1900-1950 WOMEN’S
HIST. REV. (2018), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09612025.2018.1493138.
52 PAULINE JACKSON, THE DEADLY SOLUTION TO AN IRISH PROBLEM: BACKSTREET ABORTION (1983) 2
(suggesting that there were 58 illegal abortion cases investigated or tried in Ireland between 1926 and 1974).
53 Id.
54 I939 1 KB 687, 694.
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and 59 of the Act and the "lawful abortion" in the Bourne case where the
defendant surgeon gave an abortion to a 14-year-old victim of rape.55 The
Court noted that an abortion to end a pregnancy that would otherwise “make
the woman a physical or mental wreck” could also be interpreted as lifesaving.56
Despite involving the same abortion legislation that governed Ireland,
Bourne was not a binding precedent in Ireland. As a separate legal system, the
decision of the English Court had no direct influence on Irish law.57 Travel
to the UK for abortion rose following Bourne, but border restrictions travel
during WWII and the relatively narrow parameters of the criminal exemption
limited abortion travel.58 However, the next shift in British abortion law had
a dramatic impact on abortion travel. The Abortion Act of 1967, which
became law on April 27, 1968, in parts of Britain59 provided that:
(1) . . . [A] person shall not be guilty of an offense under the law
relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered
medical practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the
opinion, formed in good faith(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life
of the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental health
of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater
than if the pregnancy were terminated;
or (b) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born, it would
suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously
handicapped.60
Born from a combination of public health concerns about congenital
disabilities caused by thalidomide.61, maternal deaths from unsafe abortion,
Id. at 695.
Id. at 696.
57 See SPUC v Grogan (no. 5) [1998] 4 IR 343, 381-382, (where McNaughten J stated the prevailing legal view
was that "the Bourne approach could not have been adopted in this country consistent with the Constitution
prior to the 8th Amendment." See also Hamilton CJ in X v Att’y Gen., [1992] 1 IR.
58See, e.g., Pauline Jackson, Trials and Tribulations, 18(1) CANADIAN J. OF IRISH STUD., WOMEN AND IRISH POL.
112, 113-114 (1992) (arguing that Irish women traveled to mainland Britain to seek abortions before the 1967
Act, but travel was expensive and complicated and during the Second World War it severely restricted. From
1939 to 1946, journies to the UK required a police-issued travel permit which expanded the market for illegal
abortion on Irish soil.
59 The Act was not extended to Northern Ireland.
60 Abortion Act 1967 §1, 87 HALS. STAT http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1967/87/section/1/enacted.
61 Thalidomide was a medication widely prescribed for pregnant women in the United Kingdom to ease
morning sickness but was later discovered to cause severe impairments in fetal development. See generally, Kate
Gleeson, Persuading Parliament: Abortion Law Reform in the UK, 22(2) AUSTRALASIAN PARLIAMENTARY REV. 23, 24,
55
56
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and a growing abortion rights movement,62 the Act dramatically expanded
legal abortion access in Britain by expanding the exemptions to the
criminalization of abortion under the Offences Against the Person Act. Under
the Abortion Act, which remains in place today, a person is not guilty of a
crime if the abortion is carried out on licensed premises by a registered
medical practitioner63 (i) following a good faith opinion that the pregnancy
could be injurious to the physical or mental health of the woman or her
family, or (ii) up to twenty-four weeks in the case of a severely handicapped
fetus.64 The legislation had no legal effect in Ireland (which was, by this point,
a Republic)65 but thousands of Irish women felt its impact for decades to
come.66 Women with money to pay for travel and the procedure in the UK
could now legally end unwanted pregnancies across the Irish Sea. The
resulting “abortion trail” 67 — traveled by thousands of Irish women — lasted
for over 50 years.
B. Constitutional Amendment (1983)
Britain was not alone in liberalizing its abortion law in this era (the late
'60s and '70s); the United States legalized abortion in 1973, France in 1975,
Sweden in 1974, Germany in 1976, Italy in 1978, the Netherlands in 1981.
Ireland, however, moved in the opposite direction. In 1983, it became the
first country in the world to enshrine in its Constitution a right to life for the
"unborn." Inserted via constitutional amendment, the right to life of the
"unborn" held equivalence to the right to life of the pregnant woman, reading
as follows:
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate
that right.68
A formidable civil society movement orchestrated the amendment's
passage. Officially launched in April 1981, the Pro-Life Amendment
30, 31 (2007).
62 See, e.g., DAVID MARSH, ABORTION POLITICS (1981).
63 There have been recent developments on this. See, e.g., BBC News, Judge Throws Out Challenge to Scots Abortion Pill
Move, BBC (August 15, 2018), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-45196213.
64 SALLY SHELDON, BEYOND CONTROL: MEDICAL POWER AND ABORTION CONTROL (1997).
65 Ireland became a republic in 1937. See supra note 37.
66 See, e.g., Brian Girvan, Social Change and Moral Politics: the Irish Constitutional Referendum 1983, 34 (1) POL. STUD.
61 (1986).
67 See ANN ROSSITER, IRELAND’S HIDDEN DIASPORA: THE ABORTION TRAIL AND THE MAKING OF A
LONDON-IRISH UNDERGROUND, 1980-2000 (2009).
68 Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 40.3.3.
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Campaign (PLAC) comprised a myriad of Catholic and other pro-life groups;
it had the support of the Irish Medical Association, the majority of elected
politicians, and the Catholic Church hierarchy.69 PLAC’s official argument
was that a “pro-life” constitutional amendment was necessary to prevent
judicial development of a constitutional right to abortion as had happened in
the United States in Roe v. Wade.70 This fear of judicial activism seemingly
arose following the 1974 Irish case of McGee v AG.71 where the Court inferred
a constitutional right to contraception for married couples from an
unenumerated constitutional right to marital privacy.72 Without decisive legal
action, the PLAC argued, the Irish Supreme Court could do what the US
Supreme Court had done in Roe and extend the holding in McGee to infer a
right to abortion.73
In reality, the specter of an extension of the law to define a right to
abortion following McGee seemed unlikely. The Irish Supreme Court had
been explicit in McGee v AG, albeit obiter dicta, that the right to contraception
did not extend to limiting family size by abortion.74 As to the argument that
potential judicial activism in Ireland had to be blocked, it is not clear whom
69 See generally TOM HESKETH, THE SECOND PARTITIONING OF IRELAND: THE ABORTION REFERENDUM OF
1983 (1990) (describing the history and goals of PLAC); see also EMILY O' REILLY, MASTERMINDS OF THE
RIGHT; Rosanna Cooney, Story of the 8th: How Right-Wing Catholic Groups Staged a Remarkable Political Coup, JOE.IE,
https://www.joe.ie/life-style/story-of-the-8th-how-right-wing-catholic-groups-staged-a-remarkable-politicalcoup-614595. See also, Fintan O’Toole, Why Ireland Became the Only Country in the World to Have a Constitutional Ban on
Abortion, IR. TIMES, (August 26, 2014), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/why-ireland-became-the-onlycountry-in-the-democratic-world-to-have-a-constitutional-ban-on-abortion-1.1907610.
70 410 US 113 (1973).
71 McGee, supra note 25. The importation of contraceptives had been illegal since 1935. Mrs. Mary McGee was
twenty-seven years old when she gave birth to her third and fourth children, twin daughters in November of
1970. Following the birth, McGee's doctor advised her that another pregnancy could endanger her life because
her latest pregnancies had been "complicated by serious attacks of cerebral thrombosis." Mrs. McGee attempted
to follow her doctor's orders by ordering contraceptive jelly from the United Kingdom to stop her from
conceiving again. However, customs officials, citing the 1935 statute, seized McGee's contraceptives when they
arrived in Ireland, which prompted her to challenge the restrictive law. On December 19, 1973, the Irish
Supreme Court ruled that the McGee's right to privacy within their marriage trumped legal prohibitions on
importing contraceptives. It was 1979 before a Health (Family Planning) Act enabled married couples to request
contraceptives, including condoms, on prescription – though provision was made for doctors to refuse to provide
this service on conscientious grounds. It was 1993 before condoms became freely available, without an age limit,
from commercial outlets and vending machines. See Sandra McEvoy, The Catholic Church and Fertility Control in
Ireland: the Making of a Dystopian Regime, in THE ABORTION PAPERS: VOLUME 2, 49 (Aideen Quility ed., 2015).
[hereinafter, Sandra McEvoy, The Catholic Church and Fertility Control in Ireland].
72 [1974] IR 284-85; Constitution of Ireland art. 40.3.1, "The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far as
practicable, by its law to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen." Article 41.1.1 states, "The state
recognizes the family as the natural, primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution
possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law."
73 William Binchy, Marital Privacy and Family Law: A Reply to Mr. O'Reilly, 66 IRISH STUD. (1977) 264, 333; William
Binchy, The need for a Constitutional Amendment in ABORTION AND LAW: DOCTRINE AND LIFE, (AUSTIN FLANNERY.
EDS. 1983) 116, 121 (William Binchy was the chief legal advisor of PLAC). See also Ursula Barry, Abortion in the
Republic of Ireland, 29 FEMINIST L. REV. 57, 58 (1988).
74 In McGee, Justice Walsh stated that "any action on the part of either the husband and wife or of the State to
limit family sizes by endangering or destroying human life must necessarily not only be an offense against the
common good but also against the guaranteed personal rights of the human life in question." McGee, supra note
13. Nevertheless, the pro-life lobby claimed that “whilst these views expressed by the learned judge are
encouraging they do not in themselves, of course, afford any adequate legal Constitutional protection for the
unborn.” See, The Irish Association Lawyers for The Defence of the Unborn, Newsletter 2 (1983).
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PLAC believed could mount a legal attack that would persuade the judiciary
to liberalize access to abortion in deeply Catholic 1980s Ireland.75 There was
no fervent national movement to legalize abortion at the time that needed to
be defended against.76 Though, in February 1980, Ireland had its first-ever
"Women's Right to Choose" public meeting in Trinity College Dublin,77
students mostly attended it, and the informal organization was the only group
in the country speaking out in favor of abortion rights.78 Additionally, its
resources were predominantly spent establishing and maintaining the Irish
Pregnancy Counselling Centre to provide counseling services to pregnant
women and abortion referrals to British clinics when requested.79 The Well
Woman Centre, another non-directive counseling center, was the only other
organization concerned with abortion, and the Centre’s focus was on referrals
to the UK rather than legal mobilization. By contrast, “pro-life” groups
dominated Irish civil society. The most prominent group, the Society for the
Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC), originally an English organization
formed to oppose Britain’s 1967 Abortion Act, held demonstrations up and
down the country, visited classrooms without restriction to display supposed
visuals of abortion procedures, and held hundreds of public meetings.80
SPUC was so well organized and well-resourced that it ultimately provided
PLAC with a ready-made network of campaigners in every parish.81
Nor was the legislature a threat. No representative in the Oireachtas had
ever suggested that they favor liberalizing abortion law in Ireland. The
statutory prohibitions of the Offences against the Person Act had been
reaffirmed in Irish law in 197982 and protection for the “unborn child” had
repeatedly been recognized in legislation.83 Legally and politically, the
75 A rich body of scholarship has examined the impact of the Catholic Church on Ireland in the 20th century
and, in particular, on the State's suppression of women. See Caitriona Beaumont, Women, Citizenship and Catholicism
in the Irish Free State, 1922-1948, 6 WOMEN’S HIST. REV. 563 (1997); Yvonne Scannal, The Constitution and the Role
of Women, 111, DE VALERA'S CONSTITUTION AND OURS: THOMAS DAVIS LECTURES (Brian Farrell ed., 1988);
Maebh Harding, “Religion and Family law in Ireland,” 159, The Place of Religion in Family Law: A Comparative
Search (Jane Mair, eds. 2011) 159; NO COUNTRY FOR WOMEN, (RTE 2018).
76 As will be discussed in the next chapter, the Irish women's movement of the 60s and 70s made gains on
contraception access, rights for unmarried mothers, and women's property rights. However, abortion was not a
priority for the many women's campaigns of this time. See, e.g., Pauline Conroy, “Dúirt bean liom… A woman told
me… Punishing the productive and the reproductive” 34 in THE ABORTION PAPERS IRELAND: VOLUME 2, 43 (Aideen
Quility ed., 2015).
77 Rosanna Cooney, Story of the 8th: how right-wing Catholic groups staged a remarkable political coup, JOE. IE,
https://www.joe.ie/life-style/story-of-the-8th-how-right-wing-catholic-groups-staged-a-remarkable-politicalcoup-614595; EMILY O’ REILLY, MASTERMINDS OF THE RIGHT, 56. See generally Sandra McEvoy, supra note 65
at 21-22.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 CIARA MEEHAN, supra note 49. EMILY O'REILLY, MASTERMINDS OF THE RIGHT, 54.
81 Ciara Meehan, id.
82 Health (Family Planning) Act 1979 (Act No. 20/1979), §10.
83 Civil Liability Act 1961, (Act No. 41/1961), §58, (outlining clearly that “for the avoidance of doubt it is hereby
declared that the law relating to wrongs shall apply to an unborn child for his protection in like manner as if the
child were born, provided the child is subsequently born alive.”) See also Brenda Daly, Braxton Hick's or the Birth of a
New Era – Tracing the Development of Ireland's Abortion Laws in Respect of European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence 18
EUR. J. OF HEALTH L. 375, 376 (2011).

22

“unborn” was safe in Ireland.
Some members of the PLAC movement entertained legal possibilities
other than a referendum to prevent abortion access, including criminalizing
women who had abortions abroad, physically preventing women from
leaving the country to have abortions, or prosecuting abortion referral
agencies.84 Such proposals were deemed unworkable or unpalatable; PLAC's
legal adviser conceded that prosecuting women for traveling to England for
abortions or attempts to physically stop women from traveling could provoke
harsh criticism that Irish politicians would likely not be able to withstand.85
Notwithstanding the implausibility of PLAC’s assessment of the need for
a constitutional amendment to prevent the liberalization of abortion law in
Ireland, the group managed to secure a commitment from the leaders of
Ireland’s two main political parties – Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil – for a
constitutional referendum on abortion. Contemporaneous commentators
describe the 1983 referendum campaign as an enraged and divisive battle.86
but securing the initial political agreement to hold a referendum was
surprisingly easy for the PLAC. Instability characterized Irish electoral
politics in the early 1980s – there were three general elections in the 14
months between June 1981 and November 1982 – and the respective party
leaders were eager to appease an influential conservative alliance like
PLAC.87 Additionally, the party leaders did not want to risk being labeled
"baby killers" during a chronic election cycle.88 Writing at the time, a former
Government minister turned political commentator described the decisions
of the two-party leaders as "nothing to do with the right to life of the unborn,
except the right of politicians to political life."89 Both political parties
embraced the PLAC's demand for a constitutional amendment, but the
wording of the amendment itself became a matter of political football between
the two political parties.90 Each respective draft legal text was grounded in
attempts to satisfy the PLAC lobby, engage different religious leaders, and
consolidate political support.91 In November 1982, the outgoing Fianna Fáil
Government published a draft version of the amendment:
84 See, e.g., EMILY O'REILLY, MASTERMINDS OF THE RIGHTS, 61 (1997); John Quinlan, The Right to Life of the
Unborn-An Assessment of the Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution 1984 BYU L. Rev. 371 (1984).
85 William Binchy, Ethical Issues in Reproductive Medicine, A Legal Perspective in ETHICAL ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE
MEDICINE 27(Maurice Reidy ed., 1982).
86 See, e.g., PAULINE CONROY, THE ABORTION PAPERS IRELAND: VOLUME 2 (Aideen Quilty ed., 2015)
(describing “a vile and venomous atmosphere of denunciation and hatred”).
87 See, e.g., 339 No. 10 Dáil Deb. Prionsias de Rossa, (Feb. 9, 1985) (Ir.)
https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1983-02-09/3/.
88 See, e.g., CIARA MEEHAN, Supra note 49 quoting journalist Gene Kerrigan who commented that “FitzGerald
knew that if he didn’t agree to pressure from the Knights of Columbanus-sponsored campaign, he would be in
danger of being daubed a baby murderer while trying to fight an election.”
89 EMILY O'REILLY, MASTERMINDS OF THE RIGHTS, 79 (1997) (quoting Conor Cruise O’Brien).
90 For a detailed account of this, see TOM HESKETH, THE SECOND PARTITIONING OF IRELAND: THE
ABORTION REFERENDUM OF 1983 (1990), Chps VI and VII.
91 Tom Hesketh describes how the government circulated different amendment drafts to various interest groups.
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The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate
that right.
No sooner had the incoming Fine Gael Government leader and
Taoiseach, Garret Fitzgerald, approved the outgoing government's draft than
he began to consider alternative versions to satisfy others within his party.92
His Attorney General conveyed grave concerns about the indeterminacy of
the wording, contending that the amendment could legally prevent doctors
from intervening when a woman's life was at risk or require the Oireachtas
(parliament) to legislate for abortion.93 Others raised the fact that the
amendment provided no definitions for phrases such as the “unborn,”94 “due
regard” or “as far as practicable.” Nor had the drafters provided guidance on
how law, policy, or practice could reconcile the equivalence between the right
to life of the unborn and the right to life of the "mother" in case of a conflict
between the two.95
To address the legal uncertainty, the Taoiseach proposed a new text;
"[n]othing in this Constitution shall be invoked to invalidate, or to deprive of
force or affect any provision of a law on the ground that it prohibits
abortion."96 However, the pro-life lobby and their parliamentary allies
rejected this version. The anti-abortion lobby considered it insufficient to
insert a clause into the Constitution prohibiting the legislature from legalizing
abortion; they sought to affirmatively assert fetal rights and looked to the State
to 'vindicate' those rights.97 No country had ever included fetal rights in its
Constitution, but this radical aspect of PLAC's proposal did not reduce its
influence over the process. The government abandoned their text and
proposed PLAC's favored draft to the Oireachtas as follows:
Protestant churches were among these groups and opposed the amendment, believing that it enforced Catholic
morals in the State's laws. The Church opposed abortion but felt that the Constitution was not an appropriate
place for its regulation. TOM HESKETH, THE SECOND PARTITIONING OF IRELAND: THE ABORTION
REFERENDUM OF 1983, 158 (1990).
92 Id. 141.
93 Statement of Attorney General, Mr. Peter D. Sutherland, S.C., quoted from The Ir. Times, 340 Dáil Deb.
(February 16, 1983) col.473; See also, John A. Quinlan, The Right to Life of the Unborn-An Assessment of the Eighth
Amendment to the Irish Constitution, 1984 BYU L. REV. 371, 389 (1984) [hereinafter, John A. Quinlan, The Right to
Life].
94 Tom Hesketh reveals that even PLAC was worried about the ambiguity of the draft amendment at an earlier
stage. The Irish version of the amendment (which takes precedence over the English version as per Article
25.5.4. of the Constitution) calmed their fears because this version was less ambiguous about the unborn, and
they were satisfied that it could not be interpreted as meaning 'an unborn viable child' but rather the unborn
fetus from conception. TOM HESKETH,163.
95 See, e.g., Memorandum from Peter Sutherland, February 8, 1982, 2012/90/667, DEP’T OF TAOISEACH, NAT’L
ARCHIVES OF IR.
96 341 Dáil Deb. 2225-30 (1983.
97 See, e.g., 341 Dáil Deb. 2225-30 (1983). See also, John A. Quinlan, The Right to Life supra note 93.
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The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate
that right.98
A majority of the Oireachtas voted in its favor and set a date to put the
amendment to a public vote.
Individual public representatives actively campaigned with PLAC, but on
the whole, political parties did not feature strongly in the public referendum
campaign that followed.99 The campaign was fought chiefly between PLAC
and an emergent Anti-Amendment Campaign (AAC). The AAC, established
in mid-1982, was a loose coalition of (i) pro-choice groups including feminists,
trade unions, and some liberal politicians; and (ii) a small cohort of more
conservative politicians, a small number of lawyers and medics, and most
non-Catholic religious leaders in the country.100 The liberal faction of the
AAC ceded to the more conservative voices in the group such that the AAC
coalition did not lead an openly “pro-choice” campaign. A woman’s right to
abortion, even in limited circumstances, was rarely mentioned.101 A Workers'
Party leaflet, which called for a "No" vote in the referendum, did not mention
abortion or women.102 For what they considered to be strategic reasons, the
AAC did not advocate for women’s rights and focused on attacking the
legitimacy of holding a constitutional referendum on abortion, characterizing
the amendment as "ill-considered, unnecessary, sectarian."103 and "a
rubbishly academic exercise."104 The AAC also argued that the referendum
was a waste of public money, that improving supports for unmarried mothers
and their children was a more worthwhile use of resources, and that the
amendment campaign represented a retreat from Ireland's emerging
openness as a member of the EU.105
Several members of the AAC opposed abortion rights but were concerned
about what they perceived as the “sectarian” nature of the amendment. In a
context where one of the reasons why Protestants in the North of Ireland
opposed a united Ireland was the feat that "Home Rule would mean Rome
Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 40.3.3.
TOM HESKETH, su67 (noting that the TD Oliver Flanagan, Tom O'Donnell, Michael Joe Cosgrave, and Alice
Glenn campaigned actively in favor of the amendment with PLAC).
100 TOM HESKETH, 81; See also, Story of the 8th JOE. IE, https://www.joe.ie/life-style/story-of-the-8th-how-rightwing-catholic-groups-staged-a-remarkable-political-coup-614595.
101 Maev Kennedy, Women 'shut out' from debate,' THE IR. TIMES, September 5, p.11.
102 See, e.g., BRIAN GIRVIN, SOCIAL CHANGE AND MORAL POLITICS, 66 (1986).
103 Prionsias de Rossa, Dáil Éireann, (Feb 9th, 1983), https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/198302-09/3/.
104 Quote by Mary Robinson, in TOM HESKETH, supra note _ p 96.
105 Sandra McEvoy, supra note 10, at 25; Niall Kiely, Dean Griffin urges a ‘truly republican and pluralist Ireland, THE IR.
TIMES, (September 5, 2013) at 3.
98
99
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Rule," some AAC members worried that a constitutional provision reflecting
distinct Catholic teaching would validate Protestant hesitancy about ever
rejoining the South.106 In particular, they argued that using the Constitution
— with its relative permanency and legal supremacy — to protect the ‘right
to life of the unborn’ would communicate to Ireland’s minority Protestant
community that living in Ireland meant living under the thumb of the
Catholic Church. By contrast, they suggested, if abortion was legislatively,
rather than constitutionally, prohibited, Northern Protestants might feel secure
that minority positions on social issues could at least be considered and
debated, rather summarily subsumed by Catholic fundamentalism.107
Some, albeit very few local grassroots AAC groups, were headed by
openly pro-choice activists, particularly in the urban centers of Dublin and
Cork. The AAC, however, generally tamed the more emancipatory claims
about women’s abortion rights.108 Notably, the activists who foregrounded
pro-choice arguments were sometimes accused of “playing into the hands of
PLAC” for voicing their support of abortion rights.109 At times, the AAC
echoed the concerns about the ambiguous language of the amendment and
the potentially life-threatening legal and medical confusion it could produce,
but the office of the Attorney General was entirely alone in publicly
prioritizing questions about what it would mean for a “mother” to have an
equal right to life to that of the “unborn” she carries,110 or what state defense
of the “unborn’s” right to life “as far as practicable” would look like.111 Would
the right to life of the unborn be subject to exceptions? Would constitutional
recognition of the “unborn’s” right to life prevent women from going abroad
to have abortions? This latter question was posed by civil servants in the
attorney general's office on several occasions but not the AAC; presumably,
the AAC did not want to seem to be approving of abortion by travel.
The reticence of the AAC to foreground the legal and practical impacts
of the 8th on pregnant women was matched by the fervor with which the
PLAC positioned “the unborn” as the subject of the referendum. Similar to
American anti-abortion discourse at the time, the fetus was presented as a

TOM HESKETH, supra note _ at 93.
See, e.g., TOM HESKETH, 57, 70-71. In the 1980s, the Fine Gael government sought to reassure Protestant
Unionists in Northern Ireland that the republic was not the Catholic theocracy they feared. See also CIARA
MEEHAN, supra note 74 at pp 160-164.
108 Sandra McEvoy, supra note 10, 35.
109 See also Sandra McEvoy, supra note 10, at 26. (Describing how some activists, primarily working-class feminists,
broke away from AAC to form the “Women’s Right to Choose Campaign” to make arguments about women’s
rights).
110 It was not until 2009 that the meaning of 'unborn' was judicially determined as being the "embryo or fetus in
the womb from implantation" Roche v. Roche [2009] IESC 82. In 2013, §2 of the PLDPA provided that, for its
purposes, "unborn" is a reference to human life during the period of time commencing after implantation in the
womb of a woman and ending on the complete emergence of the life from the body of the woman'. PLDPA,
supra note 3.
111 See e.g., John Quinlan, 397-398. See also, 339 Dáil Deb. (February 9, 1983) col. 1357.
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vulnerable and innocent citizen that needed protection.112 The Catholic Press
asserted that the amendment was “profoundly positive” given that “that
innocent human life has an intrinsic value.113 The Society for the Protection
of the Unborn (SPUC) circulated a flyer asking people to make their votes
count for “those with no voice and no vote.”114 Evoking the post-colonial
sensibilities of Irish people, another of their pamphlets presented the
amendment as a means of defending the unborn from "the abortion mills of
England that grind Irish babies into the blood that cries out to heaven for
vengeance."115 Women, when featured in the PLAC campaign, were
presented as one of the threats from which the unborn needed the
amendment’s protection. The Catholic Bishop of Clonfert, Joseph Cassidy,
claimed that the most dangerous place for an Irish baby to be was in its
mother’s womb.116
Following a campaign dominated by pro-amendment forces, just 54.6%
of the electorate went to the polls on September 7, 1983— one of the lowest
referendum turnouts in Irish history. 68% voted in favor of the “pro-life”
clause, and 32% voted against it.117 And though the anti-abortion lobby
claimed that the 8th proclaimed the nation’s morals definitively, the precise
legal meaning of the 8th remained decidedly unclear. The Offences Against
the Person Act and its near-absolute prohibition on abortion remained on the
books, but there was no regulation to implement the 8th amendment.
Critically, there was no guidance for women, healthcare professionals, or state
officials on how to execute the 8th’s declared equivalence between the right to
life of “the unborn” and the right to life of “the mother.” Over the next 40
years, this nebulous unknown of the 8th amendment manifested painfully in
the country.
C. Legal Campaign After 1983
The 1983 abortion amendment quickly became the most litigated
amendment of the Irish Constitution. Though the legal cases and the political
battles surrounding such cases are complicated chronologically, the primary
theme is recurrent; anti-abortion groups sought sweeping enforcement of the
amendment via the Irish courts, requiring pro-choice groups to defend
against even more restrictions on abortion access.
See e.g., KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION: THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1984).
As quoted in TOM HESKETH, supra note xx at 49.
114 Society for the Protection of Unborn Children pamphlet, "Value Your Voice— Value Your Vote."
115 See, e.g., Sophie Cacciaguidi-Fahy, The Substantive Issue and the Rhetoric of the Abortion Debate in Ireland, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW 141, 147 (Anne Wagner et al. eds., 2005).
116 See, e.g., NELL MCCAFFERTY, A WOMAN TO BLAME: THE KERRY BABIES CASE 10 (2010).
117 DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, CMTY. AND LOC. GOV’T REFERENDUM RESULTS 1937-2015, 38. See generally, Sandra
McEvoy, supra note 10, at 28.
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1. SPUC v. Open Door (1986)
Following the anti-choice victory, most Irish pro-choice groups
disbanded. Activists switched from advocacy to the provision of non-directive
counseling to women who sought abortion services abroad.118 The Woman's
Right to Choose group became the Women's Information Network (WIN). It
formed clinics in Dublin, which mainly provided information about the
identity, location, and contact details of British providers, but in certain
circumstances, the Irish clinics also made abortion appointments for
women.119
The anti-abortion lobby responded to the clinics’ attempts to help women
go abroad by initiating legal proceedings against two clinics.120 Claiming a
breach of the 8th amendment, the Irish Attorney General (a different one to
the AG who had warned about the risks to women's lives inherent in the
amendment) took the case on behalf of the Society for Protection of the
Unborn Child ("SPUC") and sought an injunction to prohibit the named
clinics from providing women with information about abortion services
abroad. In Attorney General (SPUC (Ireland) Ltd.) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd. and
the Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd,121 the Attorney General argued that, by
providing information and logistical support for abortions abroad, the clinics
were “assisting in the destruction of unborn life,” in violation of the 8th
amendment.122 He added that the counseling activities amounted to “a
conspiracy to corrupt public morals” under common law and were therefore
criminal.123
The clinics defended their activities, claiming that under European
Community law (as it was then known)124 individuals in Ireland had a right
to travel to another Member state for commercial services, and therefore the
clinics were entitled to provide information about these services. An
injunction, they argued, would also violate their constitutional right to
freedom of expression.125
Sandra McEvoy, supra note 10.
SPUC [1988] IR 593 (H. Ct.) (Ir.).
120 Soc'y for Protection of Unborn Children Ir. Ltd. (SPUC) v. Open Door Counselling Ltd., [1988] IR 593 (H.
Ct.) (Ir.); SPUC v. Open Door Counselling Ltd., [1989] IR 618 (SC) (Ir.) (affirming the High Court's ruling).
121 The action, instituted by SPUC, was converted into action by the Attorney General with SPUC as a relator
on September 24, 1986, thus allowing the Attorney General to prosecute the case. Id. 602-03.
122 SPUC, [1988] IR 593 (H. Ct.) (Ir.), at 600.
123 Id.
124 Before the 1992 Treaty on European Union, February 7, 1992, OJ 1993, C224/I [Maastricht Treaty], what
is now known as the European Union (EU) was known as the European Community. European Community law
takes precedence over all national law, including constitutional law. The European Court of Justice ensures that
European Community law is enforced.
125 Article 40.6.1 (i) of the Constitution includes, subject to public order and morality, “the right of the citizens to
express freely their convictions and opinions.”
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The High Court did not find that the clinics were engaged in "criminal
conspiracy," but it issued an injunction against the clinics, finding that their
activities unlawful under the 8th.126 The clinics’ activities, the Chief Justice
stated, were within the Irish State, and thus questions of European
Community law did not arise.127
On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the decision,128 on the basis that
the right to freedom of expression was secondary to the unborn fetus's right
to life.129 In doing so, the Supreme Court suggested that the State's duty to
protect the right to life of the unborn went beyond an abortion ban; it placed
an affirmative duty on the State to vindicate the right to life of the unborn. One
such proactive measure was to prevent the distribution of information in
Ireland about the availability of abortions in other countries.
Soon after its defeat in the Irish Supreme Court, one of the clinics, Open
Door Counselling, filed an action in the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR). The ECtHR case languished until 1992, a delay common for
ECtHR cases at the time. Awaiting a hearing, the pregnancy centers
complied, for the most part, with the injunction. In a pre-google world, the
injunction meant that clinics were prohibited from giving pregnant women
the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of abortion clinics abroad.130
Fearful of litigation, many clinics shut their doors altogether.131 Social
workers and other professionals were warned that they could be subject to
legal action if they provided any form of abortion counseling.132 Bookshops,
libraries, magazines, and newsagents practiced self-censorship and removed
material that carried information about British abortion clinics.133
2. S.P.U.C. v. Coogan & SPUC v. Stephen Grogan
In response to the curtailing of clinic activity, Students’ Unions Ireland
attempted to fill the information gap, publishing the phone numbers and
addresses of English abortion clinics in their student handbooks. The SPUC
Id. 614.
Open Door, [1988] I.R. 618 (Jr. S.C.) at 625.
128 SPUC v. Open Door Counselling Ltd., [1989] IR 618 (SC) (Ir.). at 626.
129 Id.
130 An underground helpline run by the Women’s Information Network (WIN) was established and linked up
with the London-based Irish Women’s Abortion Support Group (IWASG) to provide women with information
and practical help. Other underground groups in Ireland also provided information through informal networks.
See e.g., Ivana Bacik, Abortion and the Law in Ireland in THE ABORTION PAPERS IRELAND: VOLUME 2, 104,108
(Aideen Quility ed., 2015); see also, ANN ROSSITER, IRELAND’S HIDDEN DIASPORA: THE ‘ABORTION TRAIL’
AND THE MAKING OF A LONDON-IRISH UNDERGROUND, 1980-2000 93-103 (2009).
131 In response, Ruth Riddick, the director of Open Door Counselling, decided to close her counseling center
"for fear of her clients suffering legal repercussions in a climate of cuddly fetus propaganda and moral hysteria.”
See, e.g., Lesley White, A Woman With a Cause Fights Off Old Ireland, SUNDAY TIMES, November 1, 1992.
132 See, e.g., Anna Eggert & Bill Rolston, Ireland, in ABORTION IN THE NEW EUROPE 157, 166-68 (Anna Eggert
& Bill Rolston eds., 1994).
133 LISA SMYTH, ABORTION AND NATION, 11. The pregnancy advisory sections of imported publications as
Cosmopolitan and Elle were blacked out, and British telephone directories were withdrawn from Irish libraries
because they listed the numbers of termination clinics in Britain. SCHWEPPE, THE UNBORN CHILD, 29.
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responded quickly. In SPUC v. Coogan134SPUC sought an injunction against
the students to prevent the printing, publishing, or distributing of the Welfare
Guide UCD (University College Dublin). The High Court refused this
application due to lack of standing, but on appeal, the Supreme Court ruled
that the importance of the societal right SPUC was trying to protect and
recognized that the organization had sufficient standing to sue.135 SPUC used
this standing to return to the High Court and add two more student unions
to the proposed injunction in SPUC v. Grogan.136
SPUC contended that publishing information about abortion clinics was
essentially the same as the abortion counseling the Irish Courts had already
prohibited; and that imparting such information violated the right to life of
the unborn child.137 They repeated the argument that the right to life of the
unborn was primary and that the students’ calls for the Court to uphold their
right to freedom of expression could not trump the right to life.138 The
defendants argued that, under European Community law, the free supply of
services within the community meant that they were entitled to publish and
distribute information about abortion services abroad and that pregnant
women had a right to receive information about the same.139 The students
also argued that the information they were providing was readily available
elsewhere, such as British telephone books, and therefore an injunction was
an ineffective means of ‘vindicating the right to life of the unborn. Turning to
women’s rights, the students argued that, owing to the potential for
complications in pregnancy, a woman’s right to bodily integrity required the
accessibility of basic information about terminating a pregnancy.140 In
response, SPUC maintained that the provision of abortion could not be
regarded as being a 'service' because it involved the destruction of the life of
a human being (the "unborn child"). They argued that women's rights to
bodily integrity could not take precedence over the right to life of the
unborn.141
Before deciding on whether to grant injunctive relief, the sole woman
judge on the High Court, Justice Carroll, referred two questions to the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg for a 'preliminary ruling' as
follows.142: (1) whether abortion was a “service” within the meaning of the
S.P.U.C. v. Coogan, [1989] ILRM 526 (H.Ct.), rev'd, [1990] ILRM 70 (S.C.).
S.P.U.C. v. Coogan, [1989] ILRM 526 1990 [ILRM] 70 (S.C.).
136 SPUC v. Stephen Grogan, [1989] IR 753 (H.Ct.), rev'd, [1989] IR 760 (SC), aff'd, remanded, [1992] ILRM
461 (Case C-159/90, EJC), aff'd slip op. (H. Ct. August 7, 1992).
137 SPUC v. Stephen Grogan, [1989] IR 753 (H.Ct.).
138 Id.
139 SPUC v. Stephen Grogan, [1989] IR 753 (H.Ct.) 692-93.
140 Alan Murdoch, Students Defend Right to Abortion Information, THE INDEPENDENT, August 7, 1992, at 6.
141 Id.
142 A preliminary ruling is a decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the interpretation of European
Union law, made at the request of a court or tribunal of a European Union member state. Article 267 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), formerly Article 117 of the EEC Treaty Establishing
the European Community. Article 177 stated that: The Court of Justice shall be competent to make a
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Treaty of Rome Article 60143 and; (2) whether Article 59’s prohibition on
restricting the freedom to supply services meant that the student groups had
a right to distribute information about abortion services in other Member
states.144 SPUC appealed to the Supreme Court, which found in their favor
and issued an injunction against the students.145 The Supreme Court’s
decision asserted that there could not be any right in European Community
Law that would allow travel for services that placed the right to life of the
“unborn” at risk.146 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court had no power to stop
Justice Carroll’s referral to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary
ruling.
The students, despite the injunction and threat of prosecution for
contempt of court, continued to distribute information.147
In October 1991, the European Court of Justice agreed with the
applicants that abortion, as a medical activity provided for remuneration, is
a “service” under Article 60 of the Treaty of Rome and noted that Article 59
of the Treaty of Rome prohibits restrictions on the receipt of services.148
Nevertheless, the students were ultimately unsuccessful. The Court held that
an injunction against the students did not amount to restricting the freedom
to supply services under European Community Law because the students had
no direct links with the service providers.149
The case, SPUC v. Grogan, returned to the Irish High Court. This time
around, the High Court instituted a permanent injunction preventing the
students from disseminating information about international abortion
services.150 Moreover, the Court passed case papers to the Director of Public
Prosecutions for possible criminal contempt proceedings against students who
had breached the earlier temporary injunction.151 The students promised to
continue providing the information about pregnancy advisory services in the
preliminary decision concerning (a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of
the institutions of the Community; and (c) the interpretation of the statutes of any bodies set up by an act of the
Council, where such statutes so provide.
143 Article 60, addressing the meaning of "services," states: Services within the meaning of this Treaty shall be
deemed to be services normally supplied for remuneration, to the extent that they are not governed by the
provisions relating to the free movement of goods, capital, and persons.
Services shall include in particular:
(a) activities of an industrial character;
(b) activities of a commercial character;
(c) artisan activities; and
(d) activities of the liberal professions. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, March 25, 1957, 298
UNTS 11, art. 60.
144 SPUC v Grogan, [1989] IR 753 (H.Ct.).
145 S.P.U.C. v Grogan [1989] IR 760 (S.C.).
146 Id. at 765.
147 THE ABORTION PAPERS IRELAND, 16; See EMILY O'REILLY, MASTERMINDS OF THE RIGHT 132-33 (1992).
148 SPUC v. Grogan, [1991] ECR 4685.
149 Id.
150 SPUC v Grogan, [1989] IR 753 (H.Ct.).
151 Alan Murdoch, Fresh Ban on Abortion Information in Ireland, THE INDEPENDENT, August 8, 1992, at 3.
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UK, stating that they were prepared to risk jail.152
Though the ECJ had upheld the ban on the students' provision of
abortion information, the outcome of the case provoked concern amongst
members of the anti-abortion lobby. The Irish Family Planning Association
(IFPA) established a direct commercial link with the British Pregnancy
Advisory Service (BPAS) – an abortion provider in the UK – whereby the
IFPA referred abortion-seeking women for BPAS's services. Because the
IFPA was now providing 'customers' to a European service provider, Ireland
could not prohibit the IFPA's abortion counseling. Now deeply suspicious of
European law, the anti-abortion lobby grew concerned about the impending
Maastricht Treaty to create the European Union (EU). The goal of the Treaty
was the creation of an economic, monetary, and political union among
Member States of the EU, but anti-abortion campaigners were adamant that
the 8th amendment needed to be legally insulated from any changes in the
interplay between Irish law and European Union law. Anti-abortion groups
mobilized quietly and successfully to convince the government to negotiate a
protocol to the Treaty that would protect the 8th amendment from any future
impact of European Union law.153 Protocol 17 read:
Nothing in the Treaty on European Union, or the Treaties
establishing the European Communities, or in the Treaties or Acts
modifying or supplementing those Treaties shall affect the application
in Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland.154
3.

The Attorney General v. X and Others
Despite another apparent victory for the Irish anti-abortion lobby, an
event in February 1992 posed the biggest threat yet to their persistent legal
and political campaign to maintain the State's abortion ban. In what became
known as the X case155 the public erupted upon hearing that the State
attempted to stop a fourteen-year-old girl, who had been raped by her best
friend's father, from traveling with her parents to London for an abortion.
Before setting out on their journey, the teenager's parents asked the Gardaí
(police) if they should preserve a tissue sample to assist with the alleged rapist's
prosecution. The Gardaí, unsure whether a DNA test would be admissible as
evidence in Court, referred this question to the Director of Public
Prosecutions, who in turn alerted the Attorney General. The Attorney
General, assuming the role as the protector of the right to life of the unborn
152 Interview with Prof. Ivava Bacik, July 2016, who was one of the students against whom the injunction was
taken; See also, Jeffrey Weinstein, An Irish Solution to an Irish Problem": Ireland's Struggle with Abortion Law, 10 ARIZ. J.
INT’L COMP. L. 165 (1993).
153 Brian Dowling, Legal look at Protocol to Treaty, IRISH INDEPENDENT, February 20, 1992.
154 Treaty on European Union, Protocol 17, February 7, 1992, OJ (C 325/5).
155 Att’y Gen. v. X and Others, [1992] 1 IR 1 (H. Ct.) (Ir.) [hereinafter, Att’y Gen. v. X].
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as per the 8th, then sought – and was granted – an injunction from the High
Court to stop the pregnant girl and her parents from traveling abroad for nine
months.156
Known as "Miss X," the girl and her family returned to Ireland upon
hearing of the injunction. But her case had already sparked mass public
outcry.157 At a march organized by the Dublin Abortion Information
Campaign (“DAIC”), 10,000 people chanted for “a woman’s right to
choose.” 158 It was only a decade before that a majority of the electorate voted
for an outright abortion ban, but for many, compelling a fourteen-year-old to
maintain a pregnancy conceived through rape was too much to stomach.159
The Irish Independent (a newspaper known for supporting the government)
included an editorial that described the State as having "created a prison" in
which X and her family had to suffer "for being the entirely innocent victims
of sexual violence of the worst kind."160 Jon O'Brien of the Irish Family
Planning Association told international media that “the state appears more
concerned with protecting the procreative rights of rapists than with
protecting the rights of their victims.”161 News outlets around the world
commented on Ireland’s tyrannical approach to a teenager in distress.162 So
intense was the criticism that the government pleaded with X's parents, who
at this point did not want any further trauma or attention, to appeal the case
to the Irish Supreme Court.163 Eventually, the family agreed to appeal, and
the State footed the bill.
156 The Court rejected the defendant’s four arguments opposing the injunction. Firstly, the High Court dismissed
the jurisdictional argument advanced, that because the Oireachtas had not regulated how the right to life of the
unborn and the right to life of the mother referred to in the 8th amendment could be reconciled, the Court could
make no order in a case in which an issue of reconciliation arose. Secondly, the Court rejected the argument that
because of the possibility of suicide, the Court would not be affording due regard to the right to life of the girl if it
upheld the order. The Court reasoned that the risk that X might take her own life if not allowed to travel for an
abortion was less and different in order of magnitude than the otherwise certain death of the unborn if the order
was not made. Thirdly, the Court determined that the defendants' contentions that the girl's right to liberty was
being unlawfully infringed were unfounded since the Court had the power to restrain the abuse of a
constitutional right when exercised to commit a wrong. And finally, the Court rejected the defendant's argument
that, as a matter of European Community law, the defendants had a prima facie right to travel to another Member
State to receive a medical service. A.G. v X, at 11-16. On the EU question, the Court contended that Ireland's
derogation from EC law on the freedom to travel for services (Articles 59 and 60 of the Treaty) would be
permissible under EC law in this case on grounds that the divergence was based on Ireland's deeply held
convictions on moral issues. Id at 16. The High Court also asserted that the European Convention of Human
Rights did not bear on the issue.
157 See, e.g., Alan O’ Keefe, Nationwide Drive to Back Girl THE IRISH INDEPENDENT, February 20, 1992, at 7. See
generally, Mary Muldowney, Breaking the Silence: Pro-choice Activism in Ireland Since 1983, in SEXUAL POLITICS IN
MODERN IRELAND 127, 134 (Sandra McAvoy & Mary McAuliffe eds., 2015).
158See, e.g., IVANA BACIK, THE IRISH CONSTITUTION AND GENDER POLITICS 387 (2013) (describing how the
rock star Sineád O' Connor flew in from the United States, "came out" about two abortions, and stormed the
Dáil refusing to leave until she had confronted the country's newly appointed Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds.).
159 See, e.g., LISA SMYTH, ABORTION AND NATION 11 (2005).
160 Irish Independent, Editorial, IRISH INDEPENDENT, February 19, 1992, at 10.
161 Irish Court denies abortion to rape victim, 14, STAR TRIB. MINNEAPOLIS, February 18, 1992.
162 See, e.g., James Clarity, Irish Court says girl can leave to obtain an abortion in Britain Girl NY TIMES (FebRUARY 27,
1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/27/world/irish-court-says-girl-can-leave-to-obtain-abortion-inbritain.html.
163 See, e.g., EMILY O'REILLY, MASTERMINDS OF THE RIGHT 133 (1997).
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Within ten days, the Supreme Court reversed the injunction. On appeal,
X's legal team argued that a 14-year-old girl, pregnant as a result of rape,
faced a real and substantial risk to her life due to the threat of suicide and that
termination of her pregnancy was legal under the 8th amendment. The
Supreme Court agreed. In attempting a reconciliation of the rights of the
"mother" and "the unborn," the four majority judges agreed that if the
termination was necessary to keep a woman alive, abortion was permissible
under the 8th amendment. In the words of Finlay CJ:
the proper test to be applied is that if it is established as a matter of
probability that there is a real and substantial risk to the life, as distinct
from the health of the mother, which can only be avoided by the
termination of her pregnancy, that such termination is permissible,
having regard to the true interpretation of Article 40.3.3 of the
Constitution. 164
A majority of the Court accepted evidence provided by a clinical
psychologist that the girl was suicidal, and they determined that this
amounted to a "real and substantial" threat to her life that could only be
alleviated by ending her pregnancy.165 However, the Court did not provide
any further guidance on other circumstances that might satisfy the test.
Rather, the judges made clear that they felt less than comfortable to be in the
“abortion umpiring business.”166 The amendment, “born of public disquiet,
historically divisive of our people,” was, the Supreme Court said, “bare of
legislative direction.”167 Their ire was evident in the reprimand delivered to
the Irish legislature by one of the judges (McCarthy J):
the failure by the legislature to enact the appropriate legislation is no
longer just unfortunate; it is inexcusable. What are pregnant women
to do? What are the parents of a pregnant girl underage to do? What
are doctors to do?168
By the time the Irish Supreme Court issued its opinion to lift the High Court
injunction that February, X had miscarried.169
Though pro-choice groups welcomed the Supreme Court’s move to lift
the injunction, some also criticized the limits of the decision. The feeling was
Att’y Gen. v. X [1992] 1 IR 1, 57–58.
Id.
166 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 US 833, 4842 (1992) (Opinion of J. Scalia).
167 Att’y Gen. v. X, at 92.
168 Id.
169 Ruadhán Mac Cormaic, X Case Judge Says Ruling is 'Moot' in Current Abortion Debate, IR. TIMES (July 6, 2013).
164
165
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that the Court’s interpretation of the 8th was too narrow and still prioritized
the "unborn." Feminist commentators and activists noted that the State's
obligation to protect fetal life under the 8th amendment extended only “as far
as practicable,” but the Supreme Court in X interpreted this to mean that if
a fetus’ life was at risk, any burden short of mortality could be imposed upon
pregnant women.170 Endangering a woman’s health or imposing economic
or emotional suffering did not make state interventions impracticable.171 As
one journalist emphasized in the days following the decision, the ruling
changed little for Irish women; “this week, at least 100 women will travel to
England for abortions.”172
Anti-abortion campaigners were also unhappy with the Court’s decision
in X.173 Arguing that permitting abortion in situations when a woman was at
risk of suicide subverted the intent of the 1983 referendum, they lobbied the
government to hold another referendum to overturn the decision. The
solution in such cases, anti-choice activists claimed, would be to "mind"
pregnant women who were suicidal,174 so that the pregnancy could be carried
to term. Within a couple of months, anti-choice lobbying bore success, and
the government committed to run an abortion referendum to eliminate
suicide risk as a legal basis for a life-saving abortion.
4. Open Door Counselling Limited v. Ireland
Before the Government managed to put another abortion referendum to
the people, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) took up the
question of whether the Irish Supreme Court’s 1988 injunction against the
provision of abortion-relation information by pregnancy counselling centers
was in keeping with the European Convention on Human Rights. Two years
prior, having exhausted their domestic remedies, the clinics had lodged an
appeal before the ECHR supervisory bodies, arguing that the Irish ban
unduly limited their freedom of expression. At that time, cases brought for
alleged violations of the ECHR were first examined by the European
Commission on Human Rights,175 which declared the case admissible and
170 See, e.g., Emily O'Reilly, One Step Forward and Two Steps Back, IR. PRESS, March 6, 1992, at 6; ABORTION
PAPERS IRELAND (Ailbhe Smyth ed., 1993).
171 See, e.g., Marie Fox and Therese Murphy, Irish Abortion: Seeking Refuge in a Jurisprudence of Doubt and Delegation
19(4) J. OF L. & SOC’Y 454 (1992).
172 Mary Holland, IR. TIMES, February 19, 1992; See, EMILY O'REILLY, MASTERMINDS OF THE RIGHT 132-33
(1992).
173 See, e.g., William Binchy, New Abortion Regime has no Effective Limits, THE IR. TIMES, March 6, 1992, at 13; Mary
Tynan, Campaign to Amend the Constitution Launched, THE IR. TIMES March 11, 1992, at 3; Billy Gilhealy, The State
and the Discursive Construction of Abortion, in GENDER, POLITICS AND THE STATE 58, 74-75 (Vicky Randall and
Georgina Waylen eds., 1998).
174 Id.
175 Until the enactment of the 11th additional Protocol to the Eur. Conv. on H.R. in 1998, applications were first
examined by the Eur. Comm’n on H. R., a political body which sought to achieve a friendly settlement of the
dispute and issued a decision. Decisions by the Eur. Comm’n on H. R. could then be appealed to the Eur. Ct.
H.R.
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made a preliminary decision that the law violated Article 10 of the
Convention, protecting freedom of speech.176 The State appealed the
Commission’s decision to the European Court of Human Rights, which
heard the case two years later in September 1992.
In Open Door Counselling Limited and Dublin Well-Woman Centre Limited v.
Ireland, the counseling centers, now joined by applicants Bonnie Maher and
Ann Downes (who worked as counselors for Dublin Well Woman) along with
two individual women, Mrs. X and Ms. Maeve Geraghty, who joined as
women of child-bearing age, argued that the Supreme Court’s injunction
prohibiting the clinics from distributing information about abortion clinics
abroad was contrary to Article 10 of the European Convention of Human
Rights (the right to freedom of expression);177 the clinics and counsellors could
not impart information, and Mrs. X and Ms. Geraghty could not receive
information.178 They added that the injunction discriminated against the
applicants on grounds of political or other opinion under Article 14 of the
Convention since those who sought to counsel against abortion were
permitted to express their views without restriction.179 Finally, the clinics
raised the fundamental issue, namely, abortion’s illegality in Ireland which
they claimed violated the European Convention; women, they argued, have
a right to abortion under article 8 of the Convention, which guarantees the
“right to respect for . . . private and family life.”180
The State successfully argued that Ireland’s prohibition on abortion
information fell within the scope of permissible restrictions on the right to
freedom of expression in the European Convention; the restriction was
“prescribed by law” and was “necessary in a democratic society” under one
of the grounds specified in Article 10 namely, "the protection of public
morals." The Court accepted that Ireland had a legitimate aim in adopting
the injunction because the protection of the "unborn child" was predicated
on the Irish community's "profound moral values concerning the nature of
life," as reflected in the 1983 referendum. The Court also acknowledged that,
in general, the Convention affords Member States a wide margin of discretion
on questions involving the protection of morals within their respective
communities.181
Nevertheless, the Court agreed with the applicants that the injunction
against the clinics was “overbroad and disproportionate” and therefore fell
afoul of the Convention’s protections for freedom of expression.182 The Court
Open Door Counselling v. Ir., App. No. 14234/88 & 14235/88, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1990).
Open Door Counselling v. Ir., 15 Eur.H.R.Rep. 244 (1992).
178 Id. 53, 62, 81.
179 Id. 81, 82.
180 Id. 3 2.
181 Id.63.
182 Id. 74.
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held that the injunction was disproportionate to Ireland's legitimate aim of
protecting the unborn because it appeared to be largely ineffective—it did not
prevent the large numbers of Irish women from continuing to obtain
abortions in Britain.183 In the Court’s view, the injunction might delay many
women—possibly risking the health of such women by causing them to have
later abortions—but it did not stop the abortion trail. Noting that the clinics
served many women who faced both educational and socio-economic
barriers to accessing information, the Court commented that the injunction
was likely to have adverse effects on women who were already
disadvantaged.184 The injunction was doing little to implement the 8th
amendment; rather, it was making it more difficult for women to have the
safest type of abortion (first trimester) and reinforced the socio-economic
vulnerabilities of women who did not have access to information elsewhere.
The Court avoided considering the compatibility of Ireland's
constitutional ban on abortion with the Convention, but for the advocates, it
was a win. 185 Moreover, for the first time in the litany of abortion cases since
the 1983 referendum, a judicial decision took seriously the impact of the
information ban on women.
D. The 1992 Referendum
In November 1992, just one month after the Open Door ruling, the
Government presented three abortion-related constitutional amendments to the
Irish people. First, the 12th Amendment of the Constitution Bill responded
to anti-choice calls to subvert the X-case decision by excluding the risk of
suicide as a legal ground for a life-saving abortion. The 12th amendment read:
It shall be unlawful to terminate the life of an unborn unless such
termination is necessary to save the life, as distinct from the health, of
the mother where there is an illness or disorder of the mother giving
rise to a real and substantial risk to her life, not being a risk of selfdestruction.
Second, the uproar over the confinement of X suggested to the
Government that the public likely would vote against restrictions on the right
of women to travel abroad for abortions. Accordingly, the Government
proposed the 13th Amendment, which specified that the 8th amendment
Id. 76.
Id. 77.
185 See, e.g., Chris Ryder, Irish Advice Ban on Abortion Ruled a Breach of Rights; Women's Groups Welcome Strasbourg Verdict
That Injunction Against Information on Ending Pregnancies is 'Over-Broad,' DAILY TELEGRAPH, (October 30, 1992).
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would not limit "freedom to travel between the State and another state."186
Finally, the proposed 14th Amendment reaffirmed the right to freedom of
information: "This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make
available, in the State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law,
information relating to services lawfully available in another state."
In part, because they were no longer a united front, anti-choice activists
were unable to match the intensity and ferocity of their 1983 campaign in
their 1992 referenda campaign. Some anti-choice groups wanted to
campaign for a ‘No’ vote in all three referenda. The Pro-Life Campaign, for
example, was unhappy with the text of the 12th Amendment and its
recognition that abortion could be legally permitted to save a woman’s life. A
life-saving abortion was a misnomer to their minds. Rather than just giving
the Irish people the opportunity to remove the threat of suicide as a ground
for legal abortion, the Pro-Life Campaign wanted the amendment to ban
abortion even where there was a “real and substantive risk to the life of the
woman” (the X-case test).187 Of the same mind, Youth Defense circulated
leaflets that claimed: “the government is asking us to legalize the killing of
little babies.”188 By contrast, others, including the majority of Ireland’s
Catholic bishops, were agreeable to allowing a ‘Yes’ vote on the travel and
information amendments; they calculated that efforts to constrain these
freedoms could end up leading to more liberal concessions on abortion
restrictions down the road.189 The Catholic hierarchy understood that
women “going to England” or “getting the boat” – the euphemisms used for
abortion travel – provided a safety valve that allowed the country to ostensibly
maintain an image of Ireland as a “pro-life” nation.
Pro-choice groups also struggled to form a united coalition in the run-up
to the 1992 referendum. Following X, one group, the Dublin Abortion
Information Campaign (D.A.I.C.), adopted an explicitly pro-choice position,
but broader efforts to establish a "Repeal the Eighth Amendment Campaign"
("R.E.A.C.") led to less defiant messaging. R.E.A.C. campaigned for fewer
restrictions on accessing information about abortion, legislation on X (i.e.,
legislation specifying the right to an abortion in the case of suicide), and the
right to travel, rather than more liberal pro-choice policies.190 As in the 1983
186 Referendum (Amendment) (Act no. 2/1992 ), HTTP://www.irishstatutebook.i.e.,/Eli/1992/act/22/
enacted/en/HTML (The amendment reads “[t]his subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State
and another state.”).
187 See, e.g., Pro-Life Campaign, Valuing All Human Life,
https://prolifecampaign.ie/main/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Pro-Life-Campaign-Submission-to-the-AllParty-Oireachtas-Committee-on-Abortion-Valuing-All-Human-Life-1999.pdf (Submission of the Pro-Life
Campaign to the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution); See also Brian Girvan, Moral Politics and the
Irish Abortion Referendums 1992 47(2) PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 203 (1994).
188 Leaflet issued by Youth Defense Pro-Life Campaign (1992).
189 See, e.g., Brian Girvan, Moral Politics and the Irish Abortion Referendums 1992 47(2) PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 203
(1994).
190 Aileen O'Carroll, Anti-abortionists told to SPUC OFF!, WORKERS SOLIDARITY (1993)
http://struggle.ws/ws93/abortion38.html [hereinafter O’ Carroll, SPUC OFF].
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campaign, pro-choice arguments were tame, but this time around, the antiamendment campaign openly discussed the impacts of the proposed
amendment on women. One of their key arguments, for example, was that
the distinction between the mother's life and the mother's health was
unclear.191 Highlighting that a woman whose health might be threatened by
illness but whose life might not be immediately threatened would not be
allowed an abortion, pro-choice activists interrogated the entirely of the 12th
amendment, not just the attempt to exclude suicidal risks.192 In another
difference from 1983, the medics and the women’s groups were on the same
side; several doctors who agreed with R.E.A.C.'s argument about the
unworkability of the life and health distinction – and also opposed the
information restrictions – formed a Doctors for Information group. But
shared referendum goals aside, Doctors for Information would not appear
publicly with pro-choice women's groups.193
By a ratio of approximately two to one, the public voted against the 12th
Amendment and its proposition to exclusion of suicide risk from the lifethreatening risks that could permit an abortion. The information and travel
amendments passed by a similar margin.194 Thus, as of 1992, the Irish
Constitution contained a three-part provision relating to abortion: a
statement on the constitutionally protected right to life of “the unborn” to be
protected and vindicated as far as practicable and with due regard to the
equal right to life of the pregnant woman; a statement that the unborn’s right
to life did not limit women’s freedom to travel abroad; and a statement that
women’s freedom of information was not legally restricted by the 8th.
Though prior to the results 1992 referendum, the Minister of Health,
John O'Connell, had committed the Government to legislate on X if the
suicide proposition was defeated,195 no such action was taken. Three years
later, in 1995, the Government passed the Regulation of Information
(Services Outside the State for the Termination of Pregnancies) Act,196 to give
effect to the information amendment. Most of the Act, however, concerned
prohibitions on the dissemination of information about abortion services
rather than affirmatively protect the rights to information and expression.197
Id.
David Cole, “Going to England”: Irish Abortion Law and the. European Community, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 113, 114 (1993).
193 O’ Carroll, SPUC OFF, supra note 177.
194 Referendum Results, DEP’T OF HOUSING, PLAN. AND LOC. GOV’T,
https://www.housing.gov.ie/sites/default/files/migratedfiles/en/Publications/LocalGovernment/Voting/referendum_results_1937-2015.pdf at 47.
195 Vincent Brown, Legislation on Abortion, not just funking, is required, IR. TIMES (February 22, 2012),
https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/legislation-on-abortion-not-just-funking-is-required-1.468061.
196 Regulation of Information (Services outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act 1995 (Act No.
5/1995), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1995/act/5/enacted/en/html.
197 Even the official government guidance on the Act is clear that the objective was not the protection of the right
to information, but rather “to limit circumstances in which women seek to have abortions.” DEP’T OF HEALTH,
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The Act made it unlawful, for example, for anyone to give information that
would "encourage or advocate an abortion in individual circumstances."198
This prohibition came with the threat of summary conviction, but nothing in
the Act defined what “encourage” and “advocate” meant.
In practice, the Information Act had a chilling effect on healthcare
providers and women. At the most basic level, women were unaware of their
right to information and consequently were fearful to ask direct questions or
to reveal medical information to their medical carers.199 Doctors, nurses,
midwives, sonographers, and other healthcare workers consistently reported
that law restrained the type of care they could offer their patients; they felt
unable to inform their patients on options for ending pregnancy, including
options abroad, in case this could be construed as "advocating" Abortion
under the Act.200 While, in fact, the wording of the Act allowed for the
provision of 'truthful and objective' information, the chilling effect of this law
was such that many misread it as prohibiting the provision of even basic
information.
Despite the escalating restrictions on abortion access, Irish women
continued to terminate their pregnancies, covertly and abroad, the country's
"hidden diaspora."201 But just as the law’s imprecision impeded the right to
information on abortion, the absence of clarifying legislation inhibited the
freedom to travel for an abortion. A case in point was a 1997 High Court
decision involving a 13-year-old in state care. Known as “C,” the girl, who
became pregnant following rape, expressed to her carers that she would end
her life if forced to give birth.202 The public health board, which was
responsible for her care, obtained a court order to enable the board to take
her abroad for an abortion. Upon hearing about the intended abortion, the
anti-abortion organization Youth Defence encouraged the girl’s father to
challenge his daughter’s wishes and to contest the health board’s petition in
the High Court. 203 In what was known as "the C case," the High Court
determined that the health board was permitted to take C to England for an
Guide to the Regulation of Information (Services outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Bill,
Feb.1995.
198 Regulation of Information (Services Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act, 1995, (Act No.
5/1995), § 5.
199 See, e.g., LINDSEY EARNER-BYRNE, THE IRISH ABORTION JOURNEY, 1920–2018 (2019).
200 See, e.g., Dearbhail McDonald, Doctors Fear Abortion Charge If They Direct Patients Abroad IRISH INDEPENDENT
(December 12, 2009) (This remains an issue post repeal of the 8th amendment); See also, Kitty Holland, Coombe
Letter Refusing Abortion ‘Suggests Chilling Effect’ of Law, IR. TIMES (January 19, 2019),
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/coombe-letter-refusing-abortion-suggests-chilling-effect-of-law1.3763143.
201 William Johnston, Historical Abortion Statistics, Ireland, http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/abortion/abireland.html (last updated August 17, 2019) (noting that in 1990, 4064 Irish women had abortions in Britain; in
2001, the figure was 6673).
202 A and B v. E. Health Bd., J. Mary Fahy and C, and the Att’y Gen. [1998] 1 ILRM 460 (H. Ct.) [hereinafter,
C v Atty Gen].
203 See, e.g., Ruth Fletcher, Pro-Life’ Absolutes, Feminist Challenges: The Fundamentalist Narrative of Irish Abortion Law
1986-1992, 36(1) OSGOODE HALL L. J. 62 (1996).
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abortion because, as in the X Case, the girl was suicidal and therefore “a real
and substantial risk to her life” existed if the pregnancy were to continue.204
Although the case did not directly implicate the travel amendment, Justice
Geoghegan, writing for the court, addressed it by claiming that the 13th
amendment had not, in fact, recognized a substantive right to travel for an
abortion.205 “I do not think [the amendment] was ever intended to give some
new substantial right,” he contended. Rather, “it was intended to prevent
injunctions against travel or having an abortion abroad.”206 On Justice
Geoghan’s reading, the state could only authorize travel for an abortion if the
requirements set out in Attorney General v. X were satisfied, i.e., where a "real
and substantial risk" to a woman's life existed.207 But this contradicted the
popular understanding of the travel amendment. The Department of Justice,
for example, had legally permitted asylum seekers to travel for abortions and
then to return to Ireland without any assessment of risk to life. C’s case
questioned the legality of this practice and the abortion travel of thousands of
others.
E. The 2002 Referendum & Women on Waves
In 2002, the government proposed yet another constitutional amendment
on abortion: the 25th Amendment of the Constitution (Protection of Human
Life in Pregnancy) Bill, No.48 (2001). Presented as measures to deal with
"crisis pregnancy,"208 the amendment had four main parts: (1) to ensure that
life was protected from the moment of implantation (as opposed to
conception), (2) to require the Oireachtas to pass within 180 days of the
referendum its proposed Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy Act 2002
(which among other provisions clarified that traveling abroad for an abortion
was not a criminal offense)209 (3) to grant the proposed Act constitutional
protection so that, in the future, it could only be amended by referendum of
the People, and (4) to permit abortion when it was necessary to prevent loss
of the pregnant woman’s life except when the threat to her life was a risk of
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208 Notably, the socialist TD Joe Higgins commented that “it would be more honest if the Taoiseach presented
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suicide (i.e., to undo this element of the X Case). Penalties for procuring an
abortion also increased under the amendment.
This time, the Fianna Fáil Government had been persuaded to hold a
referendum by four anti-choice independent Teachtaí Dálí (TDs) whose
support Fianna Fáil needed to create a coalition government.210 The TDs in
question had been particularly aggravated the previous year when, at the
invitation of Irish pro-choice groups, Dutch organization Women on Waves
sailed a floating medical facility to Dublin and Cork to provide abortions. The
ship was originally intended to provide abortion in international waters to
ensure that neither woman nor provider would be criminalized. However,
given that the ship had not fulfilled certain requirements in the Netherlands,
the Dutch Justice Minister threatened to prosecute the medical professionals
on the ship if surgical or medical abortions were performed.211 Instead, the
Women on Waves team distributed contraceptives, did pregnancy tests, and
provided counseling and service information to hundreds of people. News
agencies from around the world covered the visit, and even at home, Irish
press coverage was primarily positive.212 And possibly concerning for antiabortion groups, Women on Waves Ireland, the activists who had invited the
ship publicly stated that the visit was designed “catalyze efforts to liberalize
abortion laws in Ireland.”213 In response, the independent TDs, Fianna Fáil,
and the anti-abortion groups decided that another referendum to strengthen
the 8th amendment was the way to crush this rising wave of pro-choice
activism before it gained more energy.
The government's campaign for the amendment faltered in part because
the government seemed to want to have it both ways. On the one hand, it
appeared to be seeking a greater degree of protection for "the unborn" by
asking the public to vote for a constitutional prohibition on abortion in cases
of suicide. On the other hand, in proposing an amendment to ensure that
women could leave the jurisdiction to obtain abortions, arguably the state was
diluting the legal duty is owed to "the unborn."
Faced with these competing concerns, anti-abortion forces split. 214 The
Catholic Church and the Pro-Life Campaign lobbied for a ‘‘Yes’’ vote in
agreement with the government’s proposal to tighten Irish abortion laws.215
Other organizations, such as Youth Defence and Mother and Child, called
210 See, e.g., Liam Weeks Independents in government: a case study of Ireland (Apr. 13-18, 2004)(Paper Presentation,
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for a “No” vote because the proposal defined abortion as "the intentional
destruction . . . of human life after implantation in the womb of a woman,",
i.e., the fetus's right to life applied only following implantation.216 This latter
view mirrored a recent Polish law and was proposed to avoid outlawing
contraceptives such as Plan B and IUDs.217 Amongst pro-choice groups, the
Alliance for a No Vote umbrella campaign218 focused their messaging on
objecting to the elimination of the suicide exception,219 and arguing that the
referendum was fraught with ambiguities.220 The Irish Family Planning
Association attacked the abortion regime in its whole; it's chair Tony O'Brien
condemned the government for lacking ''the political courage to publish an
amendment to the Constitution which would allow the 6500 women traveling
to the U.K. each year to have their abortions at home."
When the public voted in March 2002, the referendum was defeated by
50.4% to 49%; just 10,000 votes retained access to legal abortion by women
at risk of suicide.221 Reports from this time suggest that the vote was
influenced by bad weather that appeared to discourage people from visiting
polling stations in rural areas – the communities that the anti-abortion lobby
had pinned their hopes on.222
F. The European Court of Human Rights: D & ABC
Despite continuing calls from the Supreme Court that the 8th
amendment needed clarification,223 the Irish government maintained its
policy of legislative inaction on the 8th. Catharine Forde, former chairperson
of the Irish Family Planning Association, commented that "politicians were
216 Twenty-Fifth Amendment of the Constitution (Protection of Human Life in Pregnancy) Bill (Bill No.
48/2001), §1(1) (The Bill defined abortion as "the intentional destruction . . . of human life after implantation in
the womb of a woman.”).
217 See, e.g., Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment, supra note 112, at Second Schedule § 1(1). For commentary, see
Fintan O’ Toole, Cruel, bleak, View of Women Put to the People, THE IR. TIMES, March 5, 2002, at 14.
218 The Alliance for a No Vote umbrella group included the Irish Family Planning Association; Irish Council for
Civil Liberties Women's Sub-Committee; Lawyers for Choice; Cork Women's Right to Choose Group; Dublin
Abortion Rights Group; Women's Education Research & Resource Centre, UCD; Pro-Choice Campaign;
Socialist Party; Workers' Solidarity Movement. See http://struggle.ws/darg/pr/alliancenolaunchoct01.html.
219 See, e.g., Carol Coulter, Legislation Proposed by Government Has Four Main Aims, THE IR. TIMES, (February 18,
2002); Ivana Bacik, Hypocrisy and Fear in Debate on Abortion, THE IR. TIMES, December 24, 2001, at 14.
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terrified of being called murderers (…) they were paralyzed with fear, so they
did nothing."224 With no legal framework to assist medics (or pregnant
women) to determine what cases fell within the X-case conditions for legal
abortion, medical professionals reported that they were often unable or
unwilling to provide care to pregnant women, including life-saving care. The
Irish Medical Council Guidelines (an ethical guide to doctors practicing in
the country) explicitly excluded the threat of suicide as a ground for
terminating a pregnancy.225
Ultimately, the law’s ambiguity meant that pregnant women often needed
to turn to the courts to confirm their right to access an abortion in lifethreatening circumstances. Few choose this route; it is estimated that
approximately 2,000 pregnant women traveled from Ireland to the UK or
mainland Europe for abortions every year until 2018.226
Quite brazenly, the Irish Government relied on the absence of domestic
legislation clarifying the 8th amendment when challenged about the law at the
European Court of Human Rights. In D. v Ireland, the applicant argued that
Ireland's ban on abortion in the case of fatal fetal abnormalities violated
articles 3 (freedom from torture), 8 (right to private life) 13, 14, and 20 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.227 Upon learning that one of the
twins she was carrying had died in the womb and that the other had Edward’s
syndrome, the woman, known as D, had traveled to the UK for an abortion.
Despite her fatal fetal abnormality diagnosis, her doctors told her that she
could not end her pregnancy under Irish law. For its part, the Government
lawyers argued that it was an “open question” as to whether D would have
been legally entitled to an abortion in Ireland should she have gone through
the Irish courts system; there was no legislation on the 8th, and therefore it
was 'impossible to foresee' if an abortion in her circumstances would be
criminalized.228 The state's lawyers claimed that there was at least a tenable
argument that a fetus suffering from a fatal abnormality was not “an unborn”
for the purposes of the 8th or that even if it was an unborn, its right to life was
not actually engaged as it had no prospect of life outside the womb.229 The
European Court of Human Rights sided with the government and held that
D's case was inadmissible because D did not go through the Irish courts to
determine whether her situation fell within the 8th.
Interview with Catharine Forde, (July 19, 2018).
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The state had successfully defended itself in D v. Ireland by claiming that
Ireland likely did not ban abortion in cases of fatal fetal abnormality. Far from
a settled question, a year later, news broke that state actors were trying to stop
a pregnant 17-year-old girl from leaving the country to abort a pregnancy
with a fetal abnormality.230 "Miss D," who was in the care of the state,
expressed her intention to travel to the UK for an abortion to her social
worker, who in turn informed the Health Service Executive (HSE), the body
responsible for her care. The HSE first attempted to rely upon the X-case
exception for the teenager's case by claiming that she posed a risk to herself,
but Miss D refused to say that she was suicidal. The HSE then wrote to the
Gardaí to request that they arrest Miss D if she attempted to leave the
country. The HSE also asked that the Passport Office refuse to issue her with
a passport. 231
Miss D was forced to turn to the courts. Finding that were no legal rules
to prevent a 17-year-old girl in the care of the Health Service Executive from
traveling abroad for an abortion, the High Court in D (A Minor) v. District Judge
Brennan, the Health Services Executive, Ireland, and the Attorney General, upheld her
right to travel. 232
Miss D’s case was one of many that exemplified the particularly
challenging burdens that the 8th amendment forced upon women who were
already disadvantaged in their access to resources and power. Women in
myriad circumstances, such as migrants, asylum seekers and the
undocumented, women in lower socio-economic cases, and women with
disabilities, struggled to travel abroad for abortions. A woman's health and
age could also limit her mobility. As a Dublin city center family planning
clinic, the Irish Family Planning Association had a front-row view of the
harms of Ireland's restrictive and ambiguous abortion laws. This prompted
the organization to support three women to challenge Ireland's legal regime
on abortion at the European Court of Human Rights.233
In December 2009, the Grand Chamber of 17 Judges of the European
Court of Human Rights sat for an oral hearing of A, B, and C v. Ireland.234 The
three women argued that Ireland's criminalization of abortion had forced
them to travel to England for abortions which had jeopardized their health
and wellbeing, in violation of the right to private life under Article 8; the right
to be free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment under Article 3 and
the right to be free from discrimination per Article 14 of the European
230 See, e.g., Irish police cannot stop girl leaving for abortion, THE GUARDIAN (May 4, 2007)
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/04/ireland.
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Convention of Human Rights.235 While the first two applicants had sought
abortions for socio-economic reasons, the third applicant had become
pregnant after three years of chemotherapeutic treatment for a rare form of
cancer, and the pregnancy threatened a recurrence of the cancer. Unable to
obtain advice from Irish doctors on whether she was entitled to an abortion
in Ireland, and she had an abortion in England.
As in Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, Ireland argued that the
country’s abortion law represented the “profound moral choice of the Irish
people as to the nature of unborn life” and added that “for almost 60 years
the Court had recognized the diversity of traditions and values of the
contracting states” including the right of each contracting state to determine
that fetal life is entitled to the right to life.236
The litigants maintained that the will of the Irish people had changed
since the 1983 referendum; the Irish electorate had voted against so-called
'pro-life' amendments in all referenda since 1983, and opinion polls suggested
an appetite for reform. Accordingly, the state's asserted "legitimate aim" for
interfering with their human rights was no longer, they claimed, a valid one.
The women also underscored the ineffectiveness of Ireland's restrictions in
achieving that goal, given that the abortion rate for women in Ireland was
similar to states where abortion was legal.237
The Court separated the claims of A and B, the ‘wellbeing’ abortions from
C, the potentially life-saving abortion. In C’s case, the Court held
unanimously that Ireland had violated her right to private life under Article
8.238 The Court accepted C’s argument that the risk to her life should have
qualified her for a legal abortion per the X-case doctrine; but, because there
was no legislation clarifying that medical professionals would not be
criminalized for aborting a fetus to save a woman's life, it was rare for doctors
to actually carry out such life-saving abortions. Echoing the Irish Supreme
Court's condemnation of the government for failing to clarify the meaning of
the 8th amendment, the Court concluded that:
[t]he uncertainty generated by the lack of legislative implementation of
Article 40.3.3 (the 8th amendment) and more particularly by the lack
of effective and accessible procedures to establish a right to an
abortion under that provision, has resulted in a striking discordance
235 See
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Press/Multimedia/Webcasts+of+public+hearings/webcastEN_
media?&p_url=20091209- (Oral Argument).
236 A., B. & C. v. Ir., App. No. 25579/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009),
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Press/
Multimedia/Webcasts+of+public+hearings/webcastEN_media?&p_url=20091209- (Oral Argument,).
237 ABC, supra note 12 at 170.
238 ABC, supra note 12 at 253.
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between the theoretical right to a lawful abortion in Ireland on
grounds of a relevant risk to a woman’s life and the reality of its
practical implementation.239
In addressing the first two applicants, the Court agreed that Ireland’s
system of forcing women abroad to have abortions interfered with the
women’s right to respect for private life. But a majority of 11 judges to 6
declined to hold that the 8th amendment violated the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR). The majority reasoned that because women had
the option of lawfully travelling to another state for an abortion, the state had
"struck a fair balance" between protecting the public's interest in securing the
right to life of the unborn and the conflicting rights of the women.240 In
particular, given “the acute sensitivity of the moral and ethical issues raised
by the question of abortion,” Ireland enjoyed a “broad margin of
appreciation” in regulating the field of abortion law.241 Without discussion on
the merits, the Court dismissed the applicants' claims that their rights to nondiscrimination and freedom from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
were abridged.
Because it left the 8th amendment intact, A, B & C could be characterized
as an anti-abortion victory. However, given the violation of applicant C's right
to private life, to comply with the decision, the state was required to finally
pass legislation to implement the Supreme Court's X-case conclusion that
abortion was permissible in Ireland if necessary to save the life of the pregnant
women. A year after the decision, on November 2011, the Irish government
established an Expert Group to “elucidate” the implications of the ABC case
and to recommend a series of options on how to implement the judgment.242
A year later, in November 2012, the Expert Group reported to
government with four options to clarify the criteria under which abortions
could be carried out in order to save a woman's life;243 to clarify by means of
(i) non-statutory guidelines by the Minister for Health (ii) statutory regulations
by the Minister by Health244 (iii) primary legislation or (iv) legislation and
statutory guidelines. Before the Government or Oireachtas had the chance to
debate these options, a story broke that significantly altered the context for
deliberation. A pregnant woman named Savita Halappanavar died while in
Id. 264, 269.
Id. 241.
241 Id. 242.
242 GOV’T OF IR., ACTION PLAN A, B, & C V. IR. APPLICATION NO 25579/2005, GRAND CHAMBER JUDGMENT,
(2010), http://www.dohc.ie/press/releases/2011/20110616.html; See also Deaglan De Breadun, Minister Sets Up
Expert Group on Abortion Rights, THE IR. TIMES (November 30, 2011).
243 DEP’T OF HEALTH AND CHILD., REP. OF THE EXPERT GROUP ON THE JUDGMENT IN A, B AND C V. IR.,
(2012), http://www.dohc.ie/publications/Judgement_ABC.html [hereinafter, Expert Group Report].
244 In Ireland, statutory regulations are "an order, regulation, rule, scheme or bye-law made in exercise of a
power conferred by statute." They are similar to regulations of various government agencies in the U.S.
Statutory Instruments Act 1947.
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Galway University Hospital in circumstances where an abortion may have
saved her life.
Savita Halappanavar, a dentist of Indian origin who had been living in
Ireland for three years, was 17 weeks pregnant when she presented with signs
of an impending miscarriage to hospital staff in Galway. Her doctors told her
that her pregnancy would not survive, but they wouldn't terminate the
pregnancy 'due to their assessment of the legal context.'245 As Savita and her
husband pressed her medical team as to why she couldn’t have an abortion
when miscarriage was inevitable, a midwife explained that Ireland was “a
Catholic country”; until the fetal heartbeat stopped, doctors would not be
able to intervene.246 Instead, the medical team's approach was to "await
events." Savita's prolonged miscarriage caused her to develop sepsis. The
infection became fatal and forced her to have a heart attack, from which she
died at the age of 31.247
Until this point in time, Ireland’s proximity to the UK meant that the
country had largely escaped the deathly impacts of unsafe self-induced or the
so-called “backstreet” procedures that cost many lives in countries with
restrictive abortion laws.248 Savita's death, however, was a vividly publicized
catastrophe. There was an outpouring of discontent and outage in Ireland
and beyond. 249 “Ireland Murders Pregnant Indian Dentist’” ran a headline from
the India Times, just one of a multitude of international headlines that
followed her death.250 Communities held candle-lit vigils across the country
with signs reading "Never Again" and "Savita had a heartbeat too." In a way
never seen before, public sentiment contested the status quo on abortion, and
calls for change were no longer fringe.
245 HEALTH SERV. EXEC., FINAL REPORT: INVESTIGATION OF INCIDENT 50278 FROM TIME OF PATIENT'S
SELF-REFERRAL TO HOSPITAL ON OCTOBER 21, 2012, TO THE PATIENT'S DEATH ON OCTOBER 28, 2012, 21,
22-53, (2013) (Patient history is derived from the official investigation and final report carried out by the Irish
Health Service Executive and commissioned by the hospital.) [hereinafter HSE Report 2013].
246 Midwife confirms she told Savita Halappanavar Ireland a 'Catholic country' RTE News, (April 11, 2013)
https://www.rte.ie/news/health/2013/0410/380613-savita-halappanavar-inquest/.
247 HSE Report 2013, supra note 232. See also KITTY HOLLAND, SAVITA: THE TRAGEDY THAT SHOOK A
NATION (2013).
248 This does not mean that there were no deaths. Two months after the A, B, and C decision, the state settled a
case against it by Michelle Harte (but posthumously with her estate as she had died of cancer by the time of
settlement). In the months before her death, Michelle had an abortion in the UK, having been denied both
cancer treatment and an abortion in Ireland. Although her doctors had advised her to terminate the pregnancy
because of the risk to her health, her treating hospital in Cork refused to authorize an abortion on the basis that
her life was not under 'immediate threat.' In order to receive her cancer treatment, Michelle Harte began making
arrangements for travel to the UK for an abortion. However, her abortion was delayed owing to her need to
obtain a passport, and her cancer returned during this period. Michelle Harte subsequently died from the
returned cancer. See, e.g., Ir. Council for Civ. Liberties, Case in Focus: Michelle Harte, www.iccl.ie/herrights/health/Michelle-Harte/.
249 Bridget Fallon, Protesters in Ireland rally for abortion rights CNN, (November 18, 2012),
https://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/17/world/europe/ireland-abortion-controversy/index.html/; See also, Alison
O’ Connor, How the Death of Savita Changed the Abortion Debate, IR. EXAM’R, (October 28, 2017),
https://www.irishexaminer.com/business/arid-20461787.html.
250 Vandita Agrawal, Ireland Murders Pregnant Indian Dentist, INDIA TIMES, (November 12, 2012),
https://www.indiatimes.com/europe/ireland-murders-pregnant-indian-dentist-47214.html.
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Within a month of her story breaking, the government announced plans
to follow the recommendation of the Expert Group on ABC by introducing
a combination of legislation and guidelines to clarify how medical
professionals could determine if an abortion would be legal when a woman’s
life was at risk, thereby implementing the X-case ruling.251 Anti-abortion
groups, now most forcefully represented by the Pro-Life Campaign, Iona
Institute, and the Life Institute, argued that such legislation would "blur the
distinction between life-saving medical interventions in pregnancy and
induced abortion" and that the inclusion of suicidal ideation would become a
"gateway" for widespread abortion availability in Ireland.252 Youth Defense
unveiled campaign posters with a forlorn woman above the caption:
"Abortion tears her life apart – there is always a better solution." They were
closely followed by the Pro-life Campaign's billboards; "Did you know that
79% of women want Fine Gael to keep its pro-life commitments?" one read,
featuring a woman holding a baby.
Similarly, in the Dáil, anti-choice TDs mounted a significant campaign
against the legislation, particularly the proposed Act's legalization of abortion
in situations where a woman's life was at risk owing to a suicide threat. Brian
Walsh TD claimed that the suicide provision would "defile the Statute Book
with the absurd premise that the suicidality of one human being can be abated
by the destruction and killing of another," while others argued that it would
"open the floodgates to widespread abortion" (Eamon O'Cuiv) and
"normalize suicidal ideation" (Lucinda Creighton).253
Meanwhile, the public’s attitude suggested a willingness for reform
broader than implementing X. Polling in February 2013 revealed that 78%
of respondents supported access to abortion in the case of rape and incest. 254
A number of pro-choice TDs took advantage of the fact that the
government had actually committed to passing abortion legislation to
advocate for legislation beyond X and ABC. Invoking the Irish government’s
own argument before the European Court of Human Rights in D. v Ireland –
that the right to life of “the unborn” may not be engaged when fetal
abnormality is incompatible with life – a small group of mostly independent
251 See, e.g., Gavan Reilly, Government Will Legislate to Allow Abortion in Line With X Case Ruling, THE JOURNAL
(DECEMBER 18, 2012), https://www.thejournal.ie/ireland-to-legislate-for-abortion-721493-Dec2012/.
252 See, e.g., PROF. PATRICIA CASEY, ORAL EVIDENCE TO JOINT COMM. ON HEALTH AND CHILD., (2013);
PROF. WILLIAM BINCHY, ORAL EVIDENCE TO JOINT COMM. ON HEALTH AND CHILD., (2013).
253 See, e.g., JOINT OIREACHTAS COMM. ON HEALTH AND CHILD., REPORT ON PUBLIC HEARINGS ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOVERNMENT DECISION FOLLOWING THE PUBLICATION OF THE EXPERT GROUP
REPORT ON A, B, & C V IRELAND (2013),
http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/oireachtasbusiness/committees_list/health-and-children/.
254 See, e.g., Damian Lochrain, Irish Times’ poll: Clear shift in attitude to abortion since 2013, IR. TIMES (April 20, 2018),
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/irish-times-poll-clear-shift-in-attitude-to-abortion-since-20131.3467547?mode=sample&auth-failed=1&pworigin=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.irishtimes.com%2Fnews%2Fsocial-affairs%2Firish-times-poll-clear-shift-inattitude-to-abortion-since-2013-1.3467547.
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TDs contended that the legislation should permit access to abortion in the
context of fatal fetal anomalies.255 Three women who had traveled to the UK
for abortions in cases of fatal fetal abnormality, including D herself, addressed
the Dáil to support the legislative plan of the pro-choice TDs.256 Notably, this
was the first time that women who had had abortions spoke about their
experience openly before the Dáil.257
Following the second set of legislative hearings, the Dáil passed the
Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act (“PLDPA”) to implement the 1992
judgment in the X case, as required by A, B and C v. Ireland, to clarify that
abortion would be legal where there was a real and substantial risk to the life
of the pregnant woman).258 Marking a break with the years when antiabortion groups had dictated the legislative agenda on abortion, the
legislature did not exclude suicide risk as grounds for abortion. But pro-choice
TDs had not succeeded in determining the scope of the legislation either –
the Act did not permit abortion in cases of fatal fetal anomaly.259 The Act also
fell short in solving the legal difficulties raised by Savita’s case; doctors could
still not intervene and end a pregnancy until a pregnant woman’s life, as
opposed to her health, was patently at risk. Abortion in any situation other
than when necessary to protect a woman’s life remained a crime with a
penalty of imprisonment for up to fourteen years.
G. From the PLDPA to the Road to Repeal
Though the PLDPA was a victory for pro-choice campaigners in the sense
that the state had finally legislated for X (21 years later), their concerns were
far from abated. The new law did not improve access to abortion; legal
abortions in the years that followed averaged typically less than fifty per
year.260 Only 26 "terminations" were carried out in Irish hospitals under the
Act the year following its adoption. Three were carried out based on the risk
to the life of the woman by suicide, 14 due to the risk from physical illness,
and nine based on an emergency situation from physical illness. Under the
Act, medical professionals still owed a duty to do everything practicable to
255 Proposed section 10 by Senators Fiach Mac Conghail and Marie-Louise O'Donnell, in Committee
Amendments, 866 No. 4 Dáil Deb.,
https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/bill/2013/66/seanad/3/amendment/numberedList/eng/b6613dscn.pdf.
256 See, e.g., Niamh Connolly, D Case Woman Wants to Address Oireachtas Committee Hearings THE SUNDAY BUS. POST
(May 12, 2013).
257See, e.g., Kathy Sheridan, Stories of Abortion. IR. TIMES (February 25, 2012),
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/stories-of-abortion-1.470399.
258 PLDPA, supra note 3.
259 The government relied on advice from the Attorney General that legislating to permit abortion in cases of
fatal fetal abnormality would violate the 8th amendment.
260 See, e.g., HEALTH SERV. EXEC., NOTIFICATIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 20 OF THE PROTECTION
OF LIFE DURING PREGNANCY ACT 2013, http://health.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/annual-report2014-Protection-of-Life-During-Pregnancy1.pdf.
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preserve fetal life, whatever the consequences for a pregnant woman.261
Commenting on the new act, Dr. Rhona Mahony, Master of Ireland’s
National Maternity Hospital, explained that:
the new law has not changed much of the practice. When women get
sick, we can’t intervene until her life is at risk, and then we have to
hope we save her in time.262
And though the Act did little to alleviate the burden of travel for abortion
seekers, the annual number of women living in Ireland and accessing abortion
services outside the country began to fall.263 The primary reason for this was
the increasing use of medical abortions (or the 'abortion pill') in Ireland.
Taking – but not obtaining – the pills was illegal. As such, the pills could be
prescribed through telemedicine —usually, via international non-profit
groups, Women on Web and Women Help Women— and taken at home.
Such home use of abortion pills was not, however, a panacea for all women
in need of an abortion. In addition to its illegality, its accessibility was limited
for women who lacked information, privacy, and residency status. Young
women and migrant women faced particular challenges. The non-profits
usually mailed the pills to safe addresses in Northern Ireland, where customs
were less likely to seize the delivery. Just as going to England was not usually
an option for migrant women, crossing the border to Northern Ireland was
not always possible.
The case of ‘Ms. Y' vividly captured the reality that some women in
Ireland had no options to end unwanted pregnancies. A young migrant
woman, Ms. Y, discovered that she was pregnant while going through the
asylum process in Ireland; she had been raped in her country of origin. 264
Distraught, she repeatedly told the different state agencies and health care
workers who were managing her asylum application and her care that she
needed to have an abortion; she would otherwise commit suicide.265 Despite
the state’s new legislative guarantee in the PLDPA that abortion was legal
when a woman’s life was at risk, including the risk of suicide, Ms. Y. was

261 Kitty Holland, GP Group Adds Voice to Worries About Abortion Act, IR. TIMES (January 4, 2014)
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/gp-group-adds-voice-to-worries-about-abortion-act-1.1643922.
262 Interview with Dr. Rhona Mahony, Master of the National Maternity Hospital, July 17, 2016.
263 See, e.g., Sally Sheldon, Empowerment and Privacy? Home Use of Abortion Pills in the Republic of Ireland 43(4) SIGNS J.
OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOC’Y 823 (2018) (noting that the UK Department of Health Statistics recorded
6,672 Irish women obtaining abortion in 2001 and 3,451 in 2015).
264 See, e.g., Kitty Holland, Timeline of Ms. Y Case, IR. TIMES, (October 4, 2014).
265 Id.
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denied access to lawful abortion care and was ultimately forced to give birth
cesarean.266
The same year as Ms. Y’s ordeal, the UN Human Rights Committee
(HRC) assessed Ireland's compliance with the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The Committee condemned the new Act
and asserted that its review process effectively gave power to doctors,
obstetricians, and psychiatrists to prevent women from terminating their
pregnancies, even when termination should be lawful.267 The Committee
recommended that the state rectify its failure to provide women with access
to abortion in circumstances in which pregnancy was a result of rape, when
a woman is carrying a fetus with fatal abnormalities, and where a woman's
health was in danger.268 The comments by Nigel Rodley, then Chair of the
Committee, attracted particular attention:
Life without quality of life is not something many of us have to choose
between, and to suggest that, regardless of the health consequences of
a pregnancy, a person may be doomed to continue it at the risk of
criminal penalty is difficult to understand . . . Even more so regarding
rape when the person doesn't even bear any responsibility and is by
the law clearly treated as a vessel and nothing more. 269
The litany of tragic cases involving the 8th amendment continued. In
December of the same year (2014), a team of doctors placed a woman, who
had been declared irrecoverably brain dead, on life support—against her
family’s wishes—in an effort to enable her fetus to be born alive.270 The
woman’s medical team believed that the 8th amendment required them to
protect “the unborn” in this way;271 to have somatic care withdrawn, and the
woman's father was forced to sue the Irish Health Service.272
International criticism of Ireland's abortion law also intensified. In July
2015, the UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(CESCR) recommended that Ireland revise its legislation on abortion,
including the Constitution and the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act
266 Ms. Y also tried to go to the UK but couldn't afford the cost (her only source of money was the state stipend
for asylum seekers, which amounted to €19.10 per week) and could not complete the necessary travel permit
forms as she not speak English.
267 UN H.R. Comm., Prof. C. Flinterman of UNHR Committee on Ireland’s Abortion Laws, YOUTUBE (July 15, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kpzoa3I4oxQ.
268 Concluding Observations on the fourth periodic report of Ireland, [2014] UN Doc CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4.
269 Clip of closing comments by Nigel Rodley during Ireland’s review under the ICCPR by the UN Human Rights Committee,
YOUTUBE (July 15, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v0NCIB3uHns.;
Ann Cahill, UN: Irish Abortion Law Treats Women as “Vessels,” IR. EXAM’R (July 16, 2014),
http://www.irishexaminer.com/ireland/unirish-abortion-law-treats-women-as-vessels-275578.html.
270 P.P. v. Health Serv. Exec., [2014] IEHC 622 (H. Ct.) (Ir.) (unreported).
271 P.P., [2014] IEHC at 2.
272 P.P., [2014] IEHC at 12-13.
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2013, in line with international human rights standards.273 The Committee
members also remarked on the discriminatory impacts of the law on women
who could not afford to go abroad for an abortion or who could not access
the necessary information.274 Their condemnation was followed by the UN
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in 2016, which expresses a
number of concerns regarding the impact of Ireland's abortion laws on girls'
human rights.275 Pro-choice activism proliferated, and its base grew stronger
and more vocal about the need for access to abortion in Ireland. The
campaigning at the UN level was supplemented with myriad forms of
advocacy nationally and locally. Some activists used art and street protest
were used to bring visibility to the injustice of Ireland's abortion laws. ROSA
(for Reproductive rights, against Oppression, Sexism, and Austerity) publicly
smuggled abortion pills across the border and around the island by train, bus,
and drone, raising awareness and recruiting members along the way. The
Abortion Rights Campaign carried out an initiative called 'Chats for Choice'
that utilized Facebook Live, a web streaming facility, to counteract
misinformation about abortion in a live chat show format. The X-file Project
offered a platform for more people to come forward and share their name
and portrait in the telling of their abortion stories.276 Pro-choice groups online
and offline promoted first-person abortion story-sharing to "bust stigma" and
normalize abortion.277 Irish women began speaking publicly in
unprecedented numbers and with unprecedented candor about their
abortion histories.
By February 2016, polling from Amnesty Ireland suggested majority prochoice sentiment throughout the country.278 In the general election that same
month, most political parties took a position on the future of the 8th
amendment in their manifestos. Fine Gael (the majority party in government)
committed to establishing a 'Citizens' Assembly' to consider the matter of the
8th amendment, and the Social Democrats proposed repealing the 8th
amendment and then having a "people's convention" to consider the
legislation that would follow. Sinn Fein, Labour (the minority Government
party), the Green Party, the Anti-Austerity Alliance, and People Before Profit
all proposed repeal of the 8th amendment followed by legislation to make
273 U.N. CESCR Committee Concluding Observations on the Third Periodic Report of Ireland, U.N. Docs
E/C.12/IRL/CO/3 (2015).
274 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child Committee, Concluding Observations on the Third and Fourth Periodic Report of
Ireland U.N. Docs. CRC/C/IRL/CO/3-4.
275 Id.
276 See, e.g., Ellen Tanham, Destigmatising Abortion One Face At A Time - The X-Ile Project HER.IE,
https://www.her.ie/news/destigmatising-abortion-one-face-at-a-time-the-x-ile-project-279976 .
277 See, e.g., Abortion Rights Campaign, Time to speak out: 2017 Abortion Rights Campaign Speak Out. ABORTION
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, https://www.abortionrightscampaign.ie/event/time-to-speak-out- 2017-abortion-rightscampaign-speak-out/ .
278 Amnesty International Ireland, What You Need to Know About Attitudes to Abortion in Ireland, AMNESTY INT’L IR.
(Feb. 2016), https://www.amnesty.ie/poll/#.
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abortion available, although there was little consistency across the parties
regarding different levels of availability.279 Fianna Fáil, the main opposition
party, made no mention of abortion in its manifesto.
In May 2016, in the 'Programme for a Partnership Government, the new
government committed to establishing, within six months, a Citizens'
Assembly to examine the possibility of repealing the 8th amendment.280 In
the meantime, Ireland’s abortion law was condemned once again by the
Human Rights Committee. In a ground-breaking international human rights
law case, Amanda Mellet v Ireland281 the Human Rights Committee held that by
denying Ms. Mellet an abortion in Ireland to end a pregnancy with a fatal
fetal anomaly, Ireland had subjected her to cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment.282 The Committee also found that Ireland had violated Ms.
Mellet’s right to privacy by interfering with her decision as to how best to
cope with her non-viable pregnancy.283
The Taoiseach at the time, Enda Kenny, responded that the Human
Rights Committee ruling was not binding on the state and rather than reform
the law to comply, he proceeded with his plan for the assembly. In July 2016,
the government-appointed Judge Mary Laffoy to lead 99 members of the
public, randomly selected on the basis of being representative of the Irish
electorate in terms of gender, age, and regional spread, to examine the
possibility of repealing the 8th amendment. Justice Laffoy's stated priority was
to "facilitate an evidence-based approach to discussion and policymaking."
Beginning its work in the autumn of 2016, assembly members received oral
and written evidence from a number of experts and advocates over the course
of 9 months. The evidence covered the legal regulation of abortion in Ireland
and abroad, the intricacies of Irish constitutional law, the relationship
between domestic law and international human rights law, the experience of
medical practitioners in the UK treating women from Ireland who access
abortion in England, ethicists, and pro-choice and anti-abortion advocates.284
The citizen members themselves insisted on several interventions to help
them decide: they asked to be addressed by people with direct experience of
the 8th amendment, i.e., women who had, and who had not, accessed
279 Mark O’Reagan, Fine Gael Risks Losing Seats as Kenny ‘Ignores Women’ Over Abortion Laws, THE IR. INDEPENDENT
(September 25, 2016), http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/politics/fine-gael-risks-losing-seats-as-kennyignores-women-over-abortion-laws-35076319.html; Emer O’Toole, Ireland’s Election Result is no Stepping Stone to
Abortion Rights: It’s a Roadblock, THE GUARDIAN (March 9,
2016), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/mar/09/ireland-election-abortion-rights-campaign.
280 GOV’T OF IR., HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTAS, PROGRAMME FOR PARTNERSHIP GOVERNMENT (2017),
https://merrionstreet.ie/MerrionStreet/en/ImageLibrary/Programme_for_Partnership_Government.pdf#page
=154.
281 Mellet v. Ireland, supra note xx.
282 Id. ¶ 7.4
283 Id. ¶ 7.5.
284 See, e.g., Fiona de Londras & Mima Markicevic, Reforming abortion law in Ireland: Reflections on the public submissions
to the Citizens' Assembly, 70 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 89-98 (2018).
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abortion.285 They also insisted on the rewording of some propositions that
had been put to the group, most importantly that in addition to voting to
recommend that abortion be legal in situations of rape and serious risk to
health, they should have the option to vote for grounds of risk to the woman’s
health more generally and of socio-economics reasons and women’s
autonomy.286 In their final report, on June 29, 2017, the majority of the
Assembly members recommended that abortion be available without
restriction as to reason up to 12 weeks (48%, with 44% thinking it should be
available without restriction up to 22 weeks), up to 22 weeks where there was
a risk to a woman's health (including to mental health), on socio-economic
grounds up to 22 weeks, where the fetus was diagnosed with a non-fatal
anomaly (up to 22 weeks), in cases of rape (up to 22 weeks), where there was
a serious risk to the pregnant person's health (without time limit), or where
the fetus was diagnosed with a fetal anomaly (without time limit). 287
The assembly’s recommendations went far beyond what most people
expected;288 up until this point, public discourse had mostly focused on
exceptions, such as providing abortion in cases of fatal fetal anomalies or
situations of rape or incest, and most Irish people had assumed that the
assembly would favor this limited solution.289
The assembly's recommendations did not necessarily commit the
government or parliament to anything.290 The government responded by
establishing the ‘Joint Oireachtas Committee on the 8th Amendment of the
Constitution' comprised of representatives from various political parties from
both houses of the Oireachtas (Dáil and Seanad), to consider the assembly's
recommendations. Over a period of three months, the Committee was again
addressed by experts, some the same as those who had given testimony to the
assembly. This time, however, there was a greater emphasis on international
policy and practice on abortion, including best practices on reproductive
285 The assembly addressed this by recording testimony from people who had and who had not accessed abortion
during the time of the 8th amendment and playing those to the citizen members. This occurred in the third
weekend of the assembly's deliberations and can be accessed on its website:
https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/Meetings/Fourth-Meeting-of-the-Citizens-Assembly-on-the-EighthAmendment-of-the-Constitution.html.
286 Id.
287 Citizens’ Assembly, Final Report on the Eighth Amendment of the
Constitution (2017), https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/The-Eighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution/FinalReport-on-the-Eighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution/Final-Report-on-the-Eighth-Amendment-of-theConstitution.html (Ir.).
288 See, e.g., When citizens assemble https://www.allhandsondoc.com/; See also, Máiréad Enright, Abortion and the
Citizens’ Assembly: Agonist Futures?, IADC SYMPOSIUM (2018), https://blog-iaclaidc.org/blog/2018/12/5/abortion-and-the-citizens-assembly-agonist-futures-xb2x6 (a critical reflection on the
assembly process).
289 Patrick Chalmers, How 99 Strangers in a Dublin Hotel Broke Ireland's Abortion Deadlock, THE GUARDIAN (March 18,
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/08/how-99-strangers-in-a-dublin-hotel-broke-irelandsabortion-deadlock .
290 See generally, David Kennedy, Abortion, the Irish Constitution, and constitutional change, 5 REV. DE INVESTIGAÇÕES
CONSTITUCIONAIS 3, (2018).
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health and Ireland's obligations under international human rights law. The
World Health Organization, the Guttmacher Institute, BPAS, the Centre for
Reproductive Rights, the Irish Human Rights Commission, and a range of
other Irish medical, medico-legal, and constitutional law experts addressed
the 21 politicians.291
The Committee debated whether a limited right to access abortion (e.g.,
on grounds of rape or risk to life) could be inserted into the Constitution to
replace the 8th, but in the end, the Committee voted for 'repeal simpliciter.'292
Like the Citizen’s Assembly, the parliamentary committee recommended that
the 8th amendment be repealed from the Constitution and abortion made
lawful without restriction as to reason up to a gestational limit of 12 weeks.293
Several committee members commented that, over the course of their
involvement in the Joint Committee, they had changed their minds to favor
access to abortion for any reason in the first 12 weeks rather than an
exception-based regime.294
H. Referendum to repeal the 8th amendment
Upon receipt of the Joint Committee’s recommendations, the Cabinet
(government ministers) agreed at the end of January 2018 to hold a
referendum on the 8th Amendment in May 2018. Their proposal was to
remove the 8th and replace it with a text empowering the Oireachtas to pass
abortion law. In March, the government also shared a 'general scheme'
(Heads of a Bill) for post-repeal legislation.295 It presented a trimester
framework for dealing with abortion; in the first 12 weeks, abortion would be
available on request, following a three-day waiting period. Beyond the first
trimester of pregnancy, abortion would be available where two medical
practitioners certified that there was a risk to the life or of serious harm to the
health of the pregnant woman. There was no distinction made between
mental and physical health. Abortion would not be permitted beyond the

291 Report of the Joint Oireachtas Committee on the Eighth
Amendment (2018), https://webarchive.oireachtas.ie/parliament/media/committees/eighthamendmentoftheconst
itution/Report-of-the-Joint-Committee-on-the-Eighth-Amendment-web-version.pdf (The full list of witnesses is
included as Appendix 2 to the Committee’s Report); See also, Christine Zampas, Opening Statement to the Oireachtas
Joint Committee on the Eight Amendment to the Constitution, (October 4, 2017),
https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/committee/dail/32/joint_committee_on_the_eighth_amendment
_of_the_constitution/submissions/2017/2017-10-04_opening-statement-ms-Christina-zampas_en.pdf .
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Billy Kelleher, Why I was Persuaded abortion up to 12 weeks Should be Allowed, IR. TIMES (March 21, 2018),
https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/why-i-was-persuaded-abortion-up-to-12-weeks-should-be-allowed1.3433974 .
295 GOV’T OF IR., GENERAL SCHEME OF A BILL TO REGULATE TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY
(2018), https://health.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/General-Scheme-for-Publication.pdf.
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point of viability, which was set at the 24th week of pregnancy.296 Abortion
outside the terms of the legislation would remain a criminal offense, although
pregnant women would be exempt from prosecution.297
Though for the five years prior to the referendum, it had fallen to
Independent TDs and other small left political parties to advance pro-choice
arguments in the Dáil, by March, all of the political party leaders had
announced their support for the repeal movement. Micheál Martin (leader of
the opposition Fianna Fáil party) announced on January 19, 2018, that he
would campaign to repeal the 8th amendment, even though up until that
point, he had been on record as being against abortion access.298 His u-turn
may have been a catalyst for other political figures to come out in support of
the repeal movement. Hours after his announcement, Taoiseach Leo
Varadkar also announced his support for repeal. In a significant change of
position, Minister for Foreign Affairs Simon Coveney (and deputy leader of
the government) made a similar announcement. However, key figures in all
three main parties – Fine Gael, Fianna Fáil, and Sinn Féin – took different
sides in the debate. Some 26 Teachtaí Dála voted against allowing any
referendum on the 8th amendment, most of which were from the Fianna Fáil
party. Nonetheless, the vote to allow an amendment passed with a majority
of 97 to 26 and a referendum was announced for May 25, 2018.299
Immediately from the time of the referendum’s announcement, opinion
polling showed a consistent lead for the ‘Yes’ side.300 In March, the main
campaign movement for a Yes vote, "Together for Yes," launched. It
represented a coalition of three large pro-choice organizations, namely the
Coalition to Repeal the 8th amendment, the Abortion Rights Campaign, and
the National Women's Council. Professional and cultural organizations
formed support groups, such as Nurses Together for Yes, Psychologists
Together for Yes, Farmers for Yes. Crucially, Together for Yes mobilized
hundreds of grassroots networks to conduct a mass canvassing operation. In
every constituency in the country, local Together for Yes groups, comprised
of men and women of all ages (but primarily young people), canvassed door
to door. Every canvassing group logged responses on a specially designed

296 Sarah Bardon, Abortion Legislation: The Really Contentious Bits, IR. TIMES (May 12, 2018),
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/social-affairs/abortion-legislation-the-really-contentious-bits-1.3490740.
297 GOV’T OF IR., GENERAL SCHEME OF A BILL TO REGULATE TERMINATION OF PREGNANCY
(2018), https://health.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/General-Scheme-for-Publication.pdf.
298 See, e.g., Pat Leahy, Micheál Martin’s Abortion Stance a Response to Strong Mood for Change, IR. TIMES (January 18,
2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/miche%C3%A1l-martin-s-abortion-stance-a-response-to-strongmood-for-change-1.3361479.
299 See, e.g., Sarah Bardon, Marie O'Halloran & Michael O'Regan, Abortion referendum to go ahead following Dáil vote
IRISH TIMES (March 21, 2018) https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/Oireachtas/abortion-referendum-togo-ahead-following-dáil-vote-1.3435008.
300 Irish Times/Ipsos MRBI Poll January 28, 2018, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/poll/polljanuary-25th-2018.
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software package that fed data from doorsteps all over the country to the
campaign headquarters in Dublin.301
Notably, the Together for Yes messaging over the three months of the
referendum campaign focused on “Care, Compassion and Change” rather
than on a woman’s right to choose or women’s freedom. Emphasizing the
need to repeal the 8th in order to provide compassionate care to women who
were pregnant because of rape, or women who make hard decisions to end
pregnancies because their child won’t survive to term, Together for Yes
aimed at appeasing the alleged anti-choice instincts of a 'middle Ireland' or
Ireland's 'middle ground.'302 The campaign also argued that repeal was
necessary to alleviate the legal and medical risks for women and girls who
sourced abortion pills online and self-administered abortion without medical
supervision. Voices from the medical community were front and center, as
well as women—with husbands who had experienced pregnancies with fetal
anomalies. Some commented that voices heard at its public demonstrations
almost always had recognizably middle-class accents.303
The Catholic Church urged Irish Catholics to become “missionaries for
the cause of life” in the run-up to the referendum. The No campaign, led by
a coalition known as Save the 8th, however, did not invoke religion. Its
messaging focused, instead, on portraying the proposed legislation as being
‘too extreme’ and likely to result in a large number of abortions occurring in
Ireland.304 It frequently invoked claims about ‘vulnerable’ cases, such as
children with disabilities, and the likelihood that abortion would be used to
reduce the number of children born with particular needs. Factions of the
campaign framed abortion as murder, using the hashtag ‘#repealkills’ on
social media.
On May 25, 2018, polling stations opened from 8 am – 10 pm. Until this
day, no Irish citizen under the age of 53 had ever had the option of liberalizing
Ireland’s abortion law. Media reported that thousands had flown home from
abroad to vote for repeal.305 Analysts predicted a narrow victory for Yes.
“Feminist Christmas”306 began when the Irish Times reported the first
exit poll at 10 pm on the night of the vote. The exit poll indicated that the
Interview with Laura Harmon, Mobilization Director, Together for Yes, Jun, 10th, 2018.
Id. See also GRAINNE GRIFFIN ET AL.; IT'S A YES! HOW TOGETHER FOR YES REPEALED THE EIGHT AND
TRANSFORMED IRISH SOCIETY (2019); Sandra Duffy A change is gonna come: Reflections on the repeal campaign (2019),
https://sandraduffy.wordpress.com/2019/01/07/a-change-is-gonna-come-reflections-on-the-repeal-campaign/.
303 Paola Rivetti Race, identity, and the state after the Irish abortion referendum FEMINIST REVIEW, 121, 122 (2019).
304 See, e.g., Save the 8th Preborn babies will have NO rights www.save8.ie.; For more, see Niamh Nicgabhann, City
walls, bathroom stalls and tweeting the Taoiseach: the aesthetics of protest and the campaign for abortion rights in the Republic of
Ireland, 32 (5) JOUR. OF MEDIA & CULTURAL STUDIES 2018.
305 Molly Hunter, Irish from all over the world are flying home to vote in Ireland's abortion referendum (May 24, 2018)
https://abcnews.go.com/International/irish-world-flying-home-vote-irelands-abortionreferendum/story?id=55380085.
306 See, e.g., Katha Pollitt, It’s feminist Christmas in Ireland, (May 28, 2018) https://www.thenation.com/article/itsfeminist-christmas-in-ireland/.
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repeal vote had won by a landslide, a margin of 68% to 32%.307 In an almost
exact reverse of the 1983 referendum, in the actual confirmed result, repeal
succeeded with a vote of 66.4% percent.308 The Yes vote was carried in 39
out of 40 constituencies, and there was a majority vote for repeal in almost
every demographic. Savita Halappanavar's father, Andanappa Yalagi, spoke
of the referendum result as providing justice, at last, for his daughter.309
Following the declaration of results in Dublin Castle, the Taoiseach, Leo
Varadkar, described the outcome as "the culmination of a quiet revolution
that has been taking place in Ireland over the last couple of decades."310 In
response, Irish abortion rights activists noted that it was Varadkar's
Government and his political party who had attempted to mute their
demands for so many years.
The Thirty Sixth Amendment of the Constitution Act 2018 formally
removed the 8th amendment from the Irish Constitution and replaced it with
a new Article 40.3.3, which states that "provision may be made by law for the
regulation of termination of pregnancy"). With the power to enact legislation
on abortion, the Oireachtas repealed the Protection of Life During Pregnancy
Act and introduced the Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act
2018 (HRTPA), which came into effect in January 2019. Mirroring the
legislative proposals offered before the referendum vote, the act recognizes
four grounds within which abortion is legally available in Ireland. Abortions
are now legally available, without cost, upon request until 12 weeks of
pregnancy, subject to two conditions: (i) confirmation from a medical
practitioner that the pregnancy has not reached more than 12 weeks and (ii)
following a waiting period of 3 days after the certification that the pregnancy
is under 12 weeks. Abortions at any point beyond 12 weeks are only allowed
in cases where there is a risk to the life or of "serious harm" to the health of
the pregnant woman as certified by two medical practitioners, in
circumstances where the fetus has not reached viability;311 in emergency cases
- where a medical practitioner is of a reasonable opinion that there is “an
immediate risk” to the life or of serious harm to the health of a pregnant
woman and that a termination must be carried out immediately to avert that
307 See, e.g., Pat Leahy, Irish Times exit poll projects Ireland has voted by landslide to repeal Eighth
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/irish-times-exit-poll-projects-ireland-has-voted-by-landslide-torepeal-eighth-1.3508861.
308 See, e.g., Elections Ireland, Referendum of May 25, 2018, 36th Amendment: Regulation of Termination of
Pregnancy (Repeal of 8th Amendment),
https://electionsireland.org/results/referendum/refresult.cfm?ref=201836R (last visited September 1, 2018).
309 Megan Specia How Savita Halappanavar’s death spurred Ireland’s abortion
rights campaign NEW YORK TIMES (May 27, 2018) https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/05/27/world/europe/savita-halappanavar-Ireland-abortion.html.
310 RTE News, Result is culmination of quiet revolution, says Varadkar (May 26, 2018) https://www.rte.ie/news/eighthamendment/2018/0526/966132-reaction/.
311 Section 8, HRTPA states that: “viability” means the point in a pregnancy at which, in the reasonable opinion
of a medical practitioner, the fetus is capable of survival outside the uterus without extraordinary life-sustaining
measures.”
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risk;312 and in cases of fatal fetal abnormality. Doctors who provide abortions
outside these terms continue to risk arrest, prosecution, and up to 14 years in
prison—just as they did before the referendum.313 The Act mandates an
inquiry into the operation of the law after three years.
This chapter focused on key moments in the development of Ireland’s
abortion regime, including its ultimate demise. Amidst, rather than beyond,
such legal and political contestation were the experiences of women who
lived, and sometimes died, under Ireland’s restrictive laws. The next two
chapters of this dissertation study, in much greater depth, women’s
experiences of the law in terms of both their pain at the hands of the 8th and
their long-standing activism and defiance in spite of their suffering.

Section 10, HRTPA.
See, e.g., Caelinn Hogan, Why Ireland’s battle over abortion is far from over, THE GUARDIAN (OCTOBER 3, 2020)
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/oct/03/whyirelands-battle-over-abortion-is-far-from-overanti-abortionists.
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CHAPTER 2: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
REFORM OF IRISH ABORTION LAW
Over the decades, Irish pro-choice groups employed numerous strategies
in their struggles for change. Activists battled a stalwart anti-choice lobby and
unmoving political elites with everything from street protests, legal
challenges, social media campaigns, lobbying, artistic activism, abortion
stigma busting, to service provision (both funding and providing abortions).
Many of these strategies were infused with and augmented by international
human rights-based advocacy. In contrast to the treatment of abortion as a
crime under the 8th, international and regional human rights law recognizes
that the denial of abortion, in a range of circumstances, violates fundamental
human rights.314 Consequently, non-governmental organizations, grassroots
activists, and victims embraced international human rights. As Chapter 1
outlined, Irish advocates took complaints to the UN Human Rights
Committee.315 and the European Court of Human Rights,316 engaged in
‘shadow reporting’317 and in-person advocacy before UN Treaty Monitoring
Bodies (TMBs) and UN Special Procedures, emphasized human rights when
campaigning domestically and organized in human rights coalitions. This
chapter charts these efforts and analyzes their impact.
In turning to the international human rights framework to advance their
cause, Irish advocates emulated reproductive rights movements across the
globe. In all regions of the world, abortion rights activists invoke international
human rights in their efforts to overturn domestic restrictions on abortion,
and at the international level, advocates seek to consolidate and expand
recognition for sexual and reproductive rights. These efforts have delivered

See infra, pp 66-96.
See Mellet v Ireland, supra note xx and Whelan v Ireland, supra note xx..
316 See A, B, and C v Ireland, supra note 12.
317 Shadow reporting is a process where NGOs provide submissions to the expert bodies that periodically
monitor the implementation of the international human rights treaties, covenants, and conventions to which the
state is a signatory. Shadow reports address omissions, deficiencies, or inaccuracies in the official government
reports and thereby assist U.N. experts in their assessment of a government's compliance with international
human rights. Irish pro-choice groups submitted shadow reports to the Committee Against Torture Committee,
the Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Committee on
Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, the Human Rights Committee, and to the UN Special Rapporteur on the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health in
preparation for his report A/66/254 (2011) on the interaction between criminal laws and other legal restrictions
relating to sexual and reproductive health and the right to health.
314
315
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many successes in different countries,318 and in international fora,319 but they
have not been universally effective, nor are the gains secure. Over the past 510 years, a coordinated global pushback against reproductive rights (and the
rights of sexual orientation and gender identity minorities) has gained
significant momentum.320 Waged by alliances of conservative political actors
and religious fundamentalists — often presenting as human rights groups —
these actors use litigation and advocacy at national and international levels to
oppose a range of reproductive rights: access to abortion, contraception and
fertility treatments, and the provision of evidence-based, comprehensive
sexuality education.321 At the multilateral level, blocs of States have mirrored
and augmented their practices to dilute international protections for
reproductive rights, sexuality rights, and self-determination.322 And
increasingly, campaigns that misleadingly — and incorrectly under
international law — assert a human right for healthcare professionals (and
even institutions) to ‘conscientiously object’ to providing both abortion and
contraception are gaining traction.323 Amidst such virulent pushback to the
318 Courts in countries of Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America increasingly reference human rights standards
in their review of national abortion laws. See Rachel Rebouche, Abortion Rights as Human Rights, 25(6) SOCIAL &
LEGAL STUDIES 40 (2016) (illustrating how human rights arguments have accommodated diverse national
considerations and disparate legal standards on abortion). The results of successful international human rights
advocacy can also be seen in the expanding body of regional and international human rights standards that
advance access to abortion as a human right that will be discussed in this chapter. See also, Breaking Ground:
Treaty Monitoring Bodies on Reproductive Rights, CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS (2018),
https://www.reproductiverights.org/ sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Breaking-Ground-2018.pdf .
319 See infra, pp 64-96.
320 For a discussion of this phenomenon see, Observatory on the Universality of Rights, Rights at Risk, (2017),
https://www.awid.org/publications/rights-risk-observatory-universality-rights-trends-report-2017; Claire
Provost & Ella Milburn Christian ‘legal army’ in hundreds of court battles worldwide (2017) OPEN DEMOCRACY
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/christian-legal-army-court-battles-worldwide/
321 For a discussion of this phenomenon see, Observatory on the Universality of Rights, Rights at Risk, (2017),
https://www.awid.org/publications/rights-risk-observatory-universality-rights-trends-report-2017; Claire
Provost & Ella Milburn Christian ‘legal army’ in hundreds of court battles worldwide (2017) OPEN DEMOCRACY
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/christian-legal-army-court-battles-worldwide/ They also oppose
marriage equality, parenting rights for same-sex couples, self-determination for gender-diverse individuals.
Principal among their strategies is the co-option and misuse of human rights protections for freedom of religion
and belief, the right to life, and the family. See, e.g., UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief (2020) A/HRC/43/48; UN Human Rights Council, Report of the
Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights (2017) A/HRC/34/56; A/74/181, ¶34–35; UN Human Rights
Council, Report of the Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and in practice,
A/HRC/38/46, ¶30–35; and A/HRC/21/42, ¶ 65.
322 At the United Nations General Assembly in 2019, a group of 19 governments disavowed the inclusion of
'sexual and reproductive health and rights in U.N. documents, alleging that "they can undermine the critical role
of the family and promote practices like abortion." Remarks on Universal Health Coverage, Alex M. Azar II,
U.N. General Assembly Press, September 23, 2019, New York City, New York,
https://www.hhs.gov/about/leadership/secretary/speeches/2019-speeches/remarks-on-universal-healthcoverage.html. See also, Jayne Huckerby et al., Trump’s “Unalienable Rights” Commission Likely to Promote Anti-Rights
Agenda, JUST SECURITY (July 9, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64859/trumps-unalienable-rightscommission-likely-topromote-anti-rights-agenda/ . Additionally, in April 2019, the US successfully used the
threat of its veto power on the UN Security Council totg9 9 demand that removal of language recognizing that
victims of rape in war should have "access to sexual and reproductive health services," from Resolution 2467.
323 See, e.g., Diana Cariboni, How ‘conscientious objectors’ threaten women’s newly-won abortion rights in Latin America, July
18, 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/5050/conscientious-objectors-threaten-abortion-rights-latinamerica/; For an example of arguments used by such campaigners, July 18, 2018, see
https://www.adflegal.org/detailspages/blogdetails/allianceedge/2016/04/13/four-things-we-can-still-do-nowfor-pro-life-healthcare-providers .
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advancement of reproductive rights, it is compelling to consider the role of
international human rights in upending one of the most restrictive abortion
regimes in the world.
This study also presents insights relevant for social movement scholars
and international relations theorists concerned with the legitimacy and utility
of the international human rights framework in domestic politics. Many
scholars (and activists) cast doubt on the utility and legitimacy of international
human rights to advance social change.324 The polemics are applied to
human rights movements beyond abortion rights; human rights, whether
conceived as discourse, law, or values, face incessant claims of irrelevance and
predictions of demise. Within this milieu of critiques, scholars query whether
international human rights, as a "universalist discourse," is the best
foundation on which to build local political leverage for reform.325 Others
argue that conceptions of human rights can miss the technical and practical
work of implementing social and legal reform.326 Scholars suggest a tendency
of human rights advocacy to ignore the underlying cause of rights violations
and to distract attention from broader, structural causes of injustice and
oppression.327 The array of international legal rules and institutions are
condemned for their limited enforcement machinery.328 and their “lack of
democratic accountability.”329 Some skeptics go further and contend that the
growth of legal and political international human rights movements was a
companion to the rise of global inequality, which paved the road to populism
and further rights abuses.330
While Chapter 1 of this dissertation briefly documented Irish pro-choice
international human rights advocacy and litigation, this chapter digs deeper
into the practices of domestic advocates and the influence of international
human rights on the abortion rights movement. By examining how prochoice "civil society331 (a term used in both human rights literature and in
324 See, e.g., Laura Nader, The Americanization of International Law, in MOBILE PEOPLE, MOBILE LAW: EXPANDING
LEGAL RELATIONS IN A CONTRACTING WORLD 207–08; Sari Kouvo, A “Quick And Dirty” Approach to Women’s
Emancipation and Human Rights? 16 FEM. LEGAL STUD. 37, 39–40 (2008); Susan Marks, Human Rights, and Root

Causes, 74 MOD. L. REV. 57, 78 (2011) Anne Orford, Feminism, Imperialism, and the Mission of International Law, 71
NORDIC J. INT’L L. 275, 296 (2002); Dianne Otto, The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in International
Law Over the Last Decade, 10 MELB. J. INT'L L. 11, 12 (2009).
325 See also, Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights, and Transnational Culture: Regulating Gender Violence Through Global Law,
44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 54, 55–57 (2006); Sally Engle Merry, Rights Talk and the Experience of Law: Implementing
Women’s Human Rights to Protection from Violence, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 343, 344 (2003).
326 Rachel Rebouche, Reproducing Rights: The Intersection of Reproductive Justice and Human Rights 7 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 579 (2017).
327 See, e.g., Morton Horwitz, Rights 23 HARV. CIVIL RIGHTS–CIVIL LIB. L. Rev 393, 400 (1988).
328 See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? I YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); ALICE
EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2011).
329 See, e.g., ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW; David Kennedy, The international human rights
movement: Part of the problem 15 HARV. HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 101 (2004).
330 See, e.g., SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD (2018).
331, "civil society is a term used in both literature and in practice to describe actors that are distinguishable from
government or profit-seeking agents or individuals. See, Richard Price, Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in
World Politics 55(4) WORLD POLITICS, 579 (2003).
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practice to describe actors that are distinguishable from government or profitseeking agents) used human rights advocacy at different points in their reform
efforts in Ireland, this identifies four interlocking roles played by international
human rights law and advocacy: 1) a formative role; 2) a formal legal role; 3)
a structural role, and 4) a framing role. However, within this account, the
constraints of international human rights law for abortion rights reform
emerge. International human rights legal standards on abortion access did
not mirror the movement's ultimate vision of unrestricted access to abortion
for women in Ireland; as the movement moved from the margins to the
center, international human rights law ran out as a resource.332
Part I of this chapter sets out the current international legal standards on
abortion rights and discusses how these standards developed within the
United Nations and regional human rights systems. The trajectory of
international human rights law on abortion includes several instances where
human rights bodies considered the compatibility of Irish abortion law with
international standards. Accordingly, there is some repetition from Chapter
1, and these cases are also outlined in Part II of this chapter.
Part II documents and analyzes how Irish pro-choice activists used
international human rights-based strategies to create legal, political, and
cultural opportunities for reform. Though there are elements of chronology
in the analysis, the study cannot be told in an exact chronological account.
This chapter concludes that at key moments, human rights-based
strategies were critical to mobilize and gain leverage and legitimacy but
cautions that the formal doctrine of international human rights law on
abortion risks ambivalence for emancipatory movements for abortion rights.
A. The Trajectory of International Human Rights Law on Abortion
The texts of most human rights treaties and related international
agreements are silent on abortion. However, since the 1990s, women's rights
activists have used international human rights mechanisms to advance
protection for abortion rights. Similar to arguing that abortion rights are
implicit in provisions of domestic constitutions (as done in the US in Roe v.
Wade333), human rights advocates who campaign for abortion rights urge
human rights bodies334 to infer protection for abortion from other textually
explicit rights. As a result, even though there is no stand-alone woman’s right
332 For a contrasting view on the relevance on substantive content, see Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism,
Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 103–04 (1996) (suggesting that women’s rights
advocates focus on the adequacy of rights rather than implementation of rights).
333 Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973). The US Supreme Court recognized that the right to privacy is “broad enough
to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”.
334 The term “human rights bodies” is used to include both regional human rights courts and UN Treaty
Monitoring Bodies.
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to abortion in international human rights law, a number of human rights
bodies—those charged with interpreting treaty provisions—have asserted
national abortion restrictions to violate the right to life, right to health, right
to privacy, right to liberty and security of the person, right to equality before
the law and right to non-discrimination, and right to be free from torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
Additionally, various human rights bodies have reached decisions that use
human rights norms to pressure states to implement their own national
exceptions to abortion bans. For example, some human rights bodies have
contended that when States permit abortion in certain circumstances, the
state is obliged to adopt legislation and/or guidelines to make clear when
abortion is legal and when it is not.335 Others have said that states must ensure
that legal abortion services are effective, timely, and practically accessible,336
and that states should provide quality post-abortion care irrespective of
whether individuals have undergone a legal or illegal abortion.337 Most have
recommended that abortion should be decriminalized338 and the CEDAW
Committee has described the denial of abortion, in certain instances, as a
form of gender-based violence.339 All told, a set of norms is emerging from
the international human rights framework that recognizes that the denial of
abortion in certain circumstances is a violation of the universal human rights
of women and girls.
Notwithstanding these inroads, the scope of the developing norms
concerning abortion is limited. In particular, these norms are limited by the
willingness to recognize an affirmative right to an abortion only for
“exceptional” cases. Unless a woman’s pregnancy is the result of sexual
assault (rape or incest), threatens her life or her health, or is not capable of
surviving to term, human rights bodies have not recognized access to abortion
as a human right.340 Chapter 3 analyzes this limited scope from a critical
See infra xx
The European Court of Human Rights has emphasized this in numerous cases. See detailed discussion of the
relevant decisions infra at xx
337 General Comment No. 22 (2016) on the Right to sexual and reproductive health (article 12 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), May 2, 2016, E/C.12/GC/22.
338 See, e.g., CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 35 on gender-based violence against women, updating
General Recommendation No. 19, July 14, 2017, CEDAW/C/GC/35 at ¶ 18; CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4;
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of
Ireland, July 8, 2015, E/C.12/IRL/CO/3 at ¶ 30.
339 In 2017, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) said that “without being able to
effectively exercise their sexual and reproductive rights, women cannot realize their right to live free from
violence and discrimination.” See, IACHR Urges All States to Adopt Comprehensive, Immediate Measures to Respect and
Protect Women’s Sexual and Reproductive Rights October 23, 2017, https://mailchi.mp/dist/iachr-urges-all-states-toadopt-comprehensive-immediate-measures-to-respect-and-protect-womens-sexual-and-reproductiverights?e=07a43d57e2. The CEDAW Committee has also described criminalization of abortion and denial or
delay of access to legal abortion as “forms of gender-based violence that, depending on the circumstances, may
amount to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.” CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation 35 on
gender-based violence against women (2017), ¶18.
340 The limits of these standards
335
336
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perspective
Examining treaty provisions, decisions of human rights bodies,341 general
comments and concluding observations by human rights bodies, international
consensus statements, and the outputs of the UN special procedures, this
section outlines how the United Nations, European, Inter-American, and
African human rights accountability mechanisms have interpreted human
rights treaties to support abortion access.342 From this examination will
emerge a picture of both the successes of international human rights theories
in resisting abortion restrictions and the limitation of those theories.
1. The right to life
The right to life provides one source of protection under international
human rights law for women seeking abortion access. The right to life is
protected by international human rights treaties and customary international
law. Article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) provides that "every human being has the inherent right to life. This
right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life." Article 6 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) states that
"every child has the inherent right to life." Similar provisions can be found in
Art. 2 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (1950) ('ECHR'), Art. 4 of the American Convention
on Human Rights, and Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights, which recognizes that everyone is entitled to respect for his
or her life and safety.343
Unsafe abortions currently account for approximately 10-14% of the
maternal mortality rate globally. Abortion is not inherently dangerous344—in
most countries, it is safer than childbirth—but legal restrictions result in
millions of women either seeking abortions “underground” from untrained
persons or self-inducing using methods that risk their lives. The grievous
341 Similar to a court being petitioned, Treaty Monitoring Bodies can receive “communications” from individuals
against states that have provided their consent for this procedure. The body then forwards its ‘views’ to the state
party and the individual concerned. While these views are not directly binding on states, they “exhibit some
important characteristics of a judicial decision” because “they are arrived at in a judicial spirit, including the
impartiality and independence of Committee members, the considered interpretation of the language of the
Covenant, and the determinative character of the decisions. See, e.g., General Comment 33, Obligations of States
parties under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, June 25, 2009,
CCPR/C/GC/33 at ¶ 13.
342 The UN special procedures are independent human rights experts appointed by the U.N. Human Rights Council
to monitor human rights around the world, report on violations, and recommend strategies for governments and
other stakeholders to improve human rights conditions. They conduct thematic studies and convene expert
consultations, contribute to the development of international human rights standards, engage in advocacy, and
provide advice for technical cooperation.
343 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
344 See, e.g., Susheela Singh et al., Abortion Worldwide 2017: Uneven Progress and Unequal Access, GUTTMACHER
INSTITUTE, 2018 https://www.guttmacher.org/report/abortion-worldwide-2017.
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methods women use to end unwanted pregnancies include placing foreign
objects or herbal preparations in the vagina or cervix, ingesting substances,
or inflicting direct trauma on their bodies. Complications include
hemorrhage, sepsis, peritonitis, and trauma, many of which result in these
women losing their lives.345 Meanwhile, the scale of post-abortion
complications is substantial, with an estimated 7 million women and girls
worldwide admitted to hospital every year owing to complications related to
unsafe abortion.346
The advent of the ‘abortion pill’—a common and cheap stomach-ulcer
drug, misoprostol, mostly used in combination with another drug,
mifepristone, to end a pregnancy in the first trimester—means that abortionrelated deaths are far less common than they were a few decades ago. Still,
every year, somewhere between 50,000 and 70,000 women die as a
consequence of unsafe abortions (97% in developing countries).347 Because so
many of these deaths could be prevented by access to legal abortion—where
abortion is legally restricted, the median ratio for unsafe abortion mortality is
34 deaths per 100,000 live births, compared with one or less per 100,000 live
births in countries that allow abortion on request348—human rights law
recognizes that restrictive abortion laws can violate the right to life.
The most recent international human rights law authority recognizing that
abortion restrictions violate the right to life is the Human Rights Committee’s
2018 General Comment on the right to life — an influential interpretative
instrument that aims to clarify the normative scope of the treaty provision on
the rights to life. 349 The Human Rights Committee articulated that while
States can regulate abortion, restrictive abortion laws violate the right to life
when they expose women to a risk of death from unsafe abortion,350 and
recommended that States “provide safe, legal and effective access to abortion
where the life and health of the pregnant woman or girl are at risk, or where
carrying a pregnancy to term would cause the pregnant woman or girl
substantial pain or suffering, most notably where the pregnancy is the result
345 David A. Grimes et al., Unsafe Abortion: The Preventable Pandemic, 368 LANCET 1908, 1911 (November 6, 2006),
http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(06)69481-6.pdf.
346 Id.
347 World Health Organization (WHO), Safe abortion: Technical & policy guidance for health systems, World Health
Organization (2015)
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/173586/WHO_RHR_15.04_eng.pdf;jsessionid=64E5FCC0
E3763E34CA2B0CF9C2395646?sequence=1. Furthermore, it is estimated that 220,000 children lose their
mothers every year due to unsafe abortions. Researchers suggest that these children are at a greater risk of death
in comparison with children who have two parents as a result of receiving less education, health care, and social
care. See David Grimes et al, supra note 322; See also, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
“Unsafe abortion is still killing tens of thousands of women around the world – UN rights experts warn’” (September 28, 2016)
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20600&LangID=E.
348 See, e.g., Singh S et al., Abortion Worldwide 2017: Uneven Progress and Unequal Access, Guttmacher Institute, 2018,
https://www.guttmacher.org/report/abortion-worldwide-2017 .
349 HRC General Comment No. 36 (2018) on the right to life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36 (2018) ¶ 8
[hereinafter HRC General Comment No. 36].
350 Id.
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of rape or incest or is not viable.”351 Prior to this guidance, the Human Rights
Committee had long expressed particular concern for restrictive abortion
laws and the risk to women’s lives when reviewing State compliance with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).352
Other UN Treaty Bodies, including the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the Committee on the Rights
of the Child (CRC), have also underscored the link between the denial of
abortion and maternal mortality and addressed the denial of abortion as a
violation of women’s right to life.353 The CESCR Committee called on States
to amend restrictive abortion laws and to increase access to legal abortion in
order to decrease maternal deaths.354 To guarantee women’s right to life “in
practice,” the CESCR Committee urged States to ensure that life-saving
abortion services are accessible by adopting, for example, guidelines on legal
abortion and guaranteeing that conscientious objection laws are not an
obstacle to abortion.355
As of the year 2020, nearly all UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies recognize
access to abortion as part of the right to life when denial poses a risk to the
woman’s life. As a result, States are obliged to ensure that women do not put
351 Id. Notably, drafting General Comment No. 36 was an unusually protracted process—it took almost 4 years.
The first draft was circulated in 2015 and included references to “the rights of unborn children, including to their
right to life.” In response, a coalition of women’s rights organizations lobbied the Committee to delete from the
draft any express references to "the rights of the unborn children" or any other turn of phrase that may have
implied that the right to life under the ICCPR applied before birth. Interview with Christina Zampas, Human
Rights Lawyer, Geneva, March 3, 2017. See, also, Livio Zilli, The UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 36 on
the Right to Life and the Right to Abortion, March 6, 2019
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/03/06/the-un-human-rights-committees-general-comment-36-on-the-right-to-lifeand-the-right-to-abortion/ .
352 See, e.g., Concluding Observations of the HRC regarding El Salvador, August 22, 2003, CCPR/CO/78/SLV
at ¶14; HRC, Concluding observations on Ecuador, CCPR/C/ECU/CO/6 (2016), ¶15; Human Rights
Committee, Concluding Observations: Argentina, UN Doc. CCPR/C/ARG/CO/5 (2016), ¶ 12. The UN
Special Rapporteur on Arbitrary Killings has articulated that the death of a woman, where it can be medically
linked to a deliberate denial of access to life-saving medical care because of an absolute ban on abortion, would
not only constitute a violation of the right to life and an arbitrary deprivation of life. Report of the Special
Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions on a gender-sensitive approach to arbitrary
killings, (2017), ¶ 95.
353 CESCR, General Comment No. 22 on the right to sexual and reproductive health (2016), ¶ 10; Committee
on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 20 on the implementation of the rights of the child during
adolescence, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/20 (2016), ¶¶ 13 and 60; CEDAW Committee, “Statement of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on sexual and reproductive health and rights:
Beyond 2014 ICPD review,” 57th Session (2014)
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/Statements/SRHR26Feb201.
354 See, e.g., Concluding observations of the CESCR on Ecuador, UN Doc. E/C.12/ECU/CO/3 (2012), ¶.29;
Concluding observations of the CESCR on the Republic of Korea, UN Doc. E/C.12/KOR/CO/4 (2017);
Concluding observations of the CESCR on the Philippines, UN Doc. E/C.12/PHL/CO/5-6 (2016);
Concluding observations of the CESCR on Kenya, UN Doc. E/C.12/KEN/CO/2-5 (2016); and Concluding
observations of the CESCR on Pakistan, UN Doc. E/C.12/PAK/CO/1 (2017).
355 See, e.g., CESCR concluding observations on Spain, UN Doc. E/C.12/ESP/CO/6 (2018); Concluding
observations of the CESCR on Mexico, UN Doc. E/C.12/MEX/CO/5-6 (2017); Concluding observations of
the CESCR on Moldova, UN Doc. E/C.12/MDA/CO/3 (2017); Concluding observations of the CESCR on
Uruguay, UN Doc. E/C.12/URY/CO/5 (2107); Concluding observations of the CESCR on Poland, UN Doc.
E/C.12/POL/CO/6 (2016); and Concluding observations of the CESCR on Costa Rica, UN Doc.
E/C.12/CRI/CO/5 (2016).
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their lives at risk by procuring life-threatening abortions.356 Regionally,
human rights experts have taken the same approach: the Organization of
American States Rapporteur on the Rights of Women confirmed that women
in the Central and South American region face “significant obstacles in
exercising their sexual and reproductive rights” and are forced to “continue
pregnancies that put their lives at risk” due to restrictive abortion
legislation.357 The World Health Organization (WHO) has also outlined that
legal, regulatory, and administrative barriers to abortion access contribute to
unsafe abortion because they "deter women from seeking care and cause
delays in access to services."358
An inevitable legal issue related to the right to life approach to abortion is
whether or not a fetus or “the unborn” has a right to life. Certain States
recognize a prenatal right to life and justify prohibitions on abortion and
certain types of contraception on this basis.359 In international human rights
law, however, the invocation of claims to the right to life of the fetus has been
largely ineffective. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that
“all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,”360 and the
travaux preparatoires indicate that the word “born” was used intentionally to
confirm that the rights in the Declaration are “inherent from the moment of
birth,” thereby excluding a prenatal application of the rights protected in the
Declaration.361 Similarly, the travaux preparatoires of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights affirms that the right to life contained
in Article 6 does not apply prior to birth.362 The Convention on the Rights of
the Child defines a “child” as “every human being below the age of eighteen
years.”363 Its preamble acknowledges the child’s need for special safeguards
and care, including appropriate legal protection “before as well as after
birth.”364 However, at the time of drafting, state delegations that included this
356 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, on the right to life, October 30, 2018, CCPR/C/GC/36 at ¶ 8 [hereinafter HRC,
General Comment No. 36]; CCPR General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (The Equality of Rights Between Men
and Women), March 29, 2000, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 at ¶ 10.
357 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, On International Women’s Day, IACHR Urges States to Guarantee
Women’s Sexual and Reproductive Rights (March 6, 2015),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2015/024.asp.
358 World Health Organization, Safe Abortion: Technical and Policy Guidance for Health Systems, at 94.
359 In 2012, Honduras’ Supreme Court upheld the country’s ban on emergency contraception based on the belief
that it can harm a fertilized embryo – which is a misunderstanding of emergency contraception’s mechanism of
action. See, Decision of the Supreme Court, Feb. 1, 2012 (Hond.) [Dictamen de la CSJ, 1 de feb. de 2012
(Hond.)].
360 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted December 10, 1948, G.A. Res.217a (III), Article 1, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948).
361 U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., 99th mtg., ¶ 110-124, U.N. Doc. A/PV/99 (1948).
362 U.N. GAOR Annex, 12th Sess., Agenda Item 33, at 113 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.654 (1957); U.N. GAOR, 12th
Session, Agenda Item 33, at 199(q), U.N. Doc. A/3764 (1957). The proposed and rejected text read, "the right to
life is inherent in the human person from the moment of conception." For a contrasting view, see P.J. Flood, Does
International Law Protect the Unborn Child?” 7(2) NATIONAL CATHOLIC BIOETHICS QUARTERLY, 73 (2007).
363 Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), Article 1.
364 The phrase "before as well as after birth" was added as a result of a proposal by the Holy See, Ireland, Malta,
and the Philippines. E/CN.4/L.1542, Commission of Human Rights, 36th session, 1980, ⁋ 6.
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language stated that it would not preclude the possibility of abortion because
it was legal in many states under certain circumstances.365
Regional human rights instruments and their respective courts’
jurisprudence support similar conclusions on the level of protection the right
to life affords to the fetus. The Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam
(CRCI)366—a binding convention which has not entered into force but was
adopted in 2005 by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation's (OIC) Council
of Foreign Ministers—is the most specific in terms of its protection for
prenatal life. Article 7(a) reads, "as of the moment of birth, every child has
rights due from the parents, society and the state to be accorded proper
nursing, education, and material, hygienic and moral care. Both the fetus and
the mother must be protected and accorded special care."
Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) protects
“the right to life, in general, from the moment of conception.”367 However,
in the Baby Boy case,368 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) drew on the preparatory works to the ACHR to assert that the
drafters of the Convention did not intend for the phrase “in general, from the
moment of conception” to mean that abortion should be outlawed under the
Convention.369 Accordingly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
determined that embryos do not constitute persons under the convention and
are not afforded an absolute right to life.370
In the 2004 case of Vo v. France371, the Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights avoided clarifying whether fetuses enjoy the right to
life under Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The case
Id.
Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam, OICDoc.OIC/IGGE/HRI/2004/Rep.Final. [hereinafter
CRCI].
367 American Convention on Human Rights, 9 I.L.M. 101 (1970) (OAS Doc. OEA/SER. K/XVI/1.1 Doc. 65
(1970)) [hereinafter American Convention) Negotiated at San Jose, Costa Rica in 1969, with the active
participation of the United States, the American Convention is an international agreement that operates within
the framework of the Organization of American States. Although the Convention was signed by President Jimmy
Carter in 1978, it has yet to attain the two-thirds vote in the Senate the is required for ratification.
368 Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, OEA/ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9, rev. 1, ¶ 1 (1981) (White, Potter v United States,
commonly known as the Baby Boy Case). The case was essentially a challenge to Roe v Wade and Doe v Bolton.
Following Roe, the State of Massachusetts reversed a manslaughter conviction against a doctor who had
performed an abortion. This was challenged as a violation of the right to life under the Convention. For more,
see Dinah Shelton, Abortion and the Right to Life in the Inter-American System: The Case of Baby Boy, 2 HUM. RTS. L.J.
309 (1979).
369 Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 25, ¶ 30 ("In the light of this history, it is clear that the... addition of the phrase
'in general, from the moment of conception' does not mean that the drafters of the Convention intended to
modify the concept of the right to life that prevailed in Bogota, when they approved the American Declaration.").
Nonetheless, in practice, the ACHR has been used nationally and locally in attempts to limit access to abortion.
For example, conservatives in Argentina, while arguing against abortion in cases of rape or as the only possible
means of preventing danger to the life or health of a woman, contended that the provision had become
"prospectively unconstitutional" in light of the ACHR. See Paolo Bergallo, The Struggle Against Informal Rules on
Abortion in Argentina, in ABORTION LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 147
(eds. Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna N. Erdman, and Bernard M. Dickens).
370 Artavia Murillo et al. (“In Vitro Fertilization”) v Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., series C, No. 257, ¶ 264, 273 (November 28, 2012).
371 Vo v France, 40 EHRR 12 (2005) at ¶ 80.
365
366
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arose from a situation where, due to a mix-up at a French hospital, a doctor
punctured the applicant's amniotic sack during a medical procedure that was
meant for a different 'Mrs. Vo'. As a result, the applicant had to have a
therapeutic abortion. The doctor responsible faced malpractice charges.
Unsatisfied with this outcome, the applicant, supported in her application by
anti-abortion doctors, complained to the European Court of Human Rights
that France should have prosecuted the doctor for "unintentional homicide"
rather than malpractice and that the state's failure to do so infringed upon the
right to life of her fetus under Article 2 of the Convention. However, the
Court held that there was no violation of Article 2. The majority concluded
that "the unborn child is not regarded as a person directly protected by Article
2 of the Convention" and that if "the unborn" do have a right to life, it is
limited by the mother's rights and interests.372
International law does not establish that protecting prenatal life is
illegitimate, but it is clear that the state's duty to protect the woman's right to
life has primacy over any fetal right to life.373 In 2011, the CEDAW
Committee affirmed this in the case of L.C. v. Peru.374 In that case, a public
hospital refused to provide surgery to a child, in part because she was
pregnant, and the hospital wished to prevent harm to the fetus.375 The
CEDAW Committee confirmed that protecting the fetus over the health of
the mother was a human rights violation.376 Similarly, in 2007, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights issued precautionary measures377
to Nicaragua, requiring the state to provide medical care to a pregnant girl
who had been denied cancer treatment because her doctors were concerned
that the treatment could provoke an abortion.378
2.

The right to health

There are numerous formulations of the right to health in international
human rights treaties. Article 12(1) of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) enshrines the seminal
international human rights law articulation of the right to health. It
“recognizes the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
Id. ¶ 80 and 82. This was also indicated in A, B, and C v Ireland, supra note 10.
For a contrary view, see generally, Thomas Finegan, International Human Rights Law and the "Unborn": Texts and
Travaux Preparatory, 25 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 121 (2016).
374 LC v. Peru, CEDAW Committee Communication No. 22/2009, UN Document CEDAW/C/50/D/22/2009
(2011) [hereinafter LC v. Peru].
375 Id. ¶ 2.1–2.4, ¶ 30-31.
376 Id.
377 Article 25 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure establishes the mechanism for precautionary measures. In
serious and urgent situations, the Commission may, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, request that
a State adopt precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons or to the subject matter of the
proceedings in connection with a pending petition or case.
378 MC 43-10 – “Amelia”, Nicaragua (February 26, 2010).
372
373
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standard of physical and mental health.379 Article 24 of the CRC provides
that States must "recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of health." Article 12(1) of CEDAW obliges states
to "take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women
in the field of health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and
women, access to health care services, including those related to family
planning."380 Article 25 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities and Art. 5(e)(iv) of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination also articulate the right to
health.
The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on
the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol),381 a binding multilateral
treaty at the African regional level that came into force in 2005 is a rarity
amongst human right treaties in expressly enjoining States to ensure the
access to abortion in order to protect women's health. Under Article 14(2)(c)
of the Protocol, the right to health, States Parties are called upon to take all
appropriate measures to
protect the reproductive rights of women by authorizing medical
abortion in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest, and where continued
pregnancy endangers the mental and physical health of the mother or
the life of the mother or the fetus.
In clarifying States’ obligations under Article 14(2)(c) of the Maputo
Protocol, the African Commission calls on States, in General Comment 2,382
to adopt a purposive interpretation of grounds for abortion similar to the
WHO Technical Guidance on abortion.383 Drawing on this guidance means
that where “mental health” is relied upon as grounds for abortion, it is not
necessary for States to establish psychiatric evidence first.384 The WHO’s
definition of health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” is also adopted,
potentially enabling a broad interpretation of grounds for abortion, to include
379 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (entered into force January 3, 1976) art
12(1). This followed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1949, which affirms that 'everyone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself [or herself ] and of his [or her]
family, including food, clothing, housing, medical care, and necessary social services. Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, UN Doc A/810 (December 10, 1948) art 25(1).
380 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature
December 18, 1979, 1249 UNTS 13 (entered into force September 3, 1981) art 12(1).
381 Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6 (September
13, 2000).
382 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. General Comment No 2 on Article 14 (1) (a), (b), (c) and
(f) and Article 14 (2) (a) and (c) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Rights of Women in Africa, adopted by the African Commission on November 28, 2014.
383 Id. ¶ 10.
384 Id. ¶ 38.
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socio-economic reasons.385 The General Comment calls on States to remove
restrictions that are not necessary for providing safe abortion services, such as
the requirements of multiple signatures, approval by committees before an
abortion can be performed, or restricting the performance of abortion to only
medical practitioners.386
More generally, the right to health in international law includes a
prohibition on discrimination in the access to healthcare. Article 2 of the
ICESCR provides that Covenant rights should be exercised "without
discrimination of any kind," including on grounds of sex, race, and
socioeconomic status. Article 3 requires States to "ensure the equal right of
men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social, and cultural rights
…. [in the Covenant]." The right to health—along with other economic,
social, and cultural rights—must be progressively realized according to
available resources, but the right to non-discrimination is of immediate effect
in human rights law and cannot be restricted.387 The CEDAW Committee
has clarified that discrimination in access to health can occur not only when
there is a difference in treatment between men and women but also indirectly
when services used only by women, including reproductive healthcare, are
neglected.388 The World Health Organization advises that countries
permitting abortion on health grounds should interpret “health” to mean
“complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence
of disease or infirmity.”389
The negative health effects of abortion restrictions are evident in any
country or region with restrictive laws or other barriers on the access to
abortion. As outlined in the previous section, criminal bans and cumbersome
regulations on abortion access—particularly in the Global South—lead
women to obtain abortion procedures in unsafe circumstances. Every year,
close to five million women suffer from temporary or permanent disability as
a consequence of unsafe abortion.390 Though laws restricting access rarely
lead to lower rates of abortion,391 research in the US has shown that
regulations seeking to prevent women from accessing abortion have been
Id. ¶ 7, ¶ 38.
Id. ¶ 58.
387 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, “The nature of State Parties’
obligations” (Art. 2, ¶ 1 of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, 1990, ¶ 9.
388 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), General Recommendation
No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health), ¶15, 31 (U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1, chap. 1) (April
20, 1999),
389 World Health Organization, Constitution of the World Health Organization, at 1 (45th ed. 1949).
390 World Health Organization, Safe Abortion: Technical and Policy Guidance for Health Systems, World Health
Organization (2015)
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/173586/WHO_RHR_15.04_eng.pdf;jsessionid=64E5FCC0
E3763E34CA2B0CF9C2395646?sequence=1.
391 Gilda Sedgh, et al, Induced Abortion: Incidence and Trends Worldwide From 1995 to 2008, THE LANCET 379, No.
9816 (2012): 625-632; World Health Organization, Safe Abortion: Technical and Policy Guidance for Health Systems 23
(2012).
385
386
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marginally effective in some States,392 and that carrying an unwanted
pregnancy to term can threaten a woman’s health.393 On the other hand,
thousands of women circumvent local restrictions by traveling to regions that
offer safe and legal access; Irish women traveled to the UK, Polish women go
to Germany, and women and girls from States such as Georgia, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Texas, Ohio or Missouri in the USA travel as far as New York.
As the phenomenon of abortion travel has gained more attention, studies
have reported that travel can have negative mental health impacts on
women394 and creates long-term social inequities that may influence health
outcomes.395 Additionally, criminal abortion restrictions that are unclear
have been shown to have chilling effects on healthcare providers, to the point
that providers may refuse to provide abortions even when it is legal.396
Criminal provisions on abortion also present barriers to other reproductive
health services, including during pregnancy and childbirth; hospitals have
denied women abortions even when their lives are threatened by the
pregnancy, including in the context of miscarriage.397 In Nicaragua398 and
the Dominican Republic399 for example, state and non-state actors have
denied cancer treatment to women because of the potential harm that the
treatment could do to the fetus. In a number of countries that criminalize
abortion, women who have miscarried their pregnancies have delayed
seeking medical treatment out of fear — usually well-founded— that they will
be legally punished for purposefully inducing.400
Conceptualizing access to reproductive healthcare as part of the right to
health is a relatively recent development in international human rights law.401
In the early 1990s, UN agreements reflecting States’ political commitments
(as opposed to express legal obligations) on international development

392 See, e.g., DIANA GREENE FOSTER, THE TURNAWAY STUDY: TEN YEARS, A THOUSAND WOMEN, AND THE
CONSEQUENCES OF HAVING—OR BEING DENIED—AN ABORTION.
393 Caitlin Gerdts, et al. Side effects, physical health consequences, and mortality associated with abortion and birth after an
unwanted pregnancy, 26 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 55 (2016).
394 Aiken, Online Telemedicine supra note 6.
395 World Health Organization, Safe Abortion: Technical and Policy Guidance for Health Systems, supra note 384, at 90.
396 See e.g., Tysiac v. Poland, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. 42 (2007) [hereinafter Tysiac v. Poland].
397 Report of the UN Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and in practice, UN
Doc. A/HRC/32/44 (2016) ¶ 79; CEDAW Concluding Observations: El Salvador (2017) ¶ 36(a).
398 See, e.g., “Amelia,” Precautionary Measures MC 43-10, Inter-Am. Comm’n HR, (2010),
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/women/protection/precautionary.asp; see also, Anti-Abortion Law Kills Dominican
Teenager, CTR. FOR REPROD. RES., http://www.reproductiverights.org/press-room/dominican-republicteenager-dies-abortion-ban (last visited June 8, 2015); Rafael Romo, Pregnant Teen Dies After Abortion Ban Delays Her
Chemo Treatment for Leukemia, CNN, (August 18, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/18/world/americas/dominican-republic-abortion/.
399 See, e.g., Amnesty International, The Total Abortion Ban in Nicaragua - Women’s Lives and Health Endangered, Medical
Professionals Criminalized, 1, 8 (2009) https://perma.cc/Y7GK-RDCZ.
400 See Centre for Reproductive Rights, Marginalized, Persecuted And Imprisoned, The Effects Of El Salvador's Total
Criminalization Of Abortion (2014) https://reproductiverights.org/sites/default/files/documents/El-SalvadorCriminalizationOfAbortion-Report.pdf.
401 See Ronli Sopris, Restrictive Abortion and the Right to Health, 18 (2) MED. L. REV. 193, 196.
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introduced ‘reproductive rights’ to the human rights lexicon.402 Academics,
policymakers, and advocates consider three such political commitments —
the 1994 Cairo International Conference on Population and Development
(ICPD), its resulting Cairo Program of Action,403 and the 1995 Fourth World
Conference on Women in Beijing404 — as representing a “paradigm shift” in
this regard.405 Prior international population growth and development
policies addressed women’s reproductive needs as an issue of population
growth; access to contraception was embraced by governments on the
grounds that it could reduce the birth rate. By contrast, in these new
population commitments, participating governments endorsed “reproductive
health” as a right.406 The ICPD report described reproductive rights as:
the basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and
responsibly the number, spacing, and timing of their children and to
have the information and means to do so, and the right to attain the
highest standard of sexual and reproductive health.407
The momentum for recognizing women's reproductive rights, however, did
not extend to abortion rights at this juncture. Notably, the Holy See led a
group of Latin American States, Malta, and some OIC countries in a
successful campaign to exclude abortion access from the concept of
'reproductive rights' and from classification as a health service or method of
fertility regulation.408 This bloc of UN Members framed abortion as a threat
to national values, both religious and cultural, and successfully inserted
guarantees within the ICPD declaring that “in no case should abortion be
promoted as a method of family planning” and that legal or policy changes
on abortion access could only be determined nationally.409 In turn, the only
402 While international consensus documents are non-binding, the statements contained in these documents are
persuasive and indicative of the world community’s support for reproductive health and can be used to support
legislative and policy reform, as well as interpretations of national and international law.
403 United Nations, Report of the Internat’l Conference on Population and Development, UN Doc. No.
A/CONF.171/13, Sept. 1994, ¶¶ 8.25 [hereinafter ICPD Programme of Action]
404 Platform for Action of the Fourth World Conference on Women, UN Doc. A/CONF.177/20 [hereinafter,
Beijing Platform].
405 See, e.g., MICHELLE ROSENBERG, THE MEANS OF REPRODUCTION; Alicia Yamin, Transformative Combinations:
Women's Health and Human Rights, JOUR. OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL WOMEN'S ASSOCIATION 52, (1997) 172.
WHO, Sexual and reproductive health beyond 2014: Equality, Quality of Care and Accountability,
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/112291/WHO_RHR_14.05_eng.pdf;jsessionid=4F9F95179
F5FD66B733EB4296D1B0AD1?sequence=1.
406 The ICPD report defined “reproductive health” broadly as: “a state of complete physical, mental and social
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity, in all matters relating to the reproductive system
and to its functions and processes.” ICPD Programme of Action, supra note 397, at ¶ 7.2; See generally, Mindy Jane
Roseman, Bearing Human Rights: Maternal Health and the Promise of ICPD, in REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE WAY FORWARD 91, 108 (Laura Reichenbach & Mindy Jane Roseman eds., 2009).
407 ICPD Programme of Action, supra note 398, at ¶ 7.3.
408 Elisabeth Jay Friedman, Gendering the agenda: the impact of the transnational women’s rights movement at the UN
conferences of the 1990s, 26 WOMEN’S STUDIES INTERNATIONAL FORUM, 313, 322 (2003).
409 ICPD Programme of Action, supra note 397 ¶ 8.25.
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consensus that States reached on providing abortion access was "the Cairo
compromise," an affirmation that where abortion is legal, it should be safe,
and where illegal, women should have access to quality post-abortion care.410
The following year, the Beijing Platform asked States to “consider reviewing
laws containing punitive measures against women who have undergone
illegal abortions”411 but went no further. While the ICPD introduced public
health aspects of unsafe abortion to the UN agenda for the first time, abortion
could not yet be treated as a legitimate reproductive health service. Rather, it
was something to be prevented. 412
In the years that followed, the CEDAW and CRC Committees became
vocal about the negative health consequences of abortion restrictions for
women and girls,413 but the Committees hesitated to require that States
liberalize their domestic abortion law to comply with human rights
obligations. In 1999, the CEDAW Committee issued General
Recommendation No. 24 on Women and Health in which it echoed the
ICPD’s endorsement of reproductive health rights to clarify that “access to
health care, including reproductive health, is a basic right under the
Convention.”414 The Committee did not, however, assert that abortion denial
or its criminalization violated the right to reproductive health. It recognized
the link between maternal mortality and unsafe abortion but only asked States
to amend legislation criminalizing abortion “when possible.”415 Furthermore,
the country-specific sections within the report from the same session
expressed concerns about high levels of abortion in Greece, indicating that
the Committee did not consider abortion as part of the reproductive health
services they promoted.416 In 2000, the CESCR Committee's General
Comment No. 14. articulated that "sexual and reproductive health services,
including access to family planning, pre-and post-natal care, [and] emergency
obstetric services," must be provided as part of the right to health,417 but like
CEDAW, the CESCR Committee did not expressly recognize legal access to
410 Beijing Platform supra note 898 at ¶ 8.25. See also, Marge Berber, The Cairo “Compromise” on Abortion and its
Consequences for Making Abortion Safe and Legal, in REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE WAY
FORWARD 152–59 (Laura Reichenbach & Mindy Jane Roseman eds., 2009).
411 Id. at ¶ 106(k).
412 See generally, Johanna Fine et al., The Role of International Human Rights Norms in the Liberalization of Abortion Laws
Globally, HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 69, 70 (highlighting the contradiction between stating concern for
“unsafe abortion” but not calling states to reform their laws to permit abortion in spite of despite clear evidence
that this is essential for reducing unsafe abortion).
413 See, e.g., Concluding Observations of CEDAW regarding Belize, July 1, 1999, A/54/38 at ¶ 56; Colombia,
February 5, 1999, A/54/38 at ¶ 393; and Dominican Republic, May 14, 1998, A/53/38 at ¶ 337.
414 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation No 24: Women
and Health (Article 12), 20th session, UN Doc A/54/38/Rev.1 (1999) [hereinafter, CEDAW General
Recommendation No. 24.]
415 Id. Art 31(c).
416 CEDAW, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, including General
Recommendation 24, Supplement No. 38 A/54/38/Rev.1 3–7 (1999).
417 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No 14: The Right to the Highest
Attainable Standard of Health (Article 12), 22nd session, UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 (August 11, 2000) ¶ 14;
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on Chad, CRC/C/15/Add.107 (1999), ¶ 30.
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abortion as part of the right to health.
The CEDAW Committee received its first communication involving
abortion denial in the case of L.C. v. Peru.418 A 13-year old girl was raped by
her uncle, and when she discovered that she was pregnant, she threw herself
from the roof of a building.419 She survived and was taken to hospital, where
her doctors recommended immediate realignment of her spine to prevent
permanent paralysis.420 The surgeon in the hospital refused to perform the
surgery because of LC’s pregnancy and what he considered to be risks to the
fetus.421 LC was subsequently diagnosed with serious depression, but her
medical team refused to provide anti-depressives on the grounds of her
pregnancy.422 LC and her mother then requested an abortion for LC, which
she was entitled to under Peruvian law owing to the risk to her health,423 and
they tried to reschedule LC’s surgery.424 The hospital refused to provide an
abortion and did not perform the surgery until LC miscarried three months
later.425 The delay dramatically diminished the success of the intervention,
and LC became paralyzed from the neck down.426
LC complained to the CEDAW Committee that the state’s failure to
provide for a therapeutic abortion violated her right to non-discrimination in
access to healthcare under Article 12.427 Emphasizing that LC was a minor
and a victim of sexual abuse, the CEDAW Committee agreed that Peru had
violated her right to health under Article 12 by not ensuring she received the
healthcare that her medical condition required—both the surgery and the
abortion.428 Crucially, LC was entitled to this healthcare under national law.
As such, the precedent is limited because LC’s circumstances fell within the
state’s own legal limits for abortion access.
Following a global study on reproductive and sexual rights, in 2011, the
UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health, Anand Grover, pushed the
norm further and articulated that the criminalization of abortion could
violate the right to health.429 And for the first time, a UN expert
recommended that all States decriminalize abortion to protect the right to
health.430 Almost concurrently, in 2011, the CEDAW Committee became
less tentative in its criticisms of national abortion laws and their impact on
LC v. Peru, supra note 374.
Id. ¶¶ 2.1–2.4.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 Id.
423 Id. ¶ 8.12.
424 Id. ¶ 8.12.
425 Id. ¶¶ 2.9–2.11.
426 Id. ¶ 8.18.
427 Id. ¶ 3.3.
428 Id. ¶ 8.15.
429 UN General Assembly, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, UN Doc A/66/254, August 3, 2011.
430 Id. ¶ 65 (h).
418
419
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women's right to health.431 The heightened burdens that criminal abortion
laws impose on marginalized women and girls, such as women with poor
socio-economic resources, asylum seekers, and migrant women, was a key
theme of this criticism.432
By 2016, the CESCR Committee included access to abortion as part of
the right to reproductive health for the first time in the Committee’s corpus.433
General Comment 22 on the right to sexual and reproductive health outlines
that “States must reform laws that impede the exercise of the right to sexual
and reproductive health including laws criminalizing abortion.”434 The
Committee also delineated that respect for the right to health requires States
to prevent unsafe abortions, including to “liberalize restrictive abortion laws;
to guarantee women and girls access to safe abortion services and to quality
post-abortion care.”435 Additionally, the CESCR Committee recognized the
pernicious nature of the intersectional discrimination that impacts women
living in poverty, people with disabilities, migrants, adolescents, and people
living with HIV/AIDS when such persons seek reproductive healthcare.436
The CEDAW Committee’s 2015 Statement of the Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women on sexual and reproductive health and rights: Beyond
2014 ICPD sums up its interpretation of abortion as a human rights issue:
Unsafe abortion is a leading cause of maternal mortality and
morbidity. As such, States parties should legalize abortion at least in
cases of rape, incest, threats to the life and/or health of the mother,
or severe fetal impairment, as well as provide women with access to
quality post-abortion care, especially in cases of complications
resulting from unsafe abortions. States parties should also remove
punitive measures for women who undergo abortion. States parties
should further organize health services so that the exercise of
conscientious objection does not impede their effective access to
reproductive health care services, including abortion and post-

431 See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations Oman, ¶41,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/OMN/CO/1 (2011); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, Concluding Observations: Paraguay, ¶31, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PRY/CO/6 (2011).
432 See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations: Ireland,
CEDAW/C/IRL/CO/6-7 (2017) ¶8.1.
433 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 22, Right to Sexual and
Reproductive Health, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/22. 2016. In its general comment No. 14 (2000) on the right to the
highest attainable standard of health, the Committee did not include abortion access as part of its definition of
reproductive health, which it said means "that women and men have the freedom to decide if and when to
reproduce and the right to be informed and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods
of family planning of their choice as well as the right of access to appropriate healthcare services that will, for
example, enable women to go safely through pregnancy and childbirth."
434 Id. ¶ 45.
435 Id. ¶¶ 28, 56-57.
436 Id.
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abortion care.437
The CEDAW Committee applied such standards in its ‘Country Inquiry’ of
Northern Ireland.438 Though abortion has been permitted in England, Wales,
and Scotland since 1958, until recently, Northern Ireland criminalized
abortion in all cases other than when the life of the woman was threatened or
where the fetus would not survive to term. Invoking the right to health as
recognized in Article 12, the CEDAW Committee recommended that
Northern Ireland decriminalize abortion in all situations and legalize
abortion at least in cases of incest, rape, fetal impairment and when there is a
threat to the life or health of the woman.439
In recent years, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has
similarly urged States to “decriminalize abortion in all circumstances” to
safeguard a girl’s right to health.440 Additionally, in August 2018, the CRPD
Committee issued a ‘joint statement’ with CEDAW asserting that “access to
safe and legal abortion, as well as related services and information, are
essential aspects of women’s reproductive health.”441
At the regional human rights level, through the mechanism of
‘precautionary measures,’442 the Inter-American Court and Commission
have recognized that abortion access (though not by name, instead preferring
to describe it as medical treatment) can be necessary to protect a women’s
right to health, as recognized in Article 10 of the Protocol to the American
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. El Salvador’s near-total ban on abortion led to the measures issued in

437 CEDAW Statement of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on Sexual and
Reproductive Health and Rights: Beyond 2014 ICPD review
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CEDAW/Statements/SRHR26Feb2014.pdf.
438 Report of the inquiry concerning the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under article 8
of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
CEDAW/C/OP.8/GBR/1. The CEDAW committee can initiate ‘Country Inquiries’ if they receive “reliable
and legitimate” information of severe or systematic violations of their convention in a member state.
against Women.
439 Id.
440 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations: Ireland, ¶ 58(a), U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/IRL/CO/3-4 (2016); Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations: Kuwait (2013) ¶ 60;
Committee on the Rights of the Child Concluding Observations: Sierra Leone (2016), ¶32(c); Committee on the Rights
of the Child Concluding Observations: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (2016), ¶ 65(c).
441 Joint statement by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the Committee on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Guaranteeing sexual and reproductive health
and rights for all women, in particular women with disabilities (August 29, 2018).
442 Article 25 of the Rules of Procedure of the IACHR establishes that, in serious and urgent situations, the
Commission may, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, “request that a State adopt precautionary
measures. Such measures, whether related to a petition or not, shall concern serious and urgent situations
presenting a risk of irreparable harm to persons or to subject matter of a pending petition or case before the
organs of the inter-American system.” The measures may be of a collective nature to prevent irreparable harm to
persons due to their association with an organization, a group, or a community with identified or identifiable
members. https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/rulesiachr.asp.
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B v. El Salvador443 by the Inter-American Court. A 22-year old mother who
was pregnant with an anencephalic fetus sought an abortion when her
physician told her that carrying her pregnancy to term would exacerbate her
lupus and cause life-threatening obstetric complications.444 Though B's
request for an abortion was within the permitted exceptions to El Salvador's
abortion ban, state authorities intervened to prevent her from getting an
abortion. In response to B's petition for the Inter-American Court to
intervene, the Court ordered El Salvador to ensure that "appropriate medical
procedures" were carried out to preserve B's life, health, and personal
integrity.445 In doing so, the Court addressed the case solely as a question of
providing medical treatment for B and avoided any assessment of the
compatibility of El Salvador’s abortion ban with the Convention. By contrast,
the Special Rapporteur on Women’s Rights in the Inter-American system has
expressly named therapeutic abortion as a necessary health service for
women, the denial of which constitutes a violation of human rights.446
By invoking the right to health to call for the decriminalization of
abortion, international and regional human rights bodies have taken
important steps beyond the UN political commitments made in the 1990s. By
contrast, global health and international development policies on
reproductive health remain ambivalent on abortion rights. These policies and
practices remain bound by the ICPD and its abortion compromise: where
abortion is legal, it should be safe, and where illegal, women should have
access to quality post-abortion care.447 The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, for example, includes the target of “universal access to sexual
and reproductive health and reproductive rights,” but the target is limited to
ensuring sexual and reproductive rights as recognized in the ICPD, the
Beijing Platform for Action and the ‘outcome documents’ of their review
conferences.448 The most recent review of Beijing Platform in 2019
committed to striving for "access to safe abortion to the full extent of the law,
measures for preventing and avoiding unsafe abortions, and for the provision
of post-abortion care."449 – thereby remaining bound by the 1994
443 Order of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of May 29, 2013: Provisional Measures with Regard to
El Salvador, Matter of B., at 14, ¶17, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (2013),
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/B_se_01_ing.pdf.
444 Id. ¶ 9.
445 Id. ¶ 4(ii)(c).
446 Letter dated November 10 2006, from Victor Abramovich of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights and Santiago A. Canton to Norman Calderas Cardenal, Nicaraguan Minister of Foreign Affairs.
447 See also, Lisa Pizzarossa Here to Stay: The Evolution of Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in International Human
Rights Law (3) MDPI 29, (2018) (arguing that even prominent sexual and reproductive health rights advocates did
not push beyond the 1994 ICPD agreement in their demands in the decades following the agreement).
448 United Nations, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by the UN General
Assembly in September 2015, contains Goal 3 (Ensure healthy lives and promote wellbeing for all at all ages) and
Goal 5 (Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls).
449 See, e.g., Nairobi Statement on ICPD25: Accelerating the Promise, ¶ 3
https://www.nairobisummiticpd.org/content/icpd25-commitments (including the commitment to strive for:
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compromise on abortion. Similarly, in the WHO’s 2016-2030 “Global
Strategy for Women’s, Children’s and Adolescents’ Health”—an evidencebased strategy “designed to ensure that every woman and child realizes their
right to health”—the interventions on abortion are limited to providing postabortion care and safe abortion where it is already legal.450
3. The right to decide freely on the number and spacing of children
As mentioned, other than the Maputo Protocol, no regional or
international human rights treaty explicitly addresses abortion. The
CEDAW, where one may expect to find a provision on abortion, does not,
but it includes several provisions on family planning; these include Articles
10(h), 12(1), and 14(2). Relatedly, Article 16(1)(e) of CEDAW calls on States
to ensure that men and women have "the same rights to decide freely and
responsibly on the number and spacing of their children, and to have access
to the information, education, and means to enable them to exercise these
rights."451 However, the family planning provisions have never been
interpreted to support access to abortion, and Article 16(1)(e) only once.452
Similarly, Article 23(1) of the Convention on the Rights of all Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD) recognizes "[t]he rights of persons with disabilities to
decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children."453
but this provision has not been interpreted to support abortion rights.
4. The right to privacy
In the landmark 1973 US Supreme Court case, Roe v. Wade,454 the right
to abortion was recognized as a fundamental right included within the
guarantee of personal privacy.455 The decision had a global impact; it inspired
movements for and against the liberalization of abortion laws across the
world. This Supreme Court's judicial reasoning, which considered abortion a
matter of privacy rights, also reverberated in jurisdictions around the globe.
The European Court of Human Rights was one such importer. Strasbourg
jurisprudence treats Article 8, the right to private and family life, as the main
access to safe abortion to the full extent of the law, measures for preventing and avoiding unsafe abortions, and
for the provision of post-abortion care:).
450 The Global Strategy for Women’s, Children’s and Adolescents’ Health (2016-2030) http://www.who.int/lifecourse/partners/global-strategy/globalstrategyreport2016-2030-lowres.pdf.
451 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),
1979, Article 16(1)(e).
452 There is one exception with regards to the CEDAW Committee. In its 2018 Country Inquiry in Northern
Ireland, the Committee held that the UK had violated the right to Article 16(1)(e) due to its failure to
decriminalize abortion in Northern Ireland. See, Report of the inquiry concerning the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, CEDAW/C/OP.8/GBR/1 at ¶72. This was the first time that Article 16(1)(e) was interpreted by
the CEDAW to include abortion access.
453 Article 23(1) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. res. A/61/611 (2006).
454 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
455 Id. ¶ 153.
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provision pertinent to claims for access to abortion under the Convention.
Article 8 guarantees "respect for private and family life" and provides that this
right may not be interfered with "except such as is in accordance with the law
and is necessary . . . in the interests of . . . the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Decisions related
to the right to private life at the European Court of Human Rights have
recognized that the right incurs both negative and positive obligations; the
state may need to refrain from interfering in private life, or it may have to act
by taking measures to safeguard access. Additionally, the Court has also
asserted that privacy includes, among other things, the right to personal
identity or personal autonomy, a right to establish and develop relationships
with others, a right to moral and physical integrity, and the "right to become
or not become a parent."456 Though such interests appear to support a
woman’s right to abortion, in contrast to American jurisprudence, the
European Court does not consider the right to privacy to protect a woman’s
right to abortion.
The first case to address abortion rights in the European Convention on
Human Rights was Brüggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany457 in
1977. Two applicants claimed that Germany's criminalization of abortion in
the first trimester, other than in exceptional cases, violated their right to
respect for private life, and in the case of Scheuten, a single mother with two
children, her right to respect for family life.458 In claiming a violation of
private life, the applicants argued that the German law demanded that they
either forego sexual intercourse or use contraceptive methods that may be
unreliable, unhealthy, or unavailable459 and that the law could force women
“to carry out pregnancy against [their] will.”460 The applicants also invoked
Articles 9, 11, 14, 17, and 18 of the Convention, but all of those claims were
dismissed without interrogation by the Commission.461
The Commission asserted that legislation "regulating the termination of
pregnancy" engaged privacy interests under Article 8(1) and described the
right to private life as encompassing rights to sexual autonomy.462 and the
right to physical and psychological integrity.463 However, according to the
(now defunct) Commission, a woman’s private life becomes “shared” with the
fetus whenever she is pregnant.464 Consequently, the Commission held that
Evans v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 6339/05, § 71, ECHR 2007-IV); Tysiac v Poland supra note ¶ 107.
Bruggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, App No. 6959/75, (1981) 3 E.H.R.R. 244 /3 Eur.
Comm’n H.R. 244, (1981) [hereinafter Bruggemann v. Germany].
458 Id. ¶ 50.
459 Id.
460 Id.
461 Id. ¶ 51.
462 Id. ¶¶ 61–63.
463 Id.
464 Id. ¶ 59.
456
457
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the German law did not interfere with the applicants’ private life.465 The
Commission also emphasized that all member states of the Convention, in
one way or another, set up their own legal rules in this area.466 The
commission alleged that parties to the Convention did not intend to bind
themselves in favor of any particular position on abortion rights.467
The case of Tysiac v. Poland was the first abortion access human rights
challenge at the European Court of Human Rights. Alicja Tysiac had sought
an abortion in Poland upon being told that her pregnancy constituted a risk
to her eyesight (she had severe myopia).468 Because Poland’s abortion ban
includes exceptions for abortions where there is a risk to a woman’s life or
health, where the pregnancy is a result of a crime, or where the pregnancy
cannot survive to term,469 Tysiac's abortion was legal. However, her doctors
would not perform the abortion for her; they claimed that if she delivered by
cesarean, the risk could be averted. Unable to get an abortion, Tysiac
delivered her pregnancy by cesarean. A few months later, her eyesight
deteriorated to the point that she could no longer care for her children.470 She
initiated a criminal case against her doctors, but the Polish courts dismissed
the case. She then turned to the European Court of Human Rights.
Tysiac argued that Poland violated her right to private life both
substantively—by failing to provide her with a legal therapeutic abortion—
and procedurally—by failing to provide a comprehensive legal framework
that could guarantee her legal right to a therapeutic abortion.471
The European Court of Human Rights focused its assessment on Alicja
Tysiac’s procedural claim.472 The Court held that the right to private life
required Poland to ensure proper procedures to allow women to exercise their
domestic abortion rights. Emphasizing that it was not creating “abortion
rights,” the Court outlined that "once the legislature decides to allow
abortion, it must not structure its legal framework in a way which would limit
real possibilities to obtain it,"473 — a responsibility that extended to protecting
465 Id. at ¶ 66. There was, however, a dissent. Mr. J. E. S. Fawcett disagreed with the Commission's conclusion
regarding Article 8 and argued that the intervention of the German law in sexual morality had not been justified
by the state. He opined that regulation of abortion invades article 8(1) rights not only during pregnancy but
before conception since it will influence a woman's decision regarding its commencement and termination. Mr.
T. Opshal, with Mr. C. Norgaard and Mr. L. Kellberg, concurring, issued a separate opinion in which they
argued that the state had intervened in the applicants' private life but that this was not an interference because the
intervention was justified.
466 Id.
467 Id.
468 Tysiac v. Poland, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 5410/03 (2007) [hereinafter, Tysiac v. Poland].
469 Law on Family Planning (protection of the human fetus and conditions permitting pregnancy termination)
Statute Book 93.17.78 (1993 Act).
470 Tysiac v. Poland, supra note 468 at ¶15.
471 Id. at ¶¶ 67, 75-76.
472 See Joanna Erdman, The Procedural Turn: Abortion at the European Court of Human Rights, in ABORTION LAW IN
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 121 (Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna Erdman &
Bernard Dickens eds., 2014).
473 Tysiac v. Poland, supra note 468 at ¶ 105-6.
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against medical obstructiveness. There the Court ended its review, avoiding
discussion of the claims that Poland’s abortion law, in and of itself, interfered
with Alicja Tysiac’s human rights.474
In RR v. Poland,475 a public hospital delayed genetic testing for the
applicant after ultrasounds indicated a severe impairment in the fetus—
grounds for termination of pregnancy in Poland—until the legal time limit
for abortion expired.476 In finding a violation of RR’s right to private life, the
Court articulated that “effective access to relevant information on the
mother’s and fetus’ health, where legislation allows for abortion in certain
situations, is directly relevant for the exercise of personal autonomy.”477
Drawing on its holding in Tysiac, the Court concluded that, where domestic
law allows for abortion in cases of fetal malformation, the state has a positive
obligation under Article 8 to ensure that there is “an adequate legal and
procedural framework to guarantee that relevant, full and reliable
information on the fetus’ health is available to pregnant women.”478
In P & S v. Poland,479 a 14-year-old girl (P) became pregnant after she was
raped by a classmate.480 P's situation fell within one of Poland's exceptions to
its abortion ban, i.e., rape, and her mother (S) approached several hospitals
seeking a referral for an abortion. Still, a series of medical personnel invoked
"conscientious objection" and would not refer P to another provider.481 The
hospitals then pressured P to sign a statement that she did not want an
abortion, and state authorities removed P from the custody of her mother,
falsely claiming that P was being pressured by her mother. 482 The hospitals
also released P’s information to the press and Catholic anti-abortion
groups.483
P ultimately obtained an abortion, but the European Court held Poland
responsible for the delay and obstruction. Relying on the right to private life,
the Court reiterated that when abortion access is permitted, the state is
obligated to put in place a “procedural framework enabling a pregnant
woman to effectively exercise her right of access to lawful abortion.”484 The
Id. ¶ 116.
R.R. v. Poland, No. 27617/04, Eur. Ct. H.R., (2012) [hereinafter, R.R. v. Poland].
476 Section 4(a) of the Polish 1993 Family Planning Act provides: "An abortion can be carried out only by a
physician where 1) pregnancy endangers the mother's life or health; 2) prenatal tests or other medical findings
indicate a high risk that the fetus will be severely and irreversibly damaged or suffering from an incurable lifethreatening ailment; 3) there are strong grounds for believing that the pregnancy is a result of a criminal act."
Under any circumstances, it is only possible to obtain an abortion before the 23rdweek of pregnancy (when the
baby would be able to survive outside the mother’s body).
477 R.R. v. Poland, supra note 475 at ¶177.
478 Id. at ¶ 200.
479 P & S v. Poland, No. 57375/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012) [hereinafter, P & S. v. Poland].
480 Id. at ¶¶ 11–15.
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482 Id. at ¶¶19, 26, 28, 32.
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Court specified that exceptions to the criminalization of abortion must be
transparent, and the regulatory framework must include appropriate appeals
processes to satisfy the right to private life:485
once the state, acting within its limits of appreciation, adopts statutory
regulations allowing abortion in some situations, . . .the legal
framework devised for this purpose should be shaped in a coherent
manner which allows the different legitimate interests involved to be
taken into account adequately and in accordance with the obligations
deriving from the Convention.486
The Court followed a similar approach in the 2010 case of A, B & C v.
Ireland (already discussed in this dissertation in chapter 1) concerning three
women who went to the UK for abortions owing to Ireland’s almost total ban
on abortion.487 The first applicant, A, was a recovering alcoholic with four
children in the care of the state.488 She had suffered from post-natal
depression after each of her four prior pregnancies, which had exacerbated
her alcoholism. She felt that a fifth child could impede her progress in
becoming sober and reuniting with her family and so decided to get an
abortion.489 She borrowed money at a high interest rate to pay for travel and
a private clinic in the UK, and she traveled in secret.490 The second applicant,
B, was young and single and felt that she could not care for a child on her
own. She also traveled to the UK in secret.491 The third applicant, C, who
was in remission from cancer, tried to find out from her doctors whether her
pregnancy would impact her health and whether the radiation from her
recent cancer tests might have harmed the fetus.492 Neither her doctor nor
other healthcare workers were forthcoming. Having researched the risks
herself, she decided to travel to the UK for an abortion. Upon return to
Ireland, she suffered prolonged bleeding and infection as consequences of
incomplete abortion.493
All three applicants submitted that Ireland's abortion prohibition violated
their human rights under Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading
treatment), 8 (right to respect for private life), and 14 (prohibition of
discrimination) of the European Convention. Applicant C also claimed that
Id.
R.R. v. Poland, supra note 475 at ¶ 187; P & S v. Poland, supra note 479 at ¶ 99; See also, Tysiac v. Poland, supra
note 468 at ¶ 116; A, B, and C. v. Ireland, supra note 12 at ¶ 249.
487 A, B, & C v. Ireland, supra note 12.
488 Id. ¶ 13
489 Id. ¶¶ 13-17.
490 Id.
491 Id. ¶¶ 18-21.
492 Id. ¶¶ 24-26.
493 Id. ¶¶ 23-26.
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her right to life under Article 2 (right to life) had been violated, arguing that
abortion was not available in practice in Ireland even in a life-threatening
situation (the one possible legal exception to the ban) because there was no
legislation or guidelines to clarify that a woman had a right to a life-saving
abortion).494 In relation to the right to private life, all three applicants argued
that Ireland failed to respect their physical integrity, and the stigma, delay,
and stress they had suffered by being forced to travel secretly to England for
abortions infringed upon their right to private life.495 C also claimed that the
state’s lack of a statutory or regulatory basis for a life-saving abortion violated
her right to private life.496
The Irish government contested all of their claims and argued that even
if Article 8 was engaged, Ireland’s abortion ban was a justified interference
with the right to private life because it pursued two legitimate aims: a) the law
advanced the protection of the rights of ‘others,’497 and b) it was based on
public morals and the need to protect the right to life of the fetus.498
In relation to all three applicants, the Grand Chamber asserted that
Ireland’s prohibition on abortion impacted their private lives.499 The
Chamber did not engage C’s right to life claims but found in her favor on
privacy grounds, reiterating its previous position that, where abortion is
legally permitted, the state has a positive obligation to ensure that it is
accessible.500 But with respect to applicants A and B, the Court’s majority
held that the state’s interference with their private lives was justifiable; the
Court accepted Ireland’s claim that the normative premise of abortion
restrictions in Ireland was “the profound moral views” of the Irish people on
the protection of prenatal life, i.e. the second proffered legitimate aim.501 The
Chamber also assessed whether the prohibition on abortion was
proportionate to the state’s aim by considering whether Ireland had:
struck a fair balance between, on the one hand, the first and second
applicants’ right to respect for their private lives under Article 8 and,
on the other, the profound moral values of the Irish people as to the
nature of life, and consequently as to the need to protect the life of the
unborn.502

Id.
Id. ¶ 167-178.
496 Id. ¶ 128.
497 Id. ¶ 181.
498 Id. ¶ 182.
499 Id. ¶ 214, 216.
500 Id. ¶ 263-264.
501 Id. ¶ 227.
502 Id. ¶ 230. The "margin of appreciation" is a judicial principle that the European Court developed as a form of
ethical decentralization to national authorities. The Court gives states a margin to decide how to balance the
state's protection for a fundamental right and its's protection of public interest. For more, see Eval Benvenisti,
Margin of Appreciation, Consensus and Universal Standards, 31(4) NYU J. INT’L L. POL. 843, 843–854, (1999).
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In determining whether this balance was met, the Court afforded the Irish
government a wide “margin of appreciation”503 and the claims of A and B
were dismissed.504
At the UN level, the right to privacy in abortion jurisprudence at the
Human Rights Committee produces similarly tentative support for abortion
access. Many cases replicate the European Court’s approach, i.e., the
Committee will find States in violation of the right to privacy if their abortion
regulation is not implemented in practice. KL v. Peru505 challenged Peru’s
failure to implement a woman’s right to a therapeutic abortion. When she
was three months pregnant, KL, then aged 17, attended a public hospital in
Lima for an ultrasound, which revealed that she was carrying a fetus with a
fatal anomaly where the fetus lacks most or all of a forebrain. Her gynecologist
told KL that her life was in danger if the pregnancy continued.506 KL opted
to have a therapeutic abortion, which is legal in Peru, but the hospital's
director refused. As a result, KL gave birth to an anencephalic newborn and
suffered from severe depression when the newborn died four days after she
gave birth.507
KL complained to the HRC that is interfering with her decision to legally
terminate her pregnancy and subjecting her to an "extended funeral" for her
child; the state acted on the basis of prejudicial social attitudes towards
women to violate her rights under Articles 3 (non-discrimination between
men and women), 6 (life), 7 (torture and ill-treatment), 24 (the right of every
child to receive from her family, society and the state the protection required
by her status as a minor) and 26 (equal protection of the law) of the ICCPR.
508 In terms of the violation of her right to privacy, KL argued that by
interfering with her decision to have an abortion—a decision that impacted
her bodily integrity and her life more broadly—the state violated her right to
privacy.509
The Committee found in favor of KL, but on a different basis. Rather
than engaging her argument that the state interfered with a woman's right to
make autonomous decisions about reproduction or parenthood, the
Committee held that the "state interfered arbitrarily in her private life by
denying her the opportunity to secure medical intervention."510
LMR v. Argentina511 involved a girl who was pregnant as a result of rape.
Argentina permits abortion for victims of rape, but the hospital that LMR
K.L. v. Peru, CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003, Communication No. 1153/2003 [hereinafter K.L. v. Peru]
Id.
505 Id.
506 Id. ¶¶ 2.1—2.2.
507 Id. ¶¶ 2.3 & 2.6.
508 Id. ¶¶ 3.4-3.7.
509 Id.
510 Id. ¶ 6.4.
511 LMR v. Argentina, UN Doc. CCPR/C/101/D 1608/2007, (UN Human Rights Committee Apr 28, 2011).
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attended initiated legal proceedings to prevent her from getting an
abortion.512 Following a series of appeals, the Supreme Court of Buenos Aires
determined that LMR could get an abortion, but the hospital again refused
to perform the abortion on grounds of “institutional conscience.”513 With the
help of local women’s organizations, LMR obtained an illegal abortion on
the “black market.”514 LMR suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder in
the aftermath.515
LMR’s mother complained to the HRC that the hospital’s refusal to
terminate the pregnancy violated her human rights,516 including her right to
be free from arbitrary interference in her private life.517 She emphasized that
the state arbitrarily interfered in her private life by making a decision
concerning her life and reproductive health on her behalf.518 In response, the
Committee held that Argentina’s unlawful interference—through the
judiciary—in an issue that should have been resolved "between the patient
and her physician" violated LMR's right to privacy.519
In Mellet v. Ireland520 and Whelan v. Ireland,521 the applicants’ argued that
Ireland’s abortion ban in cases of non-viable pregnancies impeded their
physical and psychological integrity and arbitrarily interfered in their
decision-making.522 In response, the HRC concluded that by interfering with
their decision not to continue a non-viable pregnancy and causing mental
anguish, Ireland interfered with their right to privacy.523 In contrast to the
European Court of Human Rights, the HRC held that: “the balance that the
state party has chosen to strike between protection of the fetus and the rights
of the woman cannot be justified.”524
There are no abortion-related decisions involving the right to privacy
from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. However, in 2007, the
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights brokered a friendly settlement
in Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. México. 525 Paulina, 13, was pregnant as
Id. ¶¶ 2.3—2.7.
Id. ¶ 3.16.
514 Id. ¶ 2.7.
515 Id.
516 LMR made four additional claims against Argentina; (i) the state subjected LMR and her family to physical
and mental suffering in violation of the right to be free from torture, or CIDT under Article 7; (ii) Argentina put
LMR’s right to life under Article 6 at risk by forcing her to obtain an illegal abortion (iii) Argentina violated
Article 18 (the right to freedom of religion or belief) owing to an abuse of conscientious objection and (i) the
state’s failure to exercise due diligence in safeguarding the legal right to a procedure required solely by women,
resulted in discriminatory treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ICCPR.
517 Id. ¶¶ 3.4–3.8.
518 Id. ¶ 3.2.
519 L.M.R. v. Argentina, supra note 511, ¶ 9.3.
520 Mellet v. Ireland, supra note, ¶ 7.8.
521 Whelan v. Ireland, supra note ¶ 7.7.
522 Id. ¶ 3.4. Mellet v. Ireland, supra note ¶ 3.4;
523 Mellet v. Ireland, ¶ 7.7; Whelan v. Ireland, ¶ 7.8.
524 Id.
525 Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. México, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Friendly
Settlement, Petition 161-02, Report No. 21/07 (2007).
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a result of rape. At the hospital she attended, Paulina’s medical team
purposely delayed her abortion.526 A Catholic priest and anti-abortion
hospital director began visiting Paulina as she waited, providing both Paulina
and her mother misleading information about the health risks of abortion.
Worried, Paulina canceled the abortion. Her petition to the Commission
alleged that the state had enabled public officials to violate her rights to
dignity and privacy, physical and psychological integrity, liberty, and
informed consent in its failure to issue guidelines for access to abortion for
women who have been raped.527
Paulina's case never reached the admissibility stage at the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights; Paulina and the State of Mexico reached a
"friendly settlement agreement," in which the Mexican government conceded
generally to the human rights violations and agreed to a number of
reparations.528 Similar to cases in the European Court of Human Rights, the
judicial approach distilled the issues to focus on procedure, namely the
absence of regulations to clarify the exceptions to Mexico’s abortion ban.
There was no examination of the abortion ban itself or the broader sociopolitical context that gave rise to a situation where individuals could impose
their religious beliefs about abortion on a woman.529
5. The right to be free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
The prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
(CIDT) is a norm of universal applications in international law530 and is one
of the most prolific norms contained in international and regional human
rights treaties.531 There is no single definition of torture under international
law, but international human rights bodies tend to agree upon four elements
that, if combined, constitute torture.
Id. ¶¶ 9–13.
Article 11, American Convention and Article 7, American Convention.
528 The reparations included monetary compensation for education and school supplies; psychological treatment
and health services for the victim; a public acknowledgment of responsibility by the government in the local
newspapers; changes to legislature; an assessment of the enforcement of the National Program for the Prevention
and Attention of Domestic, Sexual and Violence Against Women; the dissemination of a circular from the
Health Secretariat to other sectors that would serve to 'strengthen the commitment toward ending violations of
the right of women to the legal termination of a pregnancy. Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. México, InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, Friendly Settlement, Petition 161-02, Report No. 21/07 (2007).
529 Ciara O’Connell, Litigating Reproductive Health Right in the Inter-American System: What Does a Winning Case Look
Like? (Special Issue on Health Rights Litigation), 16 HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS J. 116, 121 (2014).
530 See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. See generally,
Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 331. (2009).
531 Torture and other forms of ill-treatment are prohibited under, inter alia: Article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT), G.A. res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984); Article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; Article 10 of the
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families, G.A. res. 45/158, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 262, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990; Article
15 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. res. A/61/611 (2006); Article 5 of the
American Convention on Human Rights; Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights; Article 5 of
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.
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I.
II.
III.

an act (or omission) that inflicts severe pain or suffering
which is intentional
for a specific purpose or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, and
IV.
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence
of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.532
In distinguishing torture from CIDT, the UN Special Rapporteur on
Torture and Ill-Treatment asserts that the concept of "powerless[ness]" is "the
decisive criteria" for distinguishing torture from cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment.533 In contrast, the European Court of Human Rights
defines torture as inhuman treatment that is both deliberate and “caus[es]
very serious and cruel suffering.” The Court considers inhuman or degrading
treatment to be conduct that, while still serious, falls below that threshold.534
The form of torture and CIDT traditionally accepted as prohibited under
international human rights law required that the perpetrator be "a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity," e.g., official detention
settings, during interrogations, or armed conflict.535 This right would protect
“the male prisoner of conscience.”536 Torture and ill-treatment inflicted upon
women by either state or non-state actors wasn't part of the picture.537
However, over the past thirty years, feminist activists transformed
understandings of torture and CIDT in international law such that pain and
suffering endured by women are also understood as a violation of the right to
be free from torture and ill-treatment.538 Rape now has been found to
constitute torture in some circumstances539 and categories of gender-based
See also, Article 1 UNCAT.
Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, U.N. E/CN.4/2006/6
(2005), ¶ 39.
534 Ireland v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 5310/71, ¶ 167 (1978).
535 The UNCAT specifies that to qualify as torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the pain or
suffering must be inflicted at the instigation, or with the consent or acquiescence, of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity. However, the prohibition on torture and ill-treatment in the ICCPR applies
regardless of whether the acts were committed by "public officials" or "other persons acting on behalf of the
State," or "private persons" and "whether by encouraging, ordering, tolerating or perpetrating prohibited acts."
HRC, General Comment No. 20, 1992, §13.
536 See, e.g., Clare McGlynn, Rape as ‘Torture’? Catherine Mackinnon and Questions of Feminist Strategy, 16(1) FEMINIST
LEGAL STUDIES, 71,75 (2008).
537 See, e.g., RONLI SOPRIS, REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM, TORTURE AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
CHALLENGING THE MASCULINISATION OF TORTURE 19–23 (2014) [hereinafter RONLI SOPRIS,
REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM]; Catharine MacKinnon, On Torture: A Feminist Perspective on Human Rights, 21, in
KATHLEEN MAHONEY AND PAUL MAHONEY (EDS.), HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A
GLOBAL CHALLENGE (1993); Rhona Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture,
(1994) 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. LAW REVIEW 291.
538 See Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright; Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J.
INT’L L. 613, 628–30 (1991); Center for Reproductive Rights, Reproductive Rights Violations as Torture and Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: A Critical Human Rights Analysis (2011)
https://reproductiverights.org/document/reproductive-rights-violations-as-torture .
539Aydin v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 23718/94 (1997) (acknowledging for the first time that an act of rape
could constitute torture); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (1998). See generally, Alice Edwards, The
Feminizing" of Torture under International Human Rights Law, 19(2) LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 349 (2006).
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non-state torture such as female genital cutting, widow and acid burning, and
the torture of “trafficked” women are emerging.540
At national, regional, and international levels, civil society organizations
extensively document the ways in which state denial of abortion rights can
generate suffering at the hands of the state that constitutes torture or other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.541 In response to such monitoring,
documentation, and advocacy, the Human Rights Committee, the
Committee Against Torture (CAT),542 and the European Court of Human
Rights have articulated that denial of access to abortion can lead to physical
or mental suffering amounting to ill-treatment. Alyson Zuerick identifies two
broad situations where this occurs.543 The first involves cases where actors,
such as medical professionals, hospital boards, or police, frustrate or obstruct
a woman’s attempts to obtain an abortion that she is legally entitled to.544 The
second and more recent branch of this abortion denial-as-ill-treatment
jurisprudence involves cases where human rights bodies find that a State's
abortion regulations themselves cause the ill-treatment.545
Beginning in the late 1990s, the UN Human Rights Committee, through
its General Comments and Concluding Observations to States, expressed its
concern restrictive abortion laws could run afoul of their obligations to
prevent torture or CIDT, particularly when the pregnancy was the result of
rape or the woman’s life was threatened.546 Over the next decade, the
Committee substantiated its reasoning on abortion denial as ill-treatment in
individual decisions.
The above-discussed case KL v. Peru,547 in 2005, was the first in a series of
cases where the HRC found that denying or obstructing a woman’s access to
an abortion amounted to CIDT. The Committee recognized that the mental
suffering that KL experienced, both during her pregnancy and after giving
birth, was a foreseeable result of the hospital compelling her to continue with
the pregnancy even though KL’s child would die very soon after birth.548 This
540 See, e.g., UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment,
E/CN.4/2006/6 (2005), ¶ 35.
541 See, e.g., Aya Fujimura-Faneslow, The state as a catalyst for violence against women: Violence against women and torture or
other ill-treatment in the context of sexual and reproductive health in Latin America and the Caribbean, AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR0133882016ENGLISH.PDF.
542 The UN Committee against Torture (CAT Committee) interprets and ensures compliance with the UN
Convention against Torture.
543 Alyson Zureick, (En)gendering Suffering: Denial of Abortion as a Form of Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, 38
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 99, 137 (2015).
544 Id. ¶140.
545 Id.
546 See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 28, supra note 3, ¶ 11 (noting that in assessing a State’s
compliance with Article 7 of the ICCPR, the Committee would examine whether States provided access to safe
abortion for women who became pregnant as a result of rape); Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations
to Peru, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/70/PER (2000) (observing that the criminalization of abortion is
incompatible with Article 7 of the ICCPR and recommending that Peru revise its abortion law)
547 KL v. Peru, supra note 503.
548 Id. ¶ 6.3.
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was compounded because her medical team provided no psychological or
medical support despite KL’s “special vulnerability as a minor girl.”549 The
Committee held that this suffering amounted to CIDT for which Peru was
liable.550
In LMR v. Argentina,551 LMR’s mother claimed that forcing her daughter
to continue with her pregnancy constituted cruel and degrading treatment
and, consequently, was a violation of her personal well-being.552 LMR also
claimed that she felt humiliated by the barrage of attention she had received,
in particular the pressure from people to continue the pregnancy and give the
baby up for adoption.553 In addressing the author’s claim, the Committee
held that Argentina’s failure “to guarantee LMR’s right to a termination of
pregnancy [as provided under domestic law] . . . caused LMR physical and
mental suffering” amounting to a violation of Article 7.554 The Committee
also expressed heightened concern at what they perceived to be the
vulnerability of the complainant, that LMR's suffering was "aggravated by
her status as a young woman with a disability."555
In 2014, in its Concluding Observations to Ireland, the HRC, citing
Article 7 of the Convention, expressed its concern that Ireland continued to
prohibit abortion in most circumstances and highlighted the “severe mental
suffering caused by the denial of abortion services to women seeking abortions
due to rape, incest, fatal fetal abnormality or serious risks to health.”556 The
Committee concluded by recommending that Ireland undertake significant
reforms, namely that it “[r]evise its legislation on abortion, including its
Constitution, to provide for additional exceptions in cases of rape, incest,
serious risks to the health of the mother, or fatal fetal abnormality” to comply
with its obligations under the ICCPR.557 When this law was subject to the
Committee’s scrutiny in two landmark cases just two years later, the
Committee unambiguously held that criminal abortion law in and of itself, i.e.,
not just obstruction of the law, violated the right to be free from cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the cases of Mellet and Whelan shared a similar
factual background. During their pregnancies, both Amanda Mellet and
Siobhán Whelan received diagnoses of fatal fetal impairments (congenital
heart defects in the case of Mellet and holoprosencephaly in the case of
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552 Id. ¶ 3.8.
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Whelan).558 At the time, Ireland only permitted abortion in situations where
there was a risk to the life of the woman, which meant that the women had
to leave Ireland, at their own expense, in order to end their non-viable
pregnancies. In Mellet’s situation, she had to return to Ireland twelve hours
after her abortion — still weak and bleeding — because she could not afford
to stay overnight in the UK.559 Upon return, neither woman received postabortion or bereavement care in the public health care system. In addition,
the women described deep feelings of shame and stigma associated with the
criminalization of abortion.560 Both women had to leave the remains of their
child in the UK to be received later via delivery by courier.561
In their separate cases, Amanda Mellet and Siobhan Whelan claimed that
Ireland subjected them to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment by i)
denying them reproductive health care and bereavement support; (ii) forcing
them to continue carrying a dying fetus; iii) compelling them to terminate
their pregnancies abroad; and iv) subjecting them to intense stigma.562 Ireland
attempted to refute these claims by pointing out that the Committee’s CIDT
holding in the KL case was due to KL being denied an abortion that was
lawfully available. 563 By contrast, Mellet and Whelan had sought abortions
that were unlawful in Ireland.
The HRC found in favor of the women. It held that by forcing the women
to leave the country for abortions in such circumstances — away from their
families and local healthcare providers, and with the burden of having to
leave the remains of their babies behind — Ireland’s abortion law subjected
the women to “intense physical and mental suffering” that violated their right
to be free from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.564 Finding that
Ireland’s abortion law itself, rather than a failure to implement the law,
amounted to a human rights violation, marked significant progress in the
Human Rights Committee's abortion jurisprudence. The decisions required
Ireland, for the first time, to compensate a woman for the expenses and
emotional distress tied to an abortion. It also called on Ireland to amend its
laws criminalizing abortion in cases of fatal fetal anomaly, including its
constitution, if necessary.
While the Committee Against Torture has not heard an individual case
on access to abortion, there are a number of very clear concluding
observations by the Committee on abortion restrictions. CAT reiterates that
restrictive abortion laws may lead to suffering tantamount to CIDT and urges
Mellet at ¶¶ 2.1-2.2; Whelan at ¶ 2.1.
Mellet v Ireland, ¶ 2.4.
560 Mellet v Ireland, ¶ 2.5; Whelan v Ireland, ¶ 2.4.
561 Mellet v Ireland, ¶ 2.5; Whelan v Ireland, ¶ 2.5.
562 Mellet v Ireland, ¶ 3.1; Whelan v Ireland, ¶ 3.1.
563 Mellet v Ireland, ¶ 4.6; Whelan v Ireland, ¶ 4.5.
564 Mellet v Ireland, ¶ 7.4 - 7.6; Whelan v Ireland, ¶7.5 -7.7
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States to reform their abortion laws as part of their obligation to prevent
CIDT.
The European Court of Human Rights has been more reticent than the
Human Rights Committee to recognize claims for ill-treatment in abortion
cases. In A, B, C v. Ireland, the applicants argued they had experienced
inhuman or degrading treatment because Ireland’s criminalization of
abortion stigmatized women who sought abortions. It was “degrading and a
deliberate affront to their dignity.”565 The Court considered this claim to be
“manifestly ill-founded” and thus inadmissible.566 Similarly, in the above
mentioned Tysiac case, the applicant claimed that the state’s failure to ensure
she could access her right to an abortion—essentially forcing her to continue
with a pregnancy knowing that her health could seriously deteriorate—
resulted in “anguish and distress” and amounted to inhuman or degrading
treatment under Article 3.567 The Court dismissed Tysiac’s claim without
explicit reason.568
In two cases, a couple of years later, the European Court went further
than it had in Tysiac. In the abovementioned case of RR v. Poland,569 the
European Court concluded that the public hospital’s deliberate delay in
providing the legal genetic testing had both humiliated RR and caused her
severe mental anguish. In combination with the woman’s “extreme
vulnerability” as a pregnant woman, the abortion denial constituted a
violation of the right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading
treatment.570 Similarly, in P & S v. Poland571 the barriers that state actors had
subjected her to in her attempt to obtain an abortion—one that she was
entitled to under Polish law—violated her right to be free from cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment.572
The response of the European Court in RR and P & S emulates the
approach of its privacy-based abortion access jurisprudence just discussed.
The Court is willing to recognize human rights violations in situations where
state actors frustrate a woman or girl’s access to abortion, but only if she was
already legally entitled to that abortion under national law. Unlike the HRC’s
move to recognize that it is the national law itself that produces the illtreatment, the European Court avoids censuring national legal restrictions on
abortion.

See, e.g., A, B, & C v Ireland, supra note 8, ¶ 162-163
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6. The right to equality and non-discrimination on the basis of sex and gender
All international human rights law treaties offer protection for the right
to non-discrimination and to equality, but the formulations differ. Article 26
of the ICCPR, which outlines that “the law shall prohibit any discrimination
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination”573 is the oldest self-standing general right to nondiscrimination in international law. Article 3 of the ACHPR, Article 24 of the
ACHR, and Protocol 12 to the ECHR similarly recognize a freestanding
right to equality before the law for all persons.
Article 2(1) of the ICCPR establishes the treaty's prohibition against
discrimination, proscribing "distinctions of any kind," including race, color,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth, or other status, in the exercise of any rights promulgated by
the Covenant. Explicitly including a right to be free from indirect
discrimination, the Human Rights Committee's General Comment No. 18
defines discrimination as that "which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal
footing, of all rights and freedoms.”574 Similar accessory provisions against
discrimination, including discrimination based on sex, can be found in most
other human rights instruments, including the ICESCR, CRC, the IMWC,
the ICRPD, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.575
Gender-specific protections for equality are found in Article 3 of the
ICCPR, which requires States to ensure the equal right of men and women
to all civil and political freedoms in the treaty and throughout the CEDAW.
States are obligated to modify or abolish existing laws and policies which
constitute discrimination against women. The CEDAW's equality standard
requires all laws that disparately impact women to be scrutinized to secure de
jure and de facto equality for women.576 Additionally, both the UNCRPD and
CEDAW Convention contain express obligations on States to eliminate
harmful gender stereotypes as part of the States’ obligations to ensure
equality.577
573 Art. 26 provides: "All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons
equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status."
574 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18
575 Convention on the Rights of the Child [hereinafter CRC], art. 2, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 (Nov 20, 1989); International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, [hereinafter CRPD], G.A. res. 61/106, art. 23(1)(b), Annex I, U.N. GAOR,
61st Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 65, U.N. Doc. A/61/49, entered into force May 3, 2008, Article 4.
576 Discrimination against women under CEDAW Convention means “any distinction, exclusion or restriction
made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.” Article 1,
CEDAW.
577 CEDAW Article 5(a); Article 8(1)(b) of the CRPD.
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Surprisingly, the CEDAW Committee does not invoke the Convention's
general prohibition on discrimination against women to address abortion
restrictions. Instead, the Committee focuses its assessment of restrictive
abortion laws under Article 12, which requires States to "take all appropriate
measures to eliminate discrimination against women in the field of health
care." Using this approach, the Committee has recognized that "criminalizing
services that only women need,"578 violates women’s right to health under
CEDAW and has urged States to reform their laws on this basis.
In LC v. Peru, the aforementioned case where a hospital refused to provide
spinal surgery to a girl because she was pregnant, while also denying her a
therapeutic abortion (that was legal in her circumstances), LC claimed that
she had suffered discriminatory treatment based “on the stereotype of
imposing the reproductive function of LC above her welfare” in violation of
Article 5 of CEDAW — the Convention’s anti-stereotyping provision.579
Article 5 requires state parties to take measures aimed at “the elimination of
prejudices based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.”580 The CEDAW
Committee agreed that LC had been discriminated against per Article 5, but
in quite confusing reasoning, articulated that LC had been denied surgery
based on “the stereotype that protection of the fetus should prevail over the
health of the mother.”581
By contrast, in the Country Inquiry of Northern Ireland in 2018, the
CEDAW Committee took a much more substantive approach to gender
discrimination and abortion denial. The Committee invoked Article 2
(requiring the elimination of laws which constitute discrimination against
women), as well as the right to health in Article 12, and the right to sexual
health and family planning in Article 16, when noting that States parties are
required to legalize abortion, at least in cases of rape, incest, threats to the life
and/or physical or mental health of the woman, or severe fetal
impairment.582 Additionally, the Committee held that the UK’s “deliberate
maintenance of criminal laws on abortion” in Northern Ireland violated
women’s right to non-discrimination by perpetuating gender-based
violence.583 The Committee also noted that the failure to combat stereotypes
depicting women primarily as mothers exacerbates discrimination against

See infra
LC v. Peru, supra note 374.
580 Id. ¶ 3.3.
581 Id. ¶ 11.3.
582 CEDAW/C/OP.8/GBR/1, Report of the inquiry concerning the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, ¶ 60.
583 Id. ¶ 72.
578
579
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women.584
The Human Rights Committee gave short shrift to the nondiscrimination claims in its first abortion case, KL. v Peru. It declared
complaints under Articles 3 (equal enjoyment of convention rights) and 26
(equality before the law) of the ICCPR to be inadmissible, stating that they
had not been “properly substantiated” because the petitioner had not
“provided any evidence relating to the events which demonstrated
discrimination.”585 However, the Committee did find a violation of Article
2(3) of the ICCPR, the right to an effective remedy,586 confirming that “the
State’s failure to exercise due diligence in safeguarding the legal right to a
procedure required solely by women resulted in discriminatory treatment.”587
In L.M.R. v. Argentina, the applicant claimed that the state’s failure to
exercise due diligence in safeguarding her already legal access to an abortion
under Argentina’s rape exception violated her right to equality and nondiscrimination on the basis of sex; she asserted that she had had a legal right
to a procedure “required solely by women.”588 She underscored that the
Committee itself had expressed concern about traditionalist attitudes
impacting women’s rights in Argentina and emphasized that her treatment
by health professionals and judges, as well as the authorities’ failure to
implement the law, had all been motivated by gender-based prejudice that
was discriminatory.589 The Human Rights Committee accepted her claim
that she had not been provided with access to an effective remedy in relation
to Article 3 (equal right of men and women to other rights) but did not provide
any analysis as to why it considered that LMR’s right to non-discrimination
had been violated.
As described in the preceding section, in the cases of Mellet and Whelan,
the applicants argued that Ireland's criminalization of abortion in cases of
fetal impairment violated their human rights by denying their dignity,
autonomy, and physical and psychological integrity.590 The women argued
584 CEDAW/C/OP.8/GBR/1, Report of the inquiry concerning the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland under article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (2018) ¶ 72.
585 K.L. v. Peru, supra note 503 at ¶ 11.1
586Article 2 (3) off the ICCPR outlines that: Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective
remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent
judicial, administrative, or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the state, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent
authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.
587 K.L. v. Peru, supra note 503at ¶ 11.1.
588 L.M.R. v. Argentina, supra note 511, at ¶ 3.5-3.6.
589 Id.
590 Mellet at ¶ 3.9; Whelan at ¶ 3.9. See also, Isaac Stanley-Becker, How an Irish-American woman’s legal case helped spur
Ireland’s abortion referendum THE WASHINGTON POST (May 17, 2018)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/how-an-irish-american-womans-legal-case-helped-spurirelands-abortion-referendum/2018/05/16/c84e506e-4d7a-11e8-85c1-9326c4511033_story.html
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that Ireland imposed no restrictions on health services “that were needed only
by men," as such, the state's abortion ban discriminated against them on the
basis of sex.591 In addition, the women raised the structural and pervasive
character of discrimination as a concern; Ireland’s law stereotyped them as
reproductive instruments whose needs were subordinate to those of the
unborn, non-viable fetus.592
In its decision, the Committee made a point of saying that it "noted" these
structural equality claims, but it took a different doctrinal approach. In its
analysis, the Committee examined how Ireland treated the applicants as
women who decided to terminate their non-viable pregnancies, in
comparison to the treatment of women who had non-viable pregnancies but
decided to carry the fetus to term.593 The latter set of women could continue
to receive the full protection of the public health system in Ireland, and all
their medical needs, including post-natal and bereavement care, were
covered by health insurance.594 The applicants who decided to abort had to
travel abroad at their own expense and were deprived of any care from the
public health care system.595
In a confusing conclusion, the Committee located its non-discrimination
finding under Article 26, allegedly on the basis of sex, on the grounds that the
Irish legal system imposed disproportionate socio-economic burdens on some
women but not on other women, depending on whether they abort or carry
to term a non-viable fetus.596 Prof. Sarah Cleveland provided a concurring
opinion that articulated alternative bases for the finding of discrimination in
Mellet and Whelan. She supported the claimant's argument that the
criminalization of abortion is sex-based discrimination because it affects a
health service that only women need and places no equivalent burden on
men.597 Additionally, she emphasized that Ireland's abortion law
disproportionately impacted low-income and vulnerable populations because
these women faced huge burdens in traveling for reproductive healthcare.598
Most critically for Cleveland, the ICCPR’s right to equal protection against
gender discrimination prohibited the gender stereotyping the applicants
complained of. Focusing on the women’s claim that they had suffered
discrimination on the basis of gender stereotyping, Cleveland outlined that
requiring women to carry a fatally impaired pregnancy to term underscored
the extent to which Irish law has “prioritized (whether intentionally or

Id.
Mellet at ¶ 3.10; Whelan at ¶ 3.11.
593 Mellet at ¶ 7.1; Whelan at ¶ 7.1.
594 Id.
595 Mellet at ¶ 7.1; Whelan at ¶ 7.1.
596 Id. ¶ 7.11.
597 Mellet, Annex II, ¶ 5.
598 Mellet, Annex II, ¶ 14.
591
592
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unintentionally) the reproductive role of women as mothers.”599 The state's
claim that the law had a non-discriminatory purpose, i.e., protection of the
unborn in line with the constitution, did not mean that "its laws may not also
be informed by such stereotypes."600 Cleveland asserted that a law animated
by a gender stereotype of women as mothers amounts to discrimination
against women under Article 26.
Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, like Article
2(1) of the ICCPR, provides protection for the enjoyment of the rights and
freedoms in the Convention “without discrimination on any ground such as
sex, race, color, language, ….or other status.”601 In the abortion
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, a number of the
applicants claimed, under Article 14, read with Articles 3 (freedom from
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment) or 8 (the right to private life), that
they had been discriminated against on grounds of sex and gender. But in all
cases, discrimination was barely considered or was summarily dismissed
without discussion.602 In RR, although the claimant included a sex
discrimination claim in the pleadings, it never appeared among the claims
considered by the Court.603 In P&S, the applicant's claim under Article 14
was dismissed as inadmissible, and no reasoning was offered to explain the
dismissal. In ABC, all three women argued that the domestic restrictions on
abortion disproportionately burdened them as women and amounted to a
violation of the right to non-discrimination on the basis of sex.604A in ABC
also sought to claim discrimination based on socio-economic status, given the
greater difficulties that she faced, as a woman with few financial resources, in
traveling to England for an abortion.605 The majority again declined to
address abortion as an issue of non-discrimination. Similarly, in Tysiac, the
Court gave no explanation for why it did not address the applicant’s equality
claims; Ms. Tysiac had argued that Poland’s failure to reasonably
accommodate her disability during the investigations amounted to
discrimination on the ground of her disability and that her treatment had
been driven by sexism.606
The foregoing jurisprudence evidences that in the absence of express legal
Id. Annex II, ¶ 14.
Mellet, Annex II, ¶ 11.
601 Note that the position is different for states that have ratified Protocol 12 to the European Convention on
Human Rights. Art. 1 of Protocol 12 introduced in 2005 an independent equality and non-discrimination right.
In its jurisprudence, the Court has articulated that Article 14 can also function as an "autonomous" provision,
i.e., it can be violated even where the substantive article relied upon to invoke Article 14 has not been violated.
See, Belgian Linguistic case (1968) 1 EHRR 252, 283.
602 See, e.g., ABC v Ireland, ¶ 270; P&S v Poland, ¶171.
603 The Center for Reproductive Rights summarizes the original claim lodged at the Court on their website:
http://reproductiverights.org/en/case/rr-vpoland-european-court-of-human-rights (accessed Nov 20, 2019).
604 ABC, ¶¶ 126, 212–215, 268, 270.
605 ABC, ¶270. Note, the Court cited its previous cases of Open Door, at ¶ 83; and Tysiac v. Poland supra note 468
at ¶144 in support of its decision not to examine the equality-based claims.
606 Tysiac, supra note 468 at ¶139.
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600
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guarantees on abortion rights, international and regional human rights bodies
have provided interpretive and textual support to protect a woman's right to
abortion in certain circumstances. At present, the law on abortion presents
an "exception-based framework" whereby states are required to legalize
abortion in cases where the pregnancy threatens the life or health of the
woman, is the result of rape or incest, or where there is severe fetal
impairment.607 Human rights bodies have mostly conceptualized abortion
restrictions as violations of the right to health (CEDAW, CESCR), the right
to be free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment (HRC, European
Court of Human Rights), and the right to privacy (European Court of Human
Rights, HRC). Recognition of equality claims for abortion rights is evolving
(HRC, CEDAW). Legal decisions have held states accountable for violations
of human rights in situations where women are denied access to abortion (i)
where states fail to provide affirmative protection for access to abortion that
is legal in national law, and (ii) in the recent HRC decisions in Mellet and
Whelan, the Committee went further and held that the state’s failure to legalize
abortion for non-viable pregnancies was a violation of the Convention.

B. Human Rights in Action
Returning to Ireland’s story of abortion law reform, the next section
explores whether the international human rights law standards just discussed
contributed to the recognition of abortion rights in Ireland. And if so, how,
and to what extent?
Legally, international human rights treaties are binding on States that
have ratified such treaties, and the obligations set out on the treaties "must be
performed in good faith."608 As noted, the content and substance of
international treaty obligations are set out in detail by their respective Treaty
Monitoring Bodies and, in the case of the European Convention on Human
607 UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies have also urged states to decriminalize abortion and to eliminate punitive
measures for women and girls who undergo abortion and for those who provide or assist with abortions. This is
not unilateral. The UNCRPD diverges from the other UNTMBs and calls for access to abortion in cases of a
fatal fetal anomaly rather than severe impairment. See, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Spain,
CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1, (19-23 September 2011): Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Austria,
CRPD/C/AUT/CO/1 (Sept 13, 2013).
607 CEDAW Comm., General Recommendation No. 24, Article 12 of the Convention (Women and Health),
U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1, (Feb 5, 1999) at ¶¶ 14, 31(c).
608 Art. 26 VCLT.
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Rights, the European Court of Human Rights. Decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights are binding on states,609 whereas the views of Treaty
Monitoring Bodies are not. However, Treaty Monitoring Body decisions
provide authoritative interpretations of the binding treaty obligations.610
Notably, there exists no coercive sovereign to enforce international human
rights law treaties. As a consequence, inquiries into the relative power of
international legal rules and how international rules exercise power are
perennial.
Traditional studies on the relative impact of international human rights
law on domestic law and practice focus much of their analysis on the
interactions between States and the “formal” architecture of international
human rights law, namely the extensive network of widely adopted treaties
and the accompanying institutional infrastructure that monitor state
compliance with such treaties.611 Under this view, the impact of international
human rights law on domestic law and policy depends upon a top-down
process whereby States respond to interstate or institutional coercion,612
persuasion,613 or socialization.614 For others, the standards and institutions of
international human rights law contribute to reform only when civil society
actors — often via social movements — leverage human rights law to achieve
their goals. These scholars go beyond the formal interactions between States
and supranational structures to examine how civil society actors use
international human rights advocacy to pressure governments to improve
their practices.615 Keck and Sikkink, for example, identify how local
Art. 46 European Convention on Human Rights.
Art. 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice asserts that the views of Committee experts are
a subsidiary source of international law. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of
Justice, entry into force Oct 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI.
611 See LOUIS HENKIN, THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (1989); See infra note 601.
612 See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 11 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002) (arguing that the
process of implementation actually fails most of the time); Daniel Hill, Estimating the Effects of Human Rights Treaties
on State Behavior, 72 J. POL. 1161 (2010) 1162; On the European Court of Human Rights, consider Mark W.
Janis, The Efficacy of Strasbourg Law, 15 CONN J INTL L 39, 39 (2000)
613 See, ARYEH NEIER, THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT: A HISTORY (2012) (arguing that
states respond to “naming and shaming” by other states or multilateral institutions); see also Ken Roth, Defending
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS.
Q. 63, 63 (2004); THOMAS RISSE ET AL. THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND
DOMESTIC CHANGE (1999) (arguing that foreign naming and shaming will be most effective in authoritarian
states, precisely because in such an information-scarce environment, foreign condemnation will have a
comparatively large impact in letting citizens and activists know that their rights are being violated).
614 See, Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54
DUKE L.J. 621, 630 (2004) (suggesting that human rights processes impact States as forms of persuasion or
“acculturation” rather than coercion); see also, Harold Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law
Home, 35 HOUSE. L. REV. 623, 642 (1998) (arguing that states comply not because they are coerced but because
the “transnational legal processes” of human rights law leads to the “internalization” of human rights norms).
615 See Kiyoteru Tsutsui, International Human Rights Law, and Social Movements: States' Resistance and Civil Society's
Insistence 8 (1) ANNUAL REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 367(2012); NEIL STAMMERS, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2009) 2; Neil Stammers, Social movements and the social construction of human rights, 21
HUM. RTS. Q. 980 (1999). BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE (2003); D. C. THOMAS, THE HELSINKI EFFECT:
INTERNATIONAL NORMS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE DEMISE OF COMMUNISM (2001).
609
610
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advocates (meaning advocates native to the impugned state) circumvent
unmoving governments by transferring the debate to the international level,
including by using international compliance mechanisms such as courts and
treaty monitoring bodies.616 The authors also detail how local actors generate
international or 'external' pressure on violating governments by connecting
with established international human rights advocacy groups and like-minded
States to amplify their cause on the global stage.617 As a result, civil society
has overcome the weak enforcement capacity of most international human
rights treaties. Notably, social movement scholars who study how legal
mobilization (including international human rights law-based mobilization) is
used by social movement actors similarly emphasize the agency and power of
activists in driving social change.618
Among international relations scholars who argue that civil society
movements do the work of moving States to comply with international human
rights standards, some contend that success depends on the extent to which
such actors make human rights change a matter of domestic politics.619
Rather than bowing to international pressure, this line of scholarship asserts
that State compliance with international human rights law depends upon
whether, and to what extent, human rights movements generate internal
pressure for change. Highlighting how international norms bodies support
their claims, advocates target a number of in-country audiences; the
legislature, the judiciary, and/or the public. In domestic litigation, legal
interest groups may prompt judges to invoke international human rights
obligations for both normative insight and legal force.620 Moreover, litigation
is newsworthy, and media reports of a citizen contesting State abuse abroad
can both raise the profile for a cause and capture the attention of politicians
and citizens. 621
In their discussion of the human rights frame in connection to
transnational feminism, Charlotte Bunch and Samantha Frost have argued
that the “large body of international covenants, agreements, and
commitments about human rights gives women political leverage and a
616 MARGARET KECK AND KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998) [hereinafter KECK AND SIKKINK]; see also, BOB CLIFFORD, THE
INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE FOR NEW HUMAN RIGHTS (2008) (describing how local activists can connect with
a broader global human rights movement of international NGOs, international organizations, state
bureaucracies, foundations, journalists, individuals who devote significant resources to the cause and in some
cases develop international legal codes to cover such as for wartime rape and HIV).
617 Id. See also, Xinyuan Dai, The "Compliance Gap" and the Efficacy of International Human Rights Institutions, in THE
PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FROM COMMITMENT TO COMPLIANCE, 85.
618 Michael W. McCann, Social Movements and the Mobilization of Law, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND AMERICAN
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: PEOPLE, PASSIONS, AND POWER 201, 209 (Anne N. Costain & Andrew S.
McFarland eds., 1998).
619 BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009)
126 [hereinafter SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS].
620 For example, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human
Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZA L. REV. 253, 282 (1999).
621 MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK 144, 145 (1994).
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tenable point of reference.”622 Similarly, advocates can place previously
unacknowledged abuses in the context of human rights to legitimize their
claims and also to educate national constituencies at both governmental and
local levels.623 In other instances, using human rights language to describe a
grievance can depoliticize issues and generate space for dialogue on
contentious or taboo topics. Activist claims may also become more evident,
and in turn more salient, in the public consciousness when demands for
change are centered upon specific rights.624 As such, international human
rights advocacy not only shames the state abroad but can be leveraged to
change opinion at home.
Another body of the literature contends that the real influence of
international human rights on social change can be measured by studying the
impact of human rights advocacy on movement actors.625 Scholars note that
the language of human rights can serve as a focal point to engage a broader
range of allies in a movement626 or individuals who oppose governing powers
for other reasons may offer support to a human rights-based movement in the
hopes of undercutting State power. A movement’s base may expand as rightsbased framing enables individuals and groups to see themselves as bearers of
rights in a way that they did not before.627 Others have studied how
international human rights advocacy facilitates networking opportunities—
via international forums in which activists and social movement organizations
interact with each other—that have myriad advantages for a movement.628
Human rights activists may share ideas or technical expertise629 and forge
coalitions to advance a cause on the global stage to increase pressure on
perpetrators to offer redress.630 Global networks can also help social
movements gain funding.
Overall, the literature on the significance and efficacy of human rights
discourse, norms, and strategies includes myriad theories, many of which
contest the relevance and legitimacy of the international system and its
622 Charlotte Bunch and Samantha Frost, Human Rights, in ROUTLEDGE INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WOMEN: GLOBAL WOMEN’S ISSUES AND KNOWLEDGE, VOL. 2 (Cheris Kramarae and Dale Spender, eds. 2000)
1078.
623 See, e.g., Alicia Yamin and Paolo Bergallo, Narratives of Essentialism and Exceptionalism: The Challenges and
Possibilities of Using Human Rights to Improve Access to Safe Abortion 19(1) HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL
(2017).
624 SALLY ENGLE Merry, Human rights and transnational culture: regulating gender violence through global law, 44 OSGOODE
L.J. 53, 58.
625 See Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Human Rights and Minority Activism in Japan: Transformation of Movement Actorhood and LocalGlobal Feedback Loop (4) 122 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1050 (2017); NITZA BERKOVITCH, FROM MOTHERHOOD TO
CITIZENSHIP: WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1999).
626 BETH SIMMONS, supra note 614 at 145.
627 See Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing processes and social movements: an overview and assessment 26
ANNU. REV. SOCIOLOGY 611 (2000); SIDNEY TARROW THE NEW TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM.
628 See Keisuke Iida, Human rights and sexual abuse: the impact of international human rights law on Japan 26(2) HUM.
RIGHTS Q. 428 (2004).
629 See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL
LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE.
630 Keck & Sikkinck, supra note 312 at 169.
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instruments.631 Rachel Rebouche suggests that human rights rhetoric may
inhibit struggles to redistribute power and resources for reproductive rights at
both the global and local levels.632 Susan Marks refers to human rights as
“‘blinders that narrow our field of vision and prevent us from seeing (and
hence from challenging) the wider scene.”633 Studies also present accounts of
how that human rights discourse can serve both limiting and expansive ends
and, depending on the context, constrain and enable transnational
solidarity.634 Some critical legal scholars contend that rights-based claims
constrain movements since they require validation by the state, and in turn,
should be recognized as 'depoliticized constructs.'635 And from a post-colonial
perspective, human rights claims are often deemed 'western,' elitist,
imperialist.636
By exploring how international human rights law and advocacy impacted
Irish abortion law reform, the following account provides empirical evidence
to support much of the scholarship just outlined. On its face, the course of
abortion rights reform in Ireland was a multi-faceted process that required
legal, political, and social change. Formally, it required political will to initiate
a referendum to repeal the 8th amendment and majority societal support to
vote in favor of repeal to enable the Oireachtas to legislate for abortion access.
Ultimately, it was the civil society movement for abortion rights that triggered
both events to deliver reform. At different junctures in their struggle,
international human rights advocacy was one of their most useful resources
in pressuring the state to initiate reform, in strengthening the composition
and reach of the movement, and in legitimizing the claim for abortion rights
enhance its legitimacy. At other points, however, human rights-based
advocacy presented potential drawbacks for the movement. When the
movement’s call for a referendum to repeal the 8th became a reality, the
formal legal standards on abortion rights in international law no longer
aligned with the movement's goals for liberalization. Recognizing a woman's
right to abortion in the limited situations where a pregnancy is a result of rape
or is not viable, or where abortion is necessary to protect a woman's life and
631 See generally, Frédéric Mégret, Where Does the Critique of International Human Rights Stand? An Exploration in 18
Vignettes, 3, NEW APPROACHES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW (J M Beneyto and D Kennedy eds., 2012).
632 Rachel Rebouche, Reproducing Rights: The Intersection of Reproductive Justice and Human Rights, 7 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 579 (2017).
633 Susan Marks, Human Rights, and Root Causes, 74 MOD. L. REV. 57, 59 (2011).
634 David Landy, Talking Human Rights: How Social Movement Activists Are Constructed and Constrained by Human Rights
Discourse, 28 (4) INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGY (2013) (describing how Jewish activists appeal to the “universalist
nature of human rights language” to justify their criticism of Israel and to counter critiques from Zionists, while
Palestinian activists use human rights discourse to decry torture of Palestinian prisoners and counter Islamic
fundamentalism or other claims with which they disagree).
635 See, e.g., Mary Bernstein, Anna-Maria Marshall, and Scott Barclay, The Challenge of Law: Sexual Orientation,
Gender Identity, and Social Movements, 1 in QUEER MOBILIZATIONS: LGBT ACTIVISTS CONFRONT THE LAW (Scott
Barclay eds., 2009).
636 See, e.g., Inderpal Grewal, ‘Women’s Rights as Human Rights’: Feminist Practices, Global Feminism, and Human Rights
Regimes in Transnationality, 3(3) CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 337 (1999).
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health, reform based on international human rights law would have fallen far
short of the movement's calls for 'free, safe and legal abortion access. As such,
this study contributes to debates about both the opportunities and tensions
generated by international human rights advocacy.
1. A formative role
A human rights-based movement to liberalize Irish abortion law emerged
only in the latter half of the 8th amendment's existence. As described in
Chapter 1, it was the anti-abortion campaign that assertively mobilized both
to pass the abortion amendment and subsequently turned to the courts to
copper-fasten Ireland's status as a "pro-life nation."637 Their activism
successfully centered on human rights for the fetus. When the amendment
was debated in the legislature, the majority view was that “the amendment is
all about the most fundamental right, the right to life”638 – that of the
"unborn," not a pregnant woman. In fact, for PLAC, the recognition of
positive rights for the unborn child—not just prohibiting abortion—was
fundamental; when the Attorney General recommended that the amendment
read "[n]othing in this Constitution shall be invoked to invalidate or to
deprive of force or affect, any provision of law on the grounds that it prohibits
abortion" the PLAC rejected it because it did not explicitly recognize the right
to life of the child.639
For the anti-amendment activists who resisted the tactics of the PLAC
campaign, it was challenging to make a case against the 8th amendment in
terms of women’s rights.640 Such was the impossibility of making feminist
arguments that the Anti-Amendment Campaign (AAC) made a strategic
decision to mute forceful calls for women’s rights and instead argued against
the amendment on the grounds that it was a “sectarian law” that would deny
non-Catholics equal rights to citizenship in Ireland (in particular those in the
six counties of Northern Ireland). The AAC reasoned that the country should
“support pluralism” and thereby reject the constitutional amendment.641 The
AAC went as far as to contend that the “radicals” who refused to lessen their
demands for women’s abortion rights were “playing into the hands of the ProLife Amendment campaign.”642
Asset out in Chapter 1, ultimately, the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign
prevailed in the referendum such that Irish law required the state to respect
637 The author borrowed this term from sociologist Lisa Smyth. See LISA SMYTH, ABORTION AND NATION: THE
POLITICS OF REPRODUCTION IN CONTEMPORARY IRELAND (2009).
638 Rory O'Hanlon, TD (Feb 17, 1983) https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1983-02-17/3/.
639 See, e.g., Gerard Hogan, Law and Religion: Church-State Relations in Ireland from Independence to the Present Day 35(1)
AM. J. OF COM. L. 37, 78 (1987).
640 See, e.g., Sandra McEvoy, From Anti-Amendment Campaigns to Demanding Reproductive Justice supra note xx.
641 CHRYSTAL HUG, THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL MORALITY IN IRELAND, 149.
642 Alan MacSimoin, How free can you be if you can’t even control your own body? Red and Black Revolution, Mar 14, 2008,
15 at, http://www.wsm.ie/c/red-and-black-revolution-14.
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"the right to life of the unborn, with due regard to the equal right to life of the
mother” and to defend and vindicate the unborn’s life “as far as practicable.”
And though victorious, anti-choice groups continued their battle.
Following the passage of the amendment (1983), the anti-abortion groups
turned their attention to the family-planning clinics that were advising Irish
women about the availability of lawful abortions in England. The Society for
the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC) successfully obtained an
injunction against the clinics by arguing that their activities violated the 8th
amendment’s right to life of the unborn.643 The clinics were forced to close.644
In response, Irish pro-choice groups turned to international human rights
mechanisms for the first time.
In 1988, the clinics launched a complaint with the European Court of
Human Rights. In Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, they argued that
by preventing the clinics from disclosing abortion-related information to
women, Irish courts were in breach of the European Convention on Human
Rights, in particular the Convention's protections for freedom of expression
(Article 10).645 The clinics also asserted that the injunction discriminated on
the basis of political opinion on the grounds that persons who sought to
counsel against abortion were permitted to express their views without
restriction.646 Additionally, the clinics argued that women have a right to
abortion under Article 8 of the Convention, which guarantees the “right to
respect for . . . private and family life.”647
For the Court, there was no dispute about whether the injunction
interfered with the clinics’ rights to impart and receive information under
Article 10(1); the injunction expressly prohibited their speech.648 Though the
state argued that because Article 2 of the European Convention protected the
right to life, it was justified in prohibiting information that would threaten the
right to life of the "unborn,"649 the Court declined to address this.
Additionally, the Court did not address the applicants’ claim that the right to
private life conferred a right to abortion or that restricting abortion
information was a form of political discrimination. Judicial deliberations
focused on whether the restrictions on the clinics’ speech could be justified
under Article 10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which
permits restraints on speech where they are “prescribed by law” and
S.P.U.C. (Ireland) Ltd. v. Open Door Counselling, 1988 I.R. 618, 621 (Ir. S.C.).
Pro-choice activists continued to provide information on abortion to women. The founder of Open Door
Counselling, Ruth Riddick, used her own phone number to continue non-directive counselling from her home.
See Linda Connolly, THE IRISH WOMEN’S MOVEMENT, 70.
645 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992) [hereinafter Open Door].
646 Id. 81, 82.
647 Id. 32.
648 Id.
649 Open Door, ¶ 28. See generally, David Cole, Going to England: Irish Abortion Law and the European Community, 17
Hᴀsᴛɪɴɢs Iɴᴛ'ʟ & Cᴏᴍᴘ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 113 (1993).
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“necessary in a democratic society” to further one of a series of specified
interests. The specified interests permitted under the Convention include
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, the prevention of
disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, preventing the disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary.650 The Court accepted that Ireland had a "legitimate aim" in
adopting the injunction, namely, the protection of morals. However, the
injunction failed the Court's proportionality test; the Court reasoned that
because Ireland allowed thousands of women to travel abroad to obtain
abortions, and had not disputed that resourceful women could get this
information in other ways, preventing the clinics from disseminating abortion
information seemed to be doing little work in actually stopping women from
having abortions, meaning that the injunction had little impact on the
'protection of morals.'651 For such reasons, the Court held that the injunction
was not narrowly tailored to its purpose. Additionally, the Court asserted that
the injunction disproportionately harmed women who did not have the
resources to find out how to get the information and only served to prolong
the amount of time that women would have to wait before having an
abortion—which could be detrimental to their health.652
For pro-choice activists in Ireland, their first foray into the institutions of
international human rights was successful; neglecting any question that
related directly to abortion or the status of the “unborn,” the European Court
of Human Rights invalidated the injunction against the clinics in its entirety.
In contrast to the clinics, the student groups who were banned from
distributing information on abortion services abroad did not appeal to the
European Court of Human Rights. Their barrister, Mary Robinson (who
went on to become the first woman President of Ireland and later UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights), had defended the students in the Irish
High Court, arguing that their information sharing activities were protected
by European Community law resulting in the Irish High Court itself referring
these questions to the European Court of Justice (ECJ).653 In 1991, the ECJ
in Grogan agreed with the defendant students that abortion was a "service"
650 Article 10(2) of the Convention provides: The exercise of these freedoms since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law
and are necessary for a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1955).
651 Open Door, 18.
652 Open Door, 24.
653 Grogan, 1989 I.R. 753 (Ir. H. Ct.). Under Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome, a domestic court may refer
questions concerning EC law to the ECJ where it “considers that a decision on the question is necessary to
enable it to give judgment.” EEC Treaty Art. 177.
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within the Treaty of Rome and that the Irish citizens had the right to receive
and impart information about medical services that were lawful in another
Member State of the European Economic Community.654 However, the ECJ
held that the student groups did not have standing to raise the claim because
they lacked an economic relationship with the English providers of abortion
services.655 In consequence, the ECJ then did not need to decide whether the
High Court's injunction prohibiting the distribution of abortion services in
other EU States violated the treaty. In this way, the ECJ avoided a showdown
with the Irish Courts, nor did they need to address any questions of human
rights.
Though Open Door and Grogan frustrated the goals and unchecked success
of the pro-life lobby in Ireland, the two decisions were limited in scope and
did nothing to liberalize abortion access in Ireland. Nevertheless, some antiabortion campaigners responded to the European cases with claims that
Ireland was on its way to allowing “abortion on demand.”656 The X-case in
1992657—where the Supreme Court concluded that abortion was lawful in
Ireland where there was a real and substantial risk to the life of women,
including risk from suicide—elevated these fears dramatically. Responding to
the case, William Binchy, legal advisor to PLAC, alleged that Ireland now
had the “most liberal abortion law in the world.”658 In reality, abortion
remained a criminal offense; in theory, abortion was available if a pregnant
woman was suicidal, but in practice, no abortions were carried out on that
basis. Information was still restricted. The Regulation of Information Act
(1995)—the legislation intended to give effect to the right to information
following the Open Door decision and the 1992 referendum—criminalized
“advocacy or promotion” of abortion. “Advocacy or promotion” was not
defined. Devoid of guidance on what advice was permissible, healthcare
providers rarely spoke about abortion to women for fear of prosecution.
Doctors were also explicitly prohibited from providing referrals.659 The first
comprehensive study of women and crisis pregnancy in Ireland found that in
practice, women and girls found it very difficult to obtain information on both
contraception and abortion.660
654 Grogan, 1991 E.C.R. I-4685, ¶ 21. See also, Siofra O’Leary, Freedom of Establishment and Freedom to Provide Services:
The Court of Justice as a Reluctant Constitutional Adjudicator: An Examination of the Abortion Information Case, 16 EUR. L.
REV. 138, 156 (1992).
655 Id.
656 See, e.g., Michael O' Regan, Leading Judge Condemns Abortion Information Act, IRISH TIMES, Jul 10, 1995, at 4
(quoting Mr. Justice Brian Walsh, a member of the European Court of Human Rights and a former Irish
Supreme Court justice).
657 Attorney Gen. v. X, supra note 155.
658 Andy Pollak, Hierarchy Criticizes Supreme Court, IRISH TIMES, Jul 1, 1995, at 8.
659 Regulation of Information Act (1995), 1995 Act, § 8 (1) reads; "It shall not be lawful for a person to whom
Section 5 applies or the employer or principal of the person to make an appointment or any other arrangement
for or on behalf of a woman with a person who provides services outside the state for the termination of
pregnancies. Sections 9 and 10 set out the legal enforcement of the offense."
660 Evelyn Mahon et al., Women and Crisis Pregnancy: A Report Presented to the Department of Health and Children (1998).
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Nor was anti-abortion hegemony significantly undermined in the decade
that followed X, Open Door, and the 1992 constitutional amendments. During
this period, pro-choice activists concentrated their efforts (unsuccessfully) on
lobbying successive governments to give effect to the X-case through
legislation, i.e., to make clear through a statute that women could legally
obtain an abortion if their life was at risk. In 1997, a group of women formed
the umbrella group, the ‘Alliance for Choice,’ and condemned political
inaction on X through demonstrations, leaflets, and direct lobbying. The prochoice ask was relatively modest; the Government had been chastised by the
country’s own Supreme Court for not providing legislative guidance on lifesaving abortion access.661 And the State’s Constitutional Review Group—a
group established by the Irish government in 1995 to review the Constitution
of Ireland and to recommend alterations—also recommended that the
Government introduce legislation to implement the X-case.662 As described
earlier in this chapter, at this time internationally, feminist human rights
groups were succeeding in gaining recognition for reproductive health rights:
the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, agreed by 187 UN
member states, listed the right of a woman to control her own sexuality and
reproduction as a human right. Closer to home, most of Europe operated
liberal abortion laws (with the exception of Malta, San Marino, and Poland)
such that Ireland was firmly out of step. However, in Ireland, not even the
most conservative calls for action on women's rights could move the
Government, or any sizeable political party, to touch abortion rights. Unless
that is if it was to constrain such rights. In March 2002, at the urging of antiabortion groups and four independent TDs, the Taoiseach introduced yet
another constitutional referendum designed to roll back the very limited legal
right to abortion. The proposed amendment — like its predecessor 10 years
before — aimed to overturn the X-case ruling by removing the risk of suicide
as grounds for abortion.663 With just a 40 percent turnout, 618,485 people
voted in favor of the Government's motion, and 629,041 voted against it.664
The anti-abortion lobby had lost once again.
In the aftermath of the 2002 referendum, the Irish Family Planning
Association (IFPA), a Dublin-based reproductive health clinic that provided
services including counseling, contraception, and post-abortion care, decided
that pro-choice advocacy in Ireland needed a new strategy. Recognizing that
since the first constitutional referendum on abortion in 1983, the Irish public
had consistently voted against further restrictions on abortion access, it
seemed clear to the IFPA that the main barrier to change was not the cited
religious or even anti-choice views of the Irish people; rather it was political
See Chapter 1.
Constitution Review Group, Report of the Constitution Review Group (1996).
663 See Chapter 1.
664 Twenty-Fifth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2001 (Bill no. 48 of 2001).
661
662
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recalcitrance.665 Similarly, the consistently high numbers of women traveling
for abortion indicated that the personal beliefs of thousands of Irish women
were not 'anti-abortion.' Rather than wait another attack by anti-abortion
advocates or sit through another decade of political indolence, the IFPA
resolved to proactively campaign for women's abortion rights. International
human rights offered key resources to match the movement's shift in
approach, namely the first proactive legal challenge to the 8th amendment.
Legal mobilization via strategic legislation for abortion law reform was
first suggested by a consultant lawyer at the organization, Ms. Julie Kay, who
had worked as a litigator for a pro-choice advocacy organization, the Center
for Reproductive Rights, in New York.666 The Irish judicial system’s
conservative interpretation of the 8th amendment—such that the Courts had
judged the amendment to permit abortion only where there is a “real and
substantial risk to the life” of the pregnant woman that can only be averted
by termination of the pregnancy667—meant that chances of success were poor
if the IFPA litigated for reform domestically. International human rights
institutions presented the only viable venue for legal challenge.
Embracing international human rights as a strategy was a matter of
pragmatism in one sense—it provided the only forum where court-based
activism to pressure the State into changing its restrictive laws could plausibly
succeed. However, as noted already in this chapter, research indicates that
litigation can yield many indirect effects for a social movement. While the
IFPA aimed to use international litigation to force the hand of the State, they
also viewed this advocacy as an opportunity to educate people about the
harms of the 8th amendment and move people to recognize the injustice that
women endured.668 Beyond this, they envisioned the case, and their media
and advocacy around it, as an opportunity to mobilize people to join their
campaign for abortion rights.669 Additionally, for the IFPA, using
international human rights-based advocacy seemed like a natural progression
in some ways. In the late 1960s, the organization was founded on human
rights principles by doctors and nurses who were concerned by the health
impacts of the denial of contraception and abortion in Ireland on the lives of
women (particularly women with repeated unwanted pregnancies). Such
impacts were heightened for women with few financial resources, and the
founders felt that using a human rights framework helped address these
Interview with Niall Behan, Irish Family Planning Association, June 2018. Notes on file with author.
Interview with Ms. Julie Kay, Former Lawyer for the Irish Family Planning Association, New York, Sept 9.
2018. Headquartered in New York but with regional offices in Geneva, Bogota, Nairobi, and Kathmandu, the
Center for Reproductive Rights is the leading advocate for sexual and reproductive rights in the international
arena, as well as a well-known domestic organization.
667 Attorney Gen. v. X., supra note xx.
668 See, e.g., press release, https://www.ifpa.ie/ifpa-launches-campaign-for-safe-and-legal-abortion-in-ireland/.
669 Id.
665
666
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challenges.670 Furthermore, the IFPA was an affiliate of the International
Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), whose IPPF Charter draws on
international sexual and reproductive rights.
Amongst the venues for international litigation, the European Court of
Human Rights was the most attractive for the IFPA because its decisions are
binding on the Irish state.671 The Court provides for individual petitioning
and a general obligation to provide recourse to a remedy. It also has a
mechanism to allow the Council of Europe’s (COE) Committee of Ministers
to bring infringement proceedings against States that refuse to implement the
Court’s judgments.672
The first international legal challenge that the IFPA worked on did not
work out as the advocates hoped. First, the applicant did not retain the IFPA
as her supporting organization because the IFPA hoped to make a joint
application on behalf of a number of women, while the applicant, D, did not
want to join this approach.673 Second, her case, D v. Ireland, was deemed
inadmissible by the European Court.674 D involved a woman pregnant with
twins, one of which stopped developing at eight weeks gestation. The other
twin was diagnosed with Edwards’s Syndrome, a severe abnormality that
would lead to the death of the baby shortly after delivery.675 Her doctors
informed her that there was nothing they could do for her—abortion was
illegal, and referring her to a clinic abroad was also illegal. She was left to “go
home and sort it out” herself.676 She did so and terminated her pregnancy in
Belfast, Northern Ireland, where abortion was legal in cases of fetal anomaly.
D’s application to the European Court complained that the 8th
amendment and Ireland's Regulation of Information (Services Outside the
State for Terminations of Pregnancies) Act 1995 prevented her from
terminating her pregnancy in the jurisdiction where she lived and restricted
her medical team from referring her to services outside the State, in violation
of her rights to (i) be free from cruel and inhuman treatment (Article 3), (ii) to
private life (Article 8), (iii) to receive and impart information (Article 10) and
670 Interviews with Maeve Taylor, Chief Advocacy Officer, Irish Family Planning Association, Dublin, Jan 4,
2016, Jun 25, 2016 and Jun 13, 2018 (notes on file with author).
671 For more see, SUZANNE EGAN ET AL. IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: 60
YEARS AND BEYOND (2014) 12-19.
672 See, e.g., Committee of Ministers of the COE, Izmir Declaration (2011)
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2011_Izmir_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf.
673 Interview with Ms. Julie Kay, supra note 662.
674 D v Ireland, supra note 412.
675 Jennifer Schweppe and Eimear Spain, When is a Fetus not an Unborn? Fatal Fetal Abnormalities and Article 40.3.30
[2013, 3 (3)] I.J.L.S. 92-110, 97.
676 Nine years after the European Court of Human Rights decision, D spoke publicly about her experience on
the Irish news. She emphasized her shock when told that she couldn’t have an abortion: “I assumed there would
be a system in our hospitals where there would be a sympathetic arrangement. Finally, I found on our own island
(Northern Ireland) there was a place where compassion and sympathy, and tolerance prevailed. If there can be
that sort of tolerance on our island just across the border, I don't see why we don't have that here." Deirdre
Conroy, RTÉ News at One, May 2, 2013.
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(iv) to be free from discrimination in the enjoyment of Convention rights
(Article 14) of the European Convention on Human Rights.677 In response,
Ireland argued that it was “an open question,” given the circumstances of D,
as to whether the 8th amendment could allow for a lawful termination,678
claiming that “there might be an issue as to the extent the State was required to
guarantee the right to life of a fetus that would not survive beyond birth.”679
(Yet in 2013, when the ministers for health and justice were defending the
limitations of the new PLDPA, they argued that they were prevented by the
Constitution from allowing for abortion in cases of fatal fetal abnormality,
and as a result, no provision was made.) The European Court decided there
was a “feasible argument to be made” that the 8th amendment’s balance
between the right to life of the mother and the fetus could have shifted in
favor of the mother as the fetus was not viable.680 D should have taken her
case to the Irish Courts to find out, the Court concluded. Accordingly, in June
2006, the Court deemed her case inadmissible because she had not exhausted
available domestic remedies.681
The IFPA lodged their challenge to Ireland’s ban on abortion in 2005 as
part of their ‘Safe and Legal in Ireland Abortion Rights Campaign,’—the first
pro-choice campaign in the country outside of a referendum.682 Four years
later, the Grand Chamber of the European Court heard the case A, B, C v.
Ireland in Strasbourg. Asset out in Part I, the applicants made a cluster of
claims under Article 8 of the European Convention, arguing that Ireland's
abortion law violated the right to private life by interfering with their physical
integrity, limiting relevant information on abortion and instigating stigma,
delay, hardship, and stress in forcing women to travel secretly to England for
an abortion.683 Under Article 3, they argued that the two options open to
women—make their way to another country to get an abortion or maintain
their unwanted pregnancies—were degrading and a deliberate affront to their
dignity.684 These claims were argued in conjunction with Article 14, the right
to be free from discrimination, on two grounds.685 First, they argued that the
criminalization of abortion was discriminatory, as it amounted to “crude
stereotyping and prejudice against women” and caused an affront to women’s
dignity.686 Second, they emphasized that the requirement to travel imposed
D v. Ireland, supra note x.
Id. ¶ 98.
679 Id. ¶ 69.
680 Id. ¶ 90-92.
681 Id. ¶ 103.
682 IFPA Launches Campaign for Safe and Legal Abortion in Ireland (Aug 8 2015) https://www.ifpa.ie/ifpalaunches-campaign-for-safe-and-legal-abortion-in-ireland/ .
683 A, B, and C v Ireland, supra note 12, ¶ 269.
684 Id. ¶ 162.
685 Interview with Ms. Julie Kay, supra note 662; Interview with Maeve Taylor, supra note 666.
686 A, B, and C v. Ireland, supra note 12, ¶ 162.
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severe burdens on women with limited financial resources.687 As Irish
abortion advocates reiterate, although women from all walks of life have
abortions, it is predominantly women who are poor, young, disabled, living
in rural areas, or have migrant status who disproportionately bear the burden
of travelling abroad.
Given that Ms. A and Ms. B had aborted their pregnancies for reasons
relating to their wellbeing and socio-economic status, their abortions were
clearly outside the life-saving exception to Ireland’s abortion ban. As such,
the ABC litigation fundamentally challenged the Irish abortion regime—a
marked contrast to the incremental approach of D v. Ireland, which had
contested only the law’s failure to exempt from criminalization abortion in
cases of fatal fetal anomaly. The plaintiffs’ narratives in ABC also differed
strikingly from D. D was a married woman who aborted a much-wanted
pregnancy. Ms. A and Ms. B were both single, poor, and terminated
unwanted pregnancies. Additionally, A was a recovering alcoholic, and B a
non-national. Though plaintiff selection in impact litigation often prioritizes
conservative narratives688—plaintiffs who look and sound like other members
of respectable society—the IFPA carefully selected the three women to
represent the diversity of women affected by the 8th amendment.689 The IFPA
considered that Ms. A, Ms. B, and Ms. C were women who made "rational
and empowering decisions" after weighing their circumstances: women who
have economic reasons for terminating pregnancies; women who have
consensual sex but contraception fails; and women with complex family
demands, as well as women who need abortions to preserve their lives and
health or to tragically end a non-viable pregnancy.690 The advocates did not
wish to risk reinforcing narrow conceptions of the "reasonable" or "deserved"
abortion by taking a case that centered on an exceptionally tragic case (such
as pregnancy due to rape, incest, or fatal fetal anomaly). For the IFPA, taking
this case was an opportunity to inclusively present narratives of the women
they served in a respectful way, away from the vitriol that had silenced women
for decades.691
The advocates considered that their Article 14 non-discrimination claims
were among their strongest and that the European Court would decide ABC
in their favor on the grounds of non-discrimination and equality. They
believed that the Court would not find it difficult to recognize the de jure
Id. ¶ 163.
See, e.g., Scott Skinner-Thompson, The First Queer Right, 116 Mɪᴄʜ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 881 (2018) (describing how
advocates engaged in strategic litigation for LGBTQ causes in the USA often choose plaintiffs who are
"upstanding" as part of their bid for success).
689 Interview with Ms. Julie Kay, supra note 662.
690 Id. See also, Irish Family Planning Association, Abortion Stigma, https://www.ifpa.ie/abortion-stigma/ .
691 Id. Social science research confirms that the choice of plaintiff in strategic litigation is important for telling the
“story” of the case both in and outside of court. See, e.g., Jennifer Sheppard, What If the Big Bad Wolf in All Those
Fairy Tales Was Just Misunderstood?: Techniques for Maintaining Narrative Rationality While Altering Stock Stories That Are
Harmful to Your Client’s Case, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 187, 190–94 (2012).
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discrimination in requiring women to go abroad for health services when men
were not sent to other countries for any health service.692 Similarly, the
disproportionate impact of the law on women without financial security was,
in the advocates’ opinion, a blatant example of socio-economic
discrimination.
In response, the Government lawyers argued that Ireland’s abortion law
represented the “profound moral choice of the Irish people as to the nature
of unborn life.”693 Ireland's Attorney General at the time, Paul Gallagher,
pleaded with the 17 judges to accept that Ireland’s abortion law embodied
moral values that were “deeply embedded” in the country’s history and
traditions.694 This was the winning argument. Asset out in the prior section,
though the Court found that there had been an interference with Ms. A's and
Ms. B's right to private life, "owing to the acute sensitivity of the moral and
ethical issues raised by abortion,"695 Ireland was entitled to a wide degree of
difference in how it dealt with abortion.696 And once it had rejected A and
B’s Article 8 claim, the Court dismissed their Article 3 claim and simply did
not discuss their claims of discrimination. The European Court upheld the
8th amendment.
In a narrow decision, the majority found in favor of Ms. C, holding that
Ireland’s failure to give legislative effect to the X-case exception to the
abortion ban (i.e., where the woman's life was threatened by the pregnancy)
violated Ireland's positive obligations under the right to private life.697 Rather
than deliver Europe’s ‘Roe v. Wade,’ the European Court served as “an ally
with a small ‘a’” for abortion rights in Ireland.698
Limited legal “win” aside, the strategic use of human rights litigation
finally provided the abortion right movement with a foothold in its struggle
against the Irish State. Up to this point, the Ireland in which the IFPA and
other pro-choice activists had attempted to campaign in presented advocates
with many of the same challenges that autocratic States impose on human
rights struggles—rule of law was weak (given that successive governments
rebuked the judiciary by failing to legislate for X);699 political activism was
stymied by the need to concentrate resources on services (in this case,
supporting women who needed to travel); pro-choice groups had no influence
on decision-makers, and victims of the law were too fearful to speak out about
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their experiences.700 International human rights litigation did not directly
produce the desired results. Nonetheless, the case enabled the movement to
legally challenge the 8th amendment for the first time and to proactively
campaign for abortion rights for Irish women.701
In the absence of political leadership and a viable legal forum domestically,
going to the European Court of Human Rights provided an institutional
environment for advocates to go on the offensive and to initiate a proactive
campaign for abortion rights.702
2. Formal legal role
“A decision from Strasbourg in your favor is the gold standard in terms of enforceability and
seriousness.”703
Commentators and skeptics usually cite the weak enforcement
mechanisms of international human rights law as a key reason for the system's
limited impact on national law. Still, even skeptics recognize the impressive
oversight mechanisms of the European Court of Human Rights.704 Described
as a “bright spot” in terms of international human rights compliance,705 a
decision from the Strasbourg Court “in your favor is the gold standard for
advocates in terms of enforceability and seriousness.”706
As described in Chapter 1, following ABC, the Irish Government
committed to establishing an 'expert group' to advise the state on the
implementation of the European Court's ruling.707 It was against this
backdrop that a newly elected independent, TD Clare Daly, prepared
legislation to give effect to the X-case ruling (legislative recognition while
making clear that she favored access to abortion in any circumstances that a
woman sought it). Her bill in private member's time on April 18 and 19, 2012,
was heavily defeated. Still, it was the first time that abortion was proactively
700 On the silence that characterized women’s experiences under the law see generally, Ruth Fletcher, Silences:
Irish women and Abortion, FEMINIST REVIEW 50 (1995); Maeve Taylor, Abortion Stigma: a health service provider’s
perspective, in THE ABORTION PAPERS IRELAND 217, (AIDEEN QUILITY EDS. 2016); KRISTEN M. SHELLENBERG,
Social Stigma, and Disclosure about Induced Abortion: Results from an Exploratory Study, 6 (1) GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH
(2011).
701 Interviews with Maeve Taylor, supra note 666, and Niall Behan, Chair of the Irish Family Planning
Association, Dublin, Jun 14, 2018.
702 Id.
703 Id.
704 See, e.g., George Ress, The Effect of Decisions and Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the Domestic Legal
Order, 40 TEX. INT’L L.J. 359, 367 (2005).
In terms of actual enforcement power, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers can bring infringement
proceedings against states that refuse to implement the Court’s judgments. Additionally, the Court’s decision on
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discussed in the Dáil without a tragedy provoking it, instead from "the
standpoint that abortion was an important human rights issue."708 Later that
year, Savita Halappanavar died after being refused an abortion, in a situation
where her inevitable miscarriage carried the risk of fatal sepsis on the grounds
that her medical team could detect a fetal heartbeat.709 The report of the
expert group was published only two weeks after news of her death, and the
circumstances of her death broke. The expert group’s report was explicit that
implementation of ABC required legislation to give effect to the right to lawful
abortion where there was a risk to a woman’s life.710 While inaction followed
all of the prior State-commissioned reports on abortion, both Savita’s death
and the gravity of the European judgment meant that this report could not
be shelved. In December 2012, the Government announced that it would
enact legislation to implement ABC. Following two sets of parliamentary
hearings,711 the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act was signed into law
in July 2013 and came into force on January 1, 2014.
The law implementing ABC did not liberalize Ireland’s abortion
restrictions in any way. The Act clarified, in regulatory form, the single
recognized exemption to Ireland’s abortion. Arguably the Act made the
process of getting a life-saving abortion more difficult—it set out a
cumbersome assessment process whereby both an obstetrician and a specialist
had to certify the risk to a woman’s life, and in the case of suicide risk, two
psychiatrists and an obstetrician were required. Additionally, the Act
included a penalty of up to 14 years imprisonment for a woman procuring an
abortion or anyone helping a woman to access an abortion in anything other
than the prescribed circumstances. In short, Ireland retained one of the most
restrictive abortion prohibitions in the world. Nonetheless, the introduction
of a legislative framework to provide for legal abortion in Ireland, albeit in
limited and highly medicalized circumstances, was a historic move. For more
than 35 years, successive governments had avoided or side-stepped (e.g., by
holding a referendum to further restrict abortion access) legislating on the 8th
amendment. There had been an almost total political paralysis (Deputy Clare
Daly’s bill being the exception) due in part to the culture of fear and toxicity
that surrounded abortion in Ireland. Even when national polls in the late
708 Clare Daly, Ireland's First Abortion Legislation in THE ABORTION PAPERS IRELAND: VOLUME 2, 262 (Aideen
Quilty ed.). For example, though he ultimately voted against the bill, the Minister for Equality and Justice at the
time, Alan Shatter, stated that "It can truly be said that the right of pregnant women to have their health
protected is, under our constitutional framework, a qualified right, as is their right to bodily integrity. This will
remain the position. This is a Republic in which we proclaim the equality of all citizens, but it is a reality that
some citizens are more equal than others." Alan Shatter, Dáil Debates, Vol 340 No. 3 Col. 533.
709 Health Service Executive. Final Report: Investigation of Incident 50278 from time of patient's self-referral to
hospital on October 21, 2012, to the patient's death on October 28, 2012.
http://www.hse.ie/eng/services/news/nimtreport50278.pdf.
710 Report of the Expert Group, supra note 703.
711 Joint Oireachtas Committee on Health and Children, Report on Public Hearings on the Implementation of the
Government Decision Following the Publication of the Expert Group Report on A, B, & C v Ireland, January
2013, http://www.oireachtas.ie/parliament/oireachtasbusiness/committees_list/health-and-children/.
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2000s began showing evidence that the public desired reform, the legislature
would not touch the 8th amendment to liberalize abortion access.712
ABC helped bring about the first occasion in the existence of the Irish
State that the legislature recognized a woman's right to abortion (albeit in
highly restrictive circumstances). In this way, the case fits the 'top-down'
model of international human rights law impact, whereby the state adjusted
its behavior in line with its international human rights obligations when
pressured to do so by an oversight body. The 'change in behavior' was limited,
but it was a focal legal development on the road to repealing the 8th.
3. Structural role
Though grassroots pro-choice organizations formed and disbanded
during referendum campaigns, the IFPA was essentially alone actor amongst
Irish civil society advocating for abortion rights in the 2000s.713 During the
ABC litigation, the only domestic group that the IFPA succeeded in rallying
to make an amicus submission to the Court was the informal group ‘Doctors
for Choice.’714 The traditional Irish human rights organizations such as
Amnesty Ireland and the Irish Council for Civil Liberties generally avoided
abortion, arguably out of concern that they might lose support (including
funding) for their more traditional human rights campaigns if they were seen
to be campaigning for abortion.715 Even women’s rights organizations, such
as the National Women’s Council of Ireland, reportedly held an ambivalent
stance towards abortion.716 Similarly, the Irish Human Rights Commission
did not advocate for change to Ireland’s abortion law.717
Post-ABC, the landscape began to change—slowly at first. In 2011, the
Irish Council for Civil Liberties campaigned for abortion access for the first

Interview with Deputy Jan O’Sullivan, June 26, 2019.
This does not mean that resistance to the state’s abortion ban was absent in Ireland. Volunteer groups such as
the Abortion Support Network and the Irish Women's Abortion Support Group (along with the IFPA) assisted
thousands of women with the stress, expense, and logistics of travel but did not yet advocate for reform
publicly. See LINDSEY EARNER-BRYNE, THE IRISH ABORTION JOURNEY, 1920–2018, 112 -118, 36.
714 Interview with Ms. Julie Kay, supra note 662. The Center for Reproductive Rights also submitted an amicus
brief. For the submission, see Doctors for Choice and BPAS, Submission to the European Court of Human Rights in ABC,
(2009) http://doctorsforchoiceireland.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/abc_brief_bpas_and_dfc.pdf.
715 This was suggested in an interview by Colm O'Gorman, CEO, Amnesty Ireland. He also explained that
Amnesty Ireland declined to work on abortion even though, at the global level, in 2007, Amnesty International
adopted a policy calling for safe and legal abortion for women and girls in cases of pregnancies that posed either
a risk to the life or health of the woman or girl, in cases of pregnancies resulting from rape or incest, and in cases
of fatal fetal abnormality. Interview with Colm O'Gorman, June 16, 2019 (notes on file with author).
716 During an interview with Jacqueline Kennedy, (former) Women’s Health Officer with National Women’s
Council Ireland, she revealed that the organization’s pro-choice position developed very gradually over time:
“We have groups all around the country, urban and rural and … it has involved much discussion and
consideration.” Interview with Jacqueline Kennedy, National Women’s Council, June 12, 2016 (notes on file
with author).
717 During an interview with a former NHRI commissioner (who did not consent for their name to be used), the
commissioner disclosed that this was due to the personal opposition of some members of the commission.
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time at the international level using the UPR process718 to successfully
convince six States to recommend that Ireland “introduce legislation to
implement the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the A,
B and C v. Ireland case, in order to clarify the circumstances in which abortion
may be lawful.”719 At a public meeting in Dublin in July 2012, 40 young
women and men laid the foundations for the first all-Ireland grassroots prochoice organization that would become known as the Abortion Rights
Campaign (ARC).720 In a marked difference from past activism, members put
the word “abortion” front and center in their new organization’s name. They
also adopted an explicitly intersectional approach in their work for “free, safe,
legal abortion” across Ireland.721 In contrast to the contention that rightsbased advocacy is often overtaken by elites and supplants community
organizing,722 ARC bridged Ireland’s vaunted urban-rural divide and built
non-hierarchal local groups across the country. Similar to the pro-active
approach of the IFPA, ARC considered their abortion rights work as being a
“forward-oriented claiming of rights,” in contrast to the reactionary protests
following the “alphabet soup” of tragedies caused by the 8th amendment.723
ARC's vision was that the law needed to "#trustwomen."
An unexpected event changed the course and force of the nascent
abortion rights movement. The death of Savita Hallapanvar on October 12
at the hands of Ireland's abortion law provoked shock and outrage throughout
the country. Though many argued that it was Savita's infection, not Ireland's
law, that caused Savita's untimely death, for thousands of people (including
those who investigated her death on behalf of the state), the culpability of the
Irish 8th amendment was clear. Twenty thousand people took to the streets in
a ‘Never Again’ march to call for reform of Ireland’s abortion law on
November 17, 2014. And in addition to generating support for activism
among individuals, her death forced the Government to move forward on
implementing ABC via the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act. Savita’s
death ultimately propelled the strategies being pursued by advocates within
the IFPA, ARC, and independent campaigners to a scale that could likely not
718 A State-driven process, under the auspices of the Human Rights Council, the Universal Periodic Review
involves a review of the human rights records of all UN Member States by their peers, i.e., other UN member
states.
719 Interview with Deirdre Duffy, Former Advocacy Director, ICCL (notes on file with author)
720 Anna Carnegie & Rachel Roth, From the Grassroots to the Oireachtas: Abortion Law Reform in the Republic of Ireland, 21
(2) HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 109, 110 (2019).
721 The ARC Values & Inclusivity Statement outlined that the group aspires "to be inclusive and representative
of the varied groups of people affected by Ireland's restrictive abortion laws. We believe this requires a particular
focus on those groups that are disproportionately affected by these laws, including women who are marginalized
by poverty, racism, immigration status, and disability." Abortion Rights Campaign, ARC’s Values & Inclusivity
Statement, https://secretweb1337tbh.abortionrightscampaign.ie/2016/11/21/abortion-rights-campaign-valuesand-inclusivity-statement/.
722 See, e.g., Wendy Brown, Suffering Rights as Paradoxes, 7(2) CONSTELLATIONS 208.
723 Interview with Sineád Corcoran, ARC, January 4, 2016; Interview with Katie Gillum, ARC, June 19, 2016.
For commentary on this march, see a, Deputy Clare Daly, Statements on the Referendum, (May 29, 2018) available at
https:// www.Oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/2018-05-29/15/.
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otherwise have been reached.724 It enabled abortion rights campaigners to
step over the threshold into the public domain.
As the Dáil prepared to legislate to implement the decision in ABC in
2013, ARC, IFPA, and many other grassroots advocates targeted both the
legislature and the public to support the Protection of Life During Pregnancy
Act. Though such activists supported the legislation, many made clear that
while historic, the Act fell far short of what was needed to secure reproductive
rights for women in Ireland. Following the passage of the Act, Ailbhe Smyth,
a leading figure in Ireland’s Marriage Equality campaign725 and longstanding
feminist activist, coordinated 12 groups to form the Coalition to Repeal the
Eighth Amendment (the Coalition) with one shared goal — to repeal the
8th.726 The nascent Coalition did not call for "free, safe and legal" abortion
access; rather, its founders sought to bring together organizations that were
pro-choice and those not explicitly pro-choice but who agreed that a
referendum should be held.727 Within twelve months, the Coalition had
grown to a network of almost 100 organizations, including political parties,
trade unions, and activists who called for a referendum to "protect and respect
women's lives, health, and choices."728 Notably, five years later, the Coalition
included over 300,000 people.
Adopting a narrower advocacy goal, the activist group 'Terminations for
Medical Reasons (also known as Leanbh Mo Chroí) emerged in response to the
failure of the 2013 legislation to include a right to abortion for women with
non-viable pregnancies. Made up of parents who had traveled to the UK to
abort non-viable pregnancies, the activists began to publicly share their stories
of heartbreak and implored the Government to "stop punishing tragedy."729
And as will be described, one founding member, Amanda Mellet, contested
Ireland's abortion ban and the suffering it forced upon her at the United
Nations.
At the annual general meeting of Amnesty Ireland in 2013, one of the
most respected human rights organizations in the country, the majority of
members voted to campaign for abortion law reform. The following year, it
launched it's national 'My Body, My Rights campaign, which advocated for
724 See, e.g., Cathie Doherty and Sinead Redmond, The Radicalisation of a New Generation of Abortion Rights Activists,
270 in THE ABORTION PAPERS IRELAND: VOLUME 2 (2015).
725 The 34th Amendment, or Marriage Equality Act, was added to the Constitution of Ireland following a public
referendum held on May 22, 2015, that passed with a 62.07% "yes" vote. The Amendment allows for marriage
contracts without distinction as to the sex of either party.
726 See, e.g., www.repeal8.ie. Interview with Ailbhe Smyth, Coalition to Repeal the 8th Amendment, June 2, 2016
(notes on file with author).
727 Interview with Sinead Kennedy, Coalition to Repeal the 8th Amendment, June 8, 2018 (notes on file with
author).
728 Id.
729 Kathy Sheridan, ‘I Believe in a Loving God and that I won’t be Damned for what I Did’ THE IRISH TIMES (April 17,
2012) https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/people/i-believe-in-a-loving-god-and-that-i-won-t-be-damnedfor-what-i-did-1.502988.
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abortion access in Ireland in line with international human rights standards:
decriminalization of abortion and legalization in cases of risk to life and health
or pregnancy that resulted from rape or carried a fatal fetal anomaly.730
Notably, when Amnesty International had voted to adopt a pro-abortion rights
campaign—marking a change in policy for the international human rights
organization — the Irish section members of Amnesty International had
opposed this change.731
In 2014 the youth-led "socialist-feminist movement," Reproductive
Rights Against Oppression, Sexism, and Austerity (ROSA), launched a
campaign based on the premise that "abortion rights are women's rights" and
called for abortion access based upon a woman's request. Taking inspiration
from the reproductive justice movement in the US, their abortion rights
campaign also included advocacy for full LGBTQ equality, free childcare, a
reverse to all cuts to domestic violence and rape crisis services, equal pay, and
State investment in public housing.732
The emergence of a multitude of new actors in the Irish abortion rights
movement was an incidental gain of the ABC litigation in a number of ways.733
For the mainstream organizations such as the Irish Council for Civil Liberties,
calling for the implementation of ABC was a hook to address abortion as a
human rights issue when lobbying at home, both to the Government and
political parties.734 For other groups, it was the two sets of hearings around
the PLDPA in 2013 that had the most impact. For long-active campaigners,
the hearings were welcome as the first time that facilitating abortion access was
on the political and social agenda, and their public platform expanded as
national reporters began turning to women's groups for their perspectives in
a way that had never happened before. For many younger women, the
hearings were the first time they experienced their reproductive rights being
deliberated in a national forum, and they became mobilized by their outrage
at the scenes of a primarily male Dáil contesting their rights.735 For others,
many of whom had suffered under the 8th amendment, the PLDPA raised
their expectations that reform was possible, and such hope translated into a

730 See, e.g., www.mybodymyrights.i.e., Amnesty Ireland called for a 'human rights complaint' abortion law that
extends access to terminations on the grounds above, but not beyond this. See also Amnesty Ireland, Submission
to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Session 55, 01 – 19 June 2015,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur29/1629/2015/en/. For the global campaign, see Amnesty
International, My life, my health, my education, my choice, my future, my body, my rights, available, at
amnesty.org/en/library/info/ACT35/001/2014/en.
731 Interview with Colm O’Gorman, supra note 711.
732 Interview with Steph Herold, ROSA, Dublin, July 5, 2016 (notes on file with author).
733 On the incidental gains of strategic litigation, see Doug NeJaime, Winning as Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941
2010-2011, and Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 715, 730 (1992).
734 Interview with Deirdre Duffy, (former) Deputy Director of the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, June 5, 2016
(notes on file with author).
735 Interview with Ailbhe Smyth, Coalition to Repeal the 8th Amendment, Dublin, July 1, 2016 (notes on file with
author).
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growing number of activists.736 While the number of women forced abroad
for abortions remained unchanged by the implementation of ABC, the
number of women and men who were willing to tackle this injustice grew.
Among the critiques of human rights advocacy that this chapter has
briefly sketched is the claim that human rights rhetoric can cause advocates
to miss possible alliances with other movements. Wendy Brown's thesis is that
rights' claims are atomistic and alienate groups from one another; in turn,
displacing, competing with, and rejecting other political projects.737 In a
similar vein, Moron Horowitz contended that the individual specific
framework of rights “draws energy and imagination away from campaigns
directed at structural change.”738 While the aim of this chapter is not to mount
a defense against such theories, the arguments do not hold for the Irish
abortion rights movement. In terms of the ability of human rights advocacy
to engage broad audiences and connect with other social justice projects, it
appears that the opposite was true. International human rights advocacy
directly facilitated the creation of alliances and coalitions to strengthen the
Irish abortion rights movement.
Prior to ABC, the IFPA was the only pro-choice group that had made
submissions to UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies, drawing attention to the
human rights impacts of Ireland’s abortion restrictions.739 When Ireland was
examined by the Human Rights Committee in 2014, ten organizations made
submissions calling for abortion law reform. For Ireland’s review by the
CEDAW Committee in March 2017, the IFPA worked within the Women’s
Human Rights Alliance—an umbrella group of non-governmental
organizations that includes the Irish Council for Civil Liberties and the
National Women’s Council of Ireland—to make a collective submission to
the Committee to make reproductive health services, including abortion “a
key issue” at the State examination in Geneva.740 Similarly, the Coalition to
Repeal the 8th Amendment's report to CEDAW was submitted by a coalition
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738 Morton Horwitz, ‘Rights’ 23 HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS-CIVIL LIBERTIES L. REVIEW (1988) 393, 400.
739 Comments of the Irish Family Planning Association in respect to the Third Periodic Report of Ireland under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). See, e.g.,
https://www.ifpa.ie/resources/submissions/; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Concluding Observations: Ireland, CEDAW/C/IRL/4-5/CO.
740 These groups included: Abortion Rights Campaign; Action for Choice; AIMS; Akidwa; Amnesty Ireland;
Anti-Austerity Alliance; AntiRacism Network; Atheist Ireland; Choice Ireland; Cork Women’s Right to Choose;
Doctors for Choice; Galway Pro-Choice; Irish Council for Civil Liberties; ICTU Youth; Lawyers for Choice;
Mandate; National Women’s Council of Ireland; Northern Ireland Alliance for Choice; Parents for Choice;
People Before Profit Alliance; Rape Crisis Network Ireland; Re(al) Reproductive Health ROSA; School of Social
Justice, UCD; Socialist Party; Socialist Workers Party; TCDSU Repeal the 8th Campaign; TENI; TFMR
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of 77 diverse groups, including student groups, migrant rights groups, and
unions.741
Accordingly, as well as providing important legal claims (discussed in the
next section), the UN Treaty Monitoring Body reviews provided
opportunities for coalition-building among advocates. The collaboration in
preparation for and advocacy during the human rights reviews of Ireland by
different UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies enhanced relationships between
organizations, attracted new groups, and led to the co-development of
strategies and ideas.742 Beyond the Treaty Body reviews in Geneva, many of
the same alliances collaborated at home to seek the implementation of the
human rights bodies’ recommendations and push for reform. In addition to
continuing to advocate jointly and produce joint reports,743 disparate actors
pursued different tactics according to their strengths and resources.
A study of digital activism, particularly on Twitter in the Irish abortion
movement, also suggests that the new alliances were expanded online.744
Grassroots organizations used social media, in part, to highlight who their
allies were, possibly to enhance their own legitimacy amongst the public. For
example, newer organizations such as the Abortion Rights Campaign and the
Coalition to Repeal the 8th frequently retweeted more established
organizations such as the National Women’s Council of Ireland (NWCI).745
Retweeting statements and/or affirmatively supporting other organizations
may also have helped maintain consensus amongst the different groups.
The collaborative human rights documentation and drafting was
designed to provide evidence to the different UN human rights Treaty bodies
about the harms of the 8th amendment, but the work itself reportedly
impacted advocates’ skills and capacity. Upon reflection after the
referendum, advocates described how their persistent international and
domestic advocacy around the UN Treaty Monitoring Body processes
provided valuable training opportunities for hundreds of advocates.746
Though resources were few, activists from numerous organizations were able
to become highly skilled in legal and human rights argumentation by the time
741 Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women by the Coalition to
Repeal the 8th Amendment (February 2017)
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/IRL/INT_CEDAW_NGO_IRL_263
53_E.pdf.
742 Id. For more on using human rights processes and training, see Shai Dothan, International Courts Improve Public
Deliberation, 39 MICH. J. INT’L L. 217 (2018).
743 Interview with Therese Caherty, Congress of Trade Unions Ireland, June 2016 and June 2018. For examples
of advocacy literature on which the groups coordinated, see Fiona Bloomer et al. Abortion as a Workplace Issue:
Trade Union Survey - North and South Of Ireland UNITE the Union, Unison, Mandate Trade Union, the CWU
Ireland, the GMB, Alliance for Choice, Trade Union Campaign to Repeal the 8th (2017). The Irish Family
Planning Association coordinated with Akidwa to publish: Sexual health and asylum: Handbook for people working with
women seeking asylum in Ireland (Irish Family Planning Association).
744 Kate Hunt, Twitter, social movements, and claiming allies in abortion debates, 16(4) J. OF INFO. TECH. & POL. (2019).
745 Id.
746 Interview with Maeve Taylor, supra note 666.
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the referendum campaign finally came around.747 Advocates were confident
in building on the criticisms that Ireland had received in international human
rights institutions to make a convincing case for change locally. Additionally,
many of their submissions focused on elevating women's stories about their
experiences of pregnancy and abortion under the 8th amendment and
included first-hand testimony in a deeply respectful way—a strategy that later
became central to the abortion rights movement.748
Irish pro-choice advocates also forged transnational human rights
networks that provided both material and status-based advantages for the
movement. The Open Society Foundation and the Center for Reproductive
Rights provided funding to ARC, Amnesty Ireland, the National Women's
Council, and the Irish Council for Civil Liberties.749 Transnational links
provided solidarity to Irish campaigners who could be parlayed for advocacy
goals. For example, in August 2017, when Ireland's Taoiseach, Leo
Varadkar, visited Canada, advocates used Twitter to connect with
reproductive rights activists in Canada, who in turn lobbied Prime Minister
Justin Trudeau to raise the lack of abortion rights in Ireland with Varadkar.
Trudeau explicitly urged the Irish Prime Minister to consider abortion "as a
matter of human rights."750 Through policy and advocacy, media, and
communication, people in Irish diaspora communities, particularly younger
women, lobbied their adopted States and the Irish State to support abortion
rights reform in Ireland. Prominent among diaspora groups for abortion
rights, the 'London-Irish Abortion Rights Campaign' invoked Ireland's
contravention of international law standards in its advocacy submissions both
to the Citizens’ Assembly on the 8th amendment and to the British Irish
Parliamentary Assembly (BIPA) in the UK.751 Diaspora communities also
helped amplify international attention on Ireland's abortion laws, including
by organizing marches in support of the movement at home across world
cities, including Berlin, Brussels, Toronto, New York, Melbourne, and
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749 Interview with Laura Harmon, National Women’s Council of Ireland, June 16, 2018.
750 See, e.g., Fiach Kelly Trudeau urges Varadkar to see abortion as a ‘fundamental right’ (August 21, 2017)
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London.752 Later, the diaspora returned home in their thousands to cast
ballots in the referendum.753
“In what is becoming a familiar scene, the Irish state must once again answer to a UN
committee as to why there has been no progress in ensuring the human rights of women and
girls in Ireland are vindicated.”754
As the number and diversity of Irish pro-choice advocates engaging with
UN human rights bodies increased, the strength and urgency of
recommendations from the UN urging the state to address abortion rights
increased. Pro-choice advocates gained increasingly expansive international
human rights recommendations to support and legitimate their calls to repeal
the 8th amendment.
The CEDAW Committee in 2005, and the Human Rights Committee in
2008, had expressed concerns regarding the highly restrictive circumstances
under which women could lawfully have an abortion, but the
recommendations were weak. CEDAW recommended a "national dialogue
on reproductive health," and the Human Rights Committee called for a
measure "to help women avoid unwanted pregnancies so that they do not
have to resort to illegal or unsafe abortions that could put their lives at risk."755
By 2014, the Human Rights Committee directly recommended that Ireland
“revise its legislation on abortion, including its Constitution to provide for
additional exceptions in cases of rape, incest, serious risks to the health of the
mother, or fatal fetal abnormality.”756 The Committee also commented on
the discriminatory impact of the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act on
women who were unable to travel abroad to seek abortions.757 The following
year (2015) the CESCR Committee specifically recommended that the
Government hold a referendum “to revise its legislation on abortion,
including the Constitution and the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act
752 See, e.g., Paddy Clancy, Irish Diaspora want their say in Repeal the 8th abortion debate IRISH CENTRAL (December 2,
2016) available at https://www.irishcentral.com/news/irishvoice/irish-diaspora-want-their-say-in-repeal-the8th-abortion-debate; see generally,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37462862.
753 See, e.g., Lisa O’ Carroll, Irish abortion referendum: voters on both sides prepare to head home, THE GUARDIAN (May 18,
2018)
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/21/irish-abortion-referendum-expats-both-sides-head-homevote.
754 See, e.g., Abortion Right Campaign spokesperson, Michali Hyams, available
at, https://www.abortionrightscampaign.ie/2017/07/28/press-release-government-must-support-repeal-of-8thamendment-in-order-to-meet-human-rights-obligations-says-abortion-rights-campaign-arc/.
755 UN Human Rights Committee ‘Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Ireland’ UN Doc
CPR/C/IRL/CO/3, 13.
756 UN Human Rights Committee 'Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Ireland' (August 19,
2014) UN Doc CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4. See also, Anthea McTiernan Irish solutions on women’s rights not enough for the
UN (July 15, 2014), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/irish-solutions-on-women-s-rights-not-enoughfor-un-1.1867197.
757 Id.
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2013, in line with international human rights standards.”758 In February
2016, the CRC Committee’s Concluding Observations called on Ireland to
“decriminalize abortion in all circumstances.”759 And in 2017, the CEDAW
Committee recommended that Ireland legalize the termination of pregnancy
“at least in cases of rape, incest, risk to the physical or mental health or the
life of the pregnant woman, and severe impairment of the fetus, and decriminalize abortion in all other cases.”760
Rather than expecting the Treaty Monitoring Bodies to coerce Ireland to
comply with its human rights obligations, the advocates sought to "embarrass
the State."761 and legitimize their demands in the eyes of the Government.762
Activists aimed to elevate the status—and acceptance—of their calls for
liberalization at home, to elicit understanding that they were “not asking for
something extreme, but that Ireland [was] extremely out of step with
international standards.”763 And in contrast to the protracted processes
involved with litigation, for local advocates, the UN review processes allowed
for regular opportunities to keep “the [abortion] issue in the human rights
context.”764
International human rights groups supporting the national movement in
Ireland similarly engaged with the Treaty Monitoring Body review processes
but also embraced litigation as a strategy. Considering the legal and policy
impacts of litigation to carry more weight Committee recommendations in
Concluding Observations, the international NGO, the Centre for
Reproductive Rights (CRR), hoped that the state's desire to comply with an
international decision would outweigh its strong inclination against liberal
abortion reform.765 Choosing the UN Human Rights Committee as their
venue, in part, out of fear that the European Court would rebuke their case,766
in 2013, the CRR logged a case on behalf of Amanda Mellet - the Irish
758 UN CESCR Committee 'Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Ireland' (July 15 2015) UN
Doc E/C.12/IRL/CO/3.
759 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on the Combined Third and Fourth Period
Reports of Ireland, CRC/C/IRL/CO/3-4, March 1, 2016, ¶ 58(a),
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC/C/IRL/CO/34&Lang=En.
760 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Concluding observations on the combined
sixth and seventh periodic report of Ireland’ (March 3, 2017), UN Doc CEDAW/C/IRL/CO/6-7.
761 On the role of ‘naming and shaming’ in prompting state compliance with human rights, see Robert O.
Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L. J. 487 (1997). See also, STUART
A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 147 (1974) (describing the capitalization of advocates on the less
formal and more political function of rights as “the politics of rights”).
762 See generally, Beth Simmons, supra note 145. See also Kal Raustiala, Refining the Limits of International Law, 34 GA.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 423, 429 (2006); Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of International Human Rights
Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 395 (2006).
763 Interview with Deirdre Duffy, Deputy Director, Irish Council for Civil Liberties, June 16, 2016 (notes on file
with author).
764 Interview with Maeve Taylor, supra note 666.
765 Interview with Leah Hoctor, Litigation Director, Centre for Reproductive Rights, Geneva, March 11, 2017
(notes on file with author).
766 Id.
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American woman who co-founded Terminations for Medical Reasons after
travelling to England to abort a non-viable pregnancy.767 The CRR felt that
they could successfully frame Amanda’s suffering at being unable to get an
abortion in Ireland despite her pregnancy having a fatal fetal anomaly as a
violation of the right to be free from cruel, degrading treatment.768 Aware
that Amanda’s case presented a narrow and potentially sympathetic claim,
their goal was to “push the jurisprudence in a way that would be domestically
accessible and implementable.”769
The CRR's hopes were realized. In June 2016, the Human Rights
Committee held that Ireland's abortion ban had violated Mellet's right to be
free from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, right to privacy, right to
seek and receive information, and right to equality before the law.770 Mellet’s
case marked the first time that the UN Human Rights Committee found that
a State’s law on abortion (rather than its practice around the law or the
actions of a third party) violated women’s human rights.771 The Government
paid Amanda Mellet $30,000 in compensation. Siobhán Whelan’s case the
following year was near identical.772 Ms. Whelan commented that she was
grateful that the Committee recognized the human rights violations she had
faced and that the state had provided reparations. But she emphasized that
she had taken the case to bring about change and to move the Government
to reform the law so that other women did not have to suffer.773
Evidence to support the notion that Government actors were directly
influenced by the decisions or recommendations emanating from the
successive UN bodies is mixed. In response to the decision in Mellet v. Ireland,
for example, the then-Taoiseach, Enda Kenny, dismissed the Human Rights
Committee's decision as "not binding" on the state and "not like the European
Court."774 At the same time, there is evidence that the UN-based human
rights advocacy was productive from a legitimacy standpoint. In the
aftermath of the country's financial crisis (2008-2012), Ireland was still
rebuilding its international reputation; some advocates noted the concern
amongst politicians that condemnation from international human rights
bodies contravened this progress and this provided openings in their

supra note 755.
Interview with Leah Hoctor, supra note 766.
769 Id.
770 Mellet v. Ireland, supra note xx
771 See also Center for Reproductive Rights, Ireland must legalize abortion to end violations of women’s human rights (2006),
https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/G
LP_Europe_MelletvIreland_FS_09%2006_Web.pdf.
772 Whelan v. Ireland, supra note xx
773 See, Pat Leahy, Woman, paid €30,000 over having to travel for abortion
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/woman-paid-30-000-over-having-to-travel-for-abortion-1.3283416.
774 Pat Leahy, UN abortion ruling is “not binding,” Enda Kenny says Iʀɪsʜ Tɪᴍᴇs (June 15, 2016) available at
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/un-abortion-ruling-is-not-binding-enda-kenny-says-1.2684762.
767
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advocacy.775 ARC recognized the limitations of soft law measures but
leveraged the authority of international human rights jurisprudence in their
advocacy.776 Maeve Taylor of the IFPA reflected on how Ireland's then
Minister for Justice, Frances Fitzgerald, a former director of the National
Women's Council, appeared visibly embarrassed as she defended the state's
position on abortion before the Human Rights Committee.777
UN human rights bodies’ supportive recommendations also served to
legitimize the demands of legislators who were allies to the reform
movement. In 2016, the Children’s Minister, Katharine Zappone—an
independent TD who at the time supported the minority Government in
exchange for the Government’s commitment to consider a referendum on the
8th amendment—capitalized on the UN’s ruling in Mellet to pressure her
fellow cabinet members to discuss the decision and to progress in setting up
the promised assembly.778 Notably, Minister Zappone was experienced in
deploying international human rights as a strategy to advance social change
in Ireland. In 2003, together with her wife Ann Gilligan, Minister Zappone
had contested, through domestic litigation, the state's failure to recognize
their same-sex marriage (which had taken place in Canada). In the course of
litigation, Zappone and Gilligan highlighted Ireland's international human
rights obligations to recognize family types beyond those based on
heterosexual marriage.779 Though she was ultimately unsuccessful in her bid
for recognition of same-sex unions in the Irish Courts in 2003, she prevailed
in her attempts to force movement on abortion law reform at the cabinetlevel. A week post-Mellet, the Government announced that it would
commence the process of setting up the Citizen’s Assembly, and less than a
month later, in July 2016, the Oireachtas voted to establish the assembly—
made up of 99 randomly selected individuals—to deliberate on a number of
issues, including the 8th amendment.780
The members of the Citizen’s Assembly heard evidence from a number
of experts covering legal regulation of abortion in Ireland and internationally,
the intricacies of constitutional law, the relationship between domestic law
and international human rights law, the experience of medical practitioners
775 See, e.g., Amelia Gentlemen, UN Calls on Ireland to Reform Abortion Laws After Landmark Ruling, Tʜᴇ Gᴜᴀʀᴅɪᴀɴ
(June 9, 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/09/ireland-abortion-lawsviolated-human-rightssays-un (quoting Colm O’Gorman, Executive Director of Amnesty International Ireland). See also: Sarah Bardon
et al, UN criticism of abortion regime to be taken seriously, Fitzgerald says, Iʀɪsʜ Tɪᴍᴇs (June 9, 2016) available at
http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/un-criticism-of-abortion-regime-to-be-taken-seriously-fitzgerald-says1.2678763.
776 Interview with Michael Haymes, Abortion Rights Campaign, March 2, 2017 (notes on file with author).
777 Statement made by Maeve Taylor, Advocacy Director, Irish Family Planning Association, Abortion and
Reproductive Justice - the Unfinished Revolution II' Conference, June 3, 2016.
778 See, e.g., Ellen Coyne, ‘Action must be taken on UN abortion ruling’ THE TIMES (June 14, 2016) available at
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/action-must-be-taken-on-un-abortion-ruling-n752s6kjh.
779 Zappone & Gilligan v. Revenue Commissioners & Ors [2006] IEHC 404.
780 See, e.g., Luke Field, The abortion referendum of 2018 and a timeline of abortion politics in Ireland to date, 33(4) IRISH
POLITICAL STUDIES 609 (2018).
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in the UK treating women from Ireland who access abortion in England,
ethicists, pro-choice and anti-abortion advocates, and (anonymized and
recorded) testimony from women who had accessed abortion and from
women who had decided not to.
Later, in 2018, as the Government and legislature considered to
undertake the actual work of reform and determine the wording of the
referendum question and legislation to follow repeal,781 legislators sought
advice on Ireland’s human rights obligations from international human rights
lawyers and the Irish Human Rights Committee. More significantly, the
argument that international human rights law required constitutional change
appears to have been significant for the Joint Oireachtas Committee in
reaching its conclusions in consideration of the Assembly’s Report.
There is also evidence that the legitimatization of pro-choice advocacy
impacted activists personally, as well as politically. Though not related to
international human rights advocacy per se, as Michael McCann suggests in
his book, Rights at Work, making legal claims and taking part in political
struggle influences how individuals perceive themselves. Legal mobilization
can enable advocates to feel more entitled and empowered. 782 For many
involved in the Irish abortion rights movement, the recognition by
international human rights bodies that Irish law violated their human rights
impacted their confidence, resilience, and even identity. Post-referendum,
newspapers depicted open pride in the nation's vote, but for decades before,
activism for abortion rights was taboo. Many activists, even right up to the
referendum, we're hesitant to tell their families about their campaign work,
fearful of stark disapproval. Others became distanced from their families.783
As one volunteer with ARC stated: “I feel as though my work has been
validated. All of a sudden, abortion isn’t taboo. It is a human rights issue. I
tell my family about it.”784
4. Framing
Though the movement’s first proactive foray into international human
rights advocacy in ABC was in large part unsuccessful, the litigation, and
advocacy surrounding it, influenced the dialogue on abortion reform in
Ireland in a significant way. At the parliamentary level, as discussed in
Chapter 1, from the 1980s onwards, political discussion on abortion had
generally been confined to consideration of whether and how to heighten
restrictions on abortion access. Moreover, the tenor of abortion debates was
781 See supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussion of the deliberations of the Joint Oireachtas Committee
in 2017 and 2018).
782 See, e.g., MICHAL MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL
MOBILIZATION (2004).
783 Interview with Vicky Conway, Lawyers for Choice, July 2, 2016 (notes on file with author).
784 Interview with Sinead Corcoran, ARC, January 4, 2016 (notes on file with author).
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generally wrought with hostility. such that divisiveness of discussion on
abortion was cited by parliamentarians as one of their reasons for inaction.
Politicians consistently balked at a discussion on abortion law reform, in turn,
maintaining the idea that abortion was too sensitive and too controversial a
topic for the legislature to reasonably deal with.
Legislating for ABC demanded parliamentary action on abortion, notably
in a way that discussed access to abortion as a right (albeit limited to a right to
keep women alive). The emotive tenor was far from fully dissipated, but the
hearings differed from the parliamentary debates that had gone before. The
Oireachtas invited the Irish Council for Civil Liberties to comment on
Ireland's obligations under the European Convention.785 The National
Women’s Council submission invoked statements by the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Health criticizing the criminalization of abortion
in Ireland.786 More generally, from this point onwards in Ireland’s abortion
law trajectory, “women’s human rights” was among the frames used by
parliamentarians to discuss abortion.
Additionally, both the institutions of human rights law and its content
provided the abortion rights movement with significant opportunities to
communicate specific harms of the 8th amendment to both domestic and
international bodies. In making submissions via individual complaints and the
Treaty Monitoring Body processes, advocates documented the testimony and
experiences of women and their healthcare providers in a way that had not
been done before.787 Irish women’s experiences of the 8th amendment had
largely been “out of sight, out of mind.” Women went to England for
abortions legally but in secret.788 Now advocates translated those silenced
experiences into a body of evidence that the 8th amendment violated human
rights and needed to go. As successive UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies made
the same, or similar recommendations, calling on Ireland to liberalize its laws
and to protect women’s rights, abortion-seeking women were no longer

785 Presentation by Dr. Alan Brady, ICCL, Houses of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Health and Children.
Report on public hearings on the implementation of Government decision following the publication of the expert
group report on A, B, and C v. Ireland. Available at http://www.oireachtas.ie/.
786 See, e.g., Report on Health Hearings on the implementation of the Government decision publication of the expert group report on A,
B, and C v. Ireland 430, available at
https://data.oireachtas.ie/ie/oireachtas/committee/dail/31/joint_committee_on_education_and_social_protec
tion/reports/2013/2013-02-04_report-on-health-hearings-on-the-implementation-of-the-government-decisionfollowing-the-publication-of-the-expert-group-report-on-a-b-c-vs-ireland-volume-one_en.pdf.
787 Interview with Linda Kavanagh, ARC, June 17, 2018.
788 It can be argued that the paucity of women’s voices created a vicious cycle. As described by the former Special
Rapporteur on Health, "...the stigma perpetuates the notion that abortion is an immoral practice, which then
reinforces the continued criminalization of the practice." See Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council
on Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health,
Interim Rep. 11 ¶ 35 (2011), transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/66/254 (August 3, 2011) (by
Anand Grover), http://www.acpd.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/SR-Right-to-Health-Criminalization-ofSRHR-2011.pdf.
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“fallen women”789 but were rights holders with a claim on the state. Indeed,
certain advocates commented that often the impact of their international
advocacy was a lot less about what the international bodies said and more
about the personal stories of women that entered the public domain.790
Abortion moved from being a peripheral subject spoken about in hushed
tones to a national question of human rights and how the state treated
women. As one advocate put it:
The Irish public, many of whom first encountered abortion via
screenings of ‘The Silent Scream’791 Within their Catholic-run schools,
were now opening up national broadsheets to see that the UN has
described Ireland's abortion ban as a violation of women's rights.792
Engaging both state actors and the public in a new discourse on abortion,
international advocacy provided the movement with many of the advantages
that scholars attribute to international human rights-based ‘framing’:793
educating the public, producing a new way of understanding the issue, and
offering captivating narratives.794 Advocates commented that international
advocacy facilitated creative media messaging that could both chastise the
state and mobilize sympathetic audiences.795 In 2014, the Chair of the
Human Rights Committee asserted that Irish law treated women who were
victims of rape “as a vessel and nothing more.” His observations attracted
national media attention, and ARC capitalized with the hashtag
#NotAVessel on social media. This slogan quickly gained traction, with
women all over the world posting pictures of themselves proclaiming “I am
#NotAVessel.”796

789 Term taken from CAELAINN HOGAN, REPUBLIC OF SHAME: STORIES FROM IRELAND’S INSTITUTIONS FOR
‘FALLEN WOMEN’ (2020).
790 Interview with Leah Hoctor, Centre for Reproductive Rights, Geneva, March 11, 2017 (notes on file with
author).
791 ‘The Silent Scream’ is a 1984 anti-abortion educational film that was produced in the U.S. in partnership with
the National Right to Life Committee.
792 Interview with Michael Hyams, ARC, Jan 2016, 2016 (notes on file with author).
793 In social movements’ research, framing describes how activists present their cause and articulate the perceived
injustices in their efforts to bring about change. See, Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, Framing Processes and
Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment 26 ANNUAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 611, 663 (2000).
794 See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Feminism and International Law: An Opportunity for Transformation, 14 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 345, 356 (2002) (“Rights-based narratives are not the only powerful narratives—and in some cultural
contexts they may be much less effective than in others—but for many of the world’s women, they offer the best
way to buttress arguments for change.”); Elisabeth Jay Friedman, Bringing Women to International Human Rights,18(4)
PEACE REVIEW: J. OF SOC. JUSTICE 480 (2006).
795 See, e.g., Sinead Corcoran et al, “I’m #NotAVessel: The impact of grassroots pro-choice activism on Ireland’s UN treaty
monitoring body examinations,” Irish Community Law Development Journal 5/2 (2016), pp.25.
796 Id.
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In addition to discursive advantages, scholars demonstrate that human
rights framing can be crucial for its legal authority.797 Such was the case for
the Irish abortion rights movement. Advocates articulated a variety of claims
in terms of human rights law. When addressing the Human Rights
Committee in 2014, advocates were able to build on ABC to underscore that
the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act was not a solution for women’s
human rights. Given that the Act only addressed the situation of women
whose pregnancy posed a serious risk to life, advocates argued that Ireland’s
ban on abortion access in cases where there was a risk to a woman's physical
or mental health, where the pregnancy was the result of a crime or where
there was a serious fetal anomaly, interfered with women’s rights to be free
from cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and the right to life under the
Covenant.798 In their submissions to the CEDAW Committee, advocates
used public health evidence to underscore that the state violated Article 12
(the right to health) of women in Ireland by imposing an unsound distinction
between risk to the life of a pregnant woman and risk to her health,799 and by
imposing onerous barriers to abortion access in cases of suicide.800 Advocates
emphasized that “abortion needed to be taken out of the criminal law and
addressed as part of an integrated approach to women’s reproductive
health.”801 Similarly, when engaging with the CESCR Committee802 and the
797 See, e.g., Maria Foscarinis, The Growth of a Movement for a Human Right to Housing in the U.S., 20 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 35 (2007) and Maria Foscarinis and Eric Tars, Housing Rights and Wrongs: The U.S. and the Right to Housing,
in HUMAN RIGHTS AT HOME, (Cynthia Soohoo, Catherine Albisa and Martha Davis eds. 2007) (describing how
framing homelessness as a human rights violation has helped add legal content to the movement’s advocacy for
policy changes in the U.S.). See generally, David Landy, Talking Human Rights: How Social Movement Activists Are
Constructed and Constrained by Human Rights Discourse, 28 (4) INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGY (2013).
798 See, e.g., Irish Family Planning Ass’n, Comments of the Irish Family Planning Association (IFPA) in Respect of the Fourth
Periodic Review of Ireland Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 7 (2014),
http://www.ifpa.ie/sites/default/files/documents/submissions/irish_family_planning_association_re_4th_perio
dic_review_of_ireland.pdf; Irish Family Planning Ass’n, Letter to assist the Pre-Sessional Working Group of the Human
Rights Committee (HRC) in its review of the State Party’s compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the adoption of the list of issues for review (August 2013); Abortion Rights Campaign, Comments of the
Abortion Rights Campaign in Respect of the Fourth Periodic Review of Ireland Under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) (June 12, 2014); Women’s Human Rights Alliance, Comments of the Women’s Human Rights
Alliance to the Human Rights Committee in Respect of the Fourth Periodic Review of Ireland Under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (2014), (on file with author).
799 See, e.g., Comments of the Irish Family Planning Association (IFPA) in Respect of the Combined Sixth and
Seventh Periodic Review of Ireland Under the CEDAW Convention (2017),
https://www.ifpa.ie/sites/default/files/irish_family_planning_association_submission_to_cedaw_january_2017
_1.pdf; See also, Comments of the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission to the United Nations
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women on Ireland’s Combined Sixth and Seventh
Periodic Reports (on file with author).
800 Abortion Rights Campaign, Comments of the Abortion Rights Campaign to the Pre-sessional Working Group of the
CEDAW Committee (2015) (on file) [hereinafter, Abortion Rights Campaign, Comments to CEDAW; National
Women’s Council Oral Statement to the Pre-Sessional Working Group of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
https://www.nwci.ie/learn/article/oral_statement_to_the_pre_sessional_working_group_of_the_committee_on
_the_e.
801 id. Abortion Rights Campaign, Comments to CEDAW.
802See, e.g., Abortion Rights Campaign, Comments of ARC to UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (2015)
https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CESCR/Shared%20Documents/IRL/INT_CESCR_ICO_IRL_18452
_E.
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Committee on the Rights of the Child, advocates highlighted Ireland’s noncompliance with the Convention where a woman faces a risk to her health
and requires access to abortion.803 And following the HRC’s decision in
Mellet, advocates emphasized that Ireland had still not taken action to comply
with the decision by holding a referendum and legislating for abortion access
for women whose pregnancies had fatal fetal abnormalities.804
The disproportionate impact of Irish abortion law on "vulnerable
women" or "marginalized women" featured as a prominent theme in
advocates' human rights submissions. The label "vulnerable women" was
code for women living in poverty, asylum seekers, and minors in the care of
the state, i.e., women for whom travel was laden with barriers, some of them
insurmountable. Exposing multiple barriers that women in poverty and/or
immigrant women faced in accessing abortion, the movement drew attention
to the intersection of needs of women in Ireland. ARC and the IFPA
collaborated with Akidwa (Ireland's National Network of Migrant Women)
to support migrant women's groups in developing submissions on their
challenges. They drew upon the 'alphabet' of tragedies in Irish abortion law;
Ms. Y, who had been raped but could not travel, and Ms. C, who had been
raped and went the whole way to High Court to overcome the restrictions on
her right to travel. Others explained how accessing the funds to cover flights,
accommodation, transportation to and from the airport, and the abortion
itself, was impossible for some women. Advocates highlighted the
discriminatory impacts of the 8th amendment on women and girls in lower
socio-economic groups.805 Significantly, the state was forced to admit that it
had "no solution" for women who were unable to travel for abortion.806
The Irish abortion rights movement elicited strong recommendations
relating the state's responsibility to reform Irish abortion law from UN human
rights bodies. Almost in unison, the UN human rights bodies outlined that to
comply with its legal obligations, Ireland needed to hold a referendum to
repeal the 8th amendment and legislate thereafter to legalize abortion in cases
where abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman, where
a woman is a victim of rape or incest or where the pregnancy was not viable.
Though the views of such bodies are not binding on States under

803 Maeve Taylor, Women's Right to Health and Ireland's Abortion Laws, 1 INT. J. OF GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS
130, 132 (2015).
804 See, e.g., Siobhan Mullally, Mellet v. Ireland: Legal Status of the UN Human Rights Committee’s ‘Views” CCJHR BLOG
(June 16, 2017) http://blogs.ucc.ie/wordpress/ccjhr/2016/06/16/mellet-v-ireland-legal-status-un-humanrights-committees-views-2/T.
805 See, e.g., IFPA, Abortion in Ireland: Statistics, https://www.ifpa.ie/Hot-Topics/Abortion/Statistics (last visited
September 1, 2018). See also Ashley Kirk, Nine a Day: The Women who Have to Travel for Abortion as Ireland Prepares for
Referendum, Tʜᴇ Tᴇʟᴇɢʀᴀᴘʜ (May 24, 2018).
806 Ronan Duffy Ireland at the UN: We have ‘no solution’ for women who can't afford to travel for an abortion (July 15, 2014)
https://www.thejournal.ie/ireland-unhrc-day-twp-1572161-Jul2014.
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international law, their views are treated as authoritative interpretations of
binding treaty obligations.807
At another level, however, the scope of abortion reform recommended by
the myriad human rights bodies was substantively limited. As set out in Part
I of this chapter, international human rights standards on abortion access
developed from a growing international concern that thousands of women
were dying or suffering severe health complications from unsafe abortions.
The law responded in two ways. First, it tried to ensure that women could
access abortion where it was legal, i.e., where a State permits legal abortion
domestically, human rights law is clear that States must put procedures in
place to enable women to access a safe, legal abortion. The litany of cases in
Part II (KL, LMR, Tysiac, LC, P & S, RR, ABC, Mellet, Whelan, Beatriz, etc.)
demonstrate that under current international human rights law
jurisprudence, States are culpable if individual service providers or a lack of
medical guidelines impede a woman's access to abortion—if that state has
already legalized abortion. If a State has not already legalized abortion,
international human rights law recommends that States make exceptions to
their restrictions to legalize access in cases where the life or health of the
woman is at risk, if the pregnancy is the result of rape or if the pregnancy is
not viable.
While such norms were initially very useful in providing legal and political
legitimacy to advocates’ calls for a referendum to repeal the 8th amendment,
as the movement progressed towards a public vote in 2017 and 2018,
international human rights law ran out as a resource.
To recap from Chapter 1, the Government officially committed to
holding a referendum on Ireland's constitutional abortion law following the
recommendation from the Citizen's Assembly in that it do so. Not only did
the Committee recommend a referendum, but that the state move to permit
abortion without restriction as to reason up to 12 weeks of pregnancy, allow
abortion where there is a risk to life or of serious harm to health after 12 weeks
but until fetal viability, and without gestational time limit where the fetus has
a condition that means it is likely to die before or within 28 days of birth.808
Only one human rights organization, Amnesty Ireland, addressed the
assembly over its 25 meetings.
Fewer movement actors were content with the notion that reform would
enable women to access abortion only in exceptional circumstances. The
need for thousands of women to leave Ireland for abortion care would remain
807 Art 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice also provides that the views of experts are a
subsidiary source of international law. Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of
Justice, entry into force October 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI.
808 Citizens’ Assembly First report and recommendations of the Citizens’ Assembly: The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution
(2017) https://ptfsoireachtas.s3.amazonaws.com/DriveH/AWData/Library3/CAdoclaid290617A_110031.pdf.
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intact. 'Real world' access to abortion would remain heavily dependent on
financial means, visa status, ability to travel, ability to take time off of work,
the availability of childcare for the pregnant person's children, or the ability
and willingness to order medication abortion online and take it illegally within
Ireland. For many involved in the campaign over the decades, incremental
and exceptions-based abortion law reform had never been their goal. The
ABC had been initiated as a case to contest the discrimination caused to the
diversity of Irish women, not just women in exceptional circumstances.809
ARC's foundations committed to "free, safe, and legal abortion" for all
women.810 The IFPA was driven by the need to recognize the rights of women
with “everyday abortion experiences.”811 Grassroots activists campaigned for
a law that would end the exile of Irish women who wanted to control their
reproductive autonomy. For thousands of women, the movement was a fight
to demand that the State #trustwomen.
In this way, if strictly adhered to, human rights law had the potential to
undermine the Irish abortion rights movement by tempering its ambitions
and limiting their demands significantly. Strict compliance with international
human rights law would have delivered a much more limited abortion right
than what was sought and ultimately achieved by pro-choice campaigners.
Notably, as noted in the last section, when the Joint Oireachtas
Committee on the Eighth Amendment had the opportunity to recommend
whether Ireland should have a referendum on the 8th amendment, the
Committee cited Ireland’s international human rights obligations “as
evidenced in the cases of Mellet v. Ireland and Whelan v. Ireland” among their
reasons for recommending constitutional change.812 However, an approach
to abortion reform predicated upon compliance with Mellet and Whelan would
only have required the state to guarantee access to abortion for women with
non-viable pregnancies—a much narrower reform than that recommended
by the Citizen's Assembly, which essentially called for a legal right to abortion,
without restriction as to reason, within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. If the
Joint Committee had not also been presented with the Citizen's Assembly's
recommendation,813 perhaps the Joint Committee, and in turn, the
See supra note 356.
See, e.g., ARC Inclusivity Statement, supra note 136. See also, IFPA Submission to the Citizen’s Assembly, A
health and rights approach to abortion in Ireland,
https://www.ifpa.ie/sites/default/files/ifpa_submission_to_the_citizens_assembly.pdf (outlining their position
that an abortion law based on exceptions where a woman has been raped or received a diagnosis of severe or
fatal anomaly, "would, in the same way, fail to meet the needs of the very group it aimed to serve").
811 See, e.g., Irish Family Planning Association, Women Have Abortions Every Day: It's Just One Choice,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R4SSHkgD73E.
812 See, e.g., Houses of The Oireachtas, Report of The Joint Committee On The Eight Amendment Of The Constitution,
December 20, 2017, at 5, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/committees/32/eighth-amendment-constitution
[hereinafter, Oireachtas, Report Of The Joint Committee]
813 First Report And Recommendation Of The Citizens’ Assembly, The Eight Amendment Of The Constitution, June 29, 2017,
https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/The-Eighth-Amendment-of-the-Constitution/Final-Report-on-the-EighthAmendment-of-the-Constitution/Final-Report-incl-Appendix-A-D.pdf See Government Of Ireland Department
809
810
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Oireachtas, would not have offered the Irish people the option to vote for
unrestricted access to abortion in the first trimester in the 2018 referendum.
In practical terms, the Government may have presented (and later enacted) a
post-repeal abortion law that was far less progressive than what was published
in March 2018.814 If the primary impact of human rights advocacy had been
to move the state to comply with its international human rights law standards
on abortion, the Irish people might not have been able to vote in favor of a
woman's right to abortion without restriction as to reason. Thousands of
women in Ireland might still be travelling to the UK every year to realize their
reproductive rights.
Interestingly, even though human rights law standards on abortion are
actually quite conservative, when it came to the official referendum campaign
in the eight weeks before the public vote, the Together for Yes campaign
dropped the framing of abortion as a ‘right,’ believing this language to be too
political.815 Rather than articulating abortion as a human right for women,
abortion was framed, primarily, as a medical need. The campaign’s policy
paper described the proposed law as a way for “women and girls to access the
abortion services which they need, in a safe and regulated medical
environment within the Irish health system.”816 There was little talk of
‘trusting women’, but much of trusting women and their doctors.817 The
dominant campaign message articulated that Repeal was about providing
healthcare to women within the state's jurisdiction. Accordingly, the
campaign leaned heavily on medical arguments for repeal, foregrounding
supportive obstetricians and gynecologists as spokespersons.818 With an
undertone of paternalism, the message was that Ireland should be caring for
its women at home. Additionally, campaign events foreground the stories of
women and couples who had experienced a diagnosis of fatal fetal
abnormality and had been forced abroad for an abortion. "Repeal," the
refrain went, was a vote for "compassion and care for your sister, your
daughter, your mother, or for your wife."819 Civil society campaigners,
Of Health, General Scheme Of A Bill To Regulate Termination Of Pregnancy, March 27, 2018, https://health.gov.ie/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/General-Scheme-for-Publication.pdf.
814 Id.
815 Interviews with the following in June 2016: Sineád Kennedy, Together for Yes; Laura Harmon, Niall Behan,
the Irish Family Planning Association.
816 Together for Yes, Position on Bill to Regulate Termination of Pregnancy, (April 5, 2018)
https://www.togetherforyes.ie/12-weeks/.
817 For example, during live TV debates, Together for Yes tweeted, "We need to trust women and trust doctors
to do their jobs":https://twitter.com/Together4yes/status/989998165616185344.
818 The support of the medical profession for reform is similar to the experience of the United States, where
physicians feared criminal and civil liability because of the vague standards at work. See Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s
Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims that Engendered Roe, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1875, 1884 (2010) [hereinafter Siegel, Roe’s
Roots]; BEFORE ROE V.WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT’S RULING 25 (Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel eds., 2010).
819 See, e.g., Senator Colette Kelleher, Seanad Debates,
https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/seanad/2018-01-17/9/; Ivana Bacik, Ireland’s abortion referendum:
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politicians, and even celebrities who became voices for 'Yes' repeated this
refrain. Emblazoned in bright colors across roadside posters, t-shirts, and
campaign literature, a Yes vote was a vote for "compassion and care."
Market research conducted in 2016 had provided the impetus for the
change in framing.820 According to this research, the so-called 'middle
ground' voters in Ireland (those who were seemingly not firmly in the 'prochoice' or 'pro-life' camp) responded well to the reproductive health frame.821
These 'middle ground' voters, also known as 'middle Ireland' or the
'concerned center,' felt emotionally torn; they wanted gradual change
according to the focus group. And they wanted there to be a reason for an
abortion. The involvement of doctors in the abortion decision was key.
Together for Yes pitched their campaign of compassion and care to this
constituency. Moving away from the themes of choice and rights, their
narrative focused on women’s health needs and the tragedies of the 8th—
women with much-wanted pregnancies who had been diagnosed with a fetal
anomaly; women who had been raped; women whose health was at risk.822
The Director of the National Women's Council and co-chair of Together for
Yes, Orla O'Connor, emphasized that "[f]or women it's (abortion), not a
political issue. It's a personal and private one."823
For a movement that had consistently highlighted the impacts of the 8th
amendment on women with multiple vulnerabilities in the international
advocacy, immigrant women, traveler women, and black and brown women
became almost invisible in official campaign activities during the
referendum.824 The messaging no longer detailed the struggles of the women
who were most penalized by the law—migrant women, women in poverty,
or children in care. Rather, it seemed as though the official campaign believed
that the public could only be convinced to trust women who fitted traditional
norms of respectability.
It is not clear whether the depoliticization of abortion rights was necessary
to win the public vote. When 'Yes' voters were asked to name which factors
were important to them in making their decision, the most important issues
were the right to choose (84%), the health or life of the woman (69%), and

why I’m campaigning for repeal Tʜᴇ Cᴏɴᴠᴇʀsᴀᴛɪᴏɴ, (March 22, 2018) https://theconversation.com/irelandsabortion-referendum-why-im-campaigning-for-repeal-96938.
820 Interview with Laura Harmon, Mobilization Director, Together for Yes (June 10, 2018) (explaining that in
2016, the National Women's Council had conducted focus group studies, paid for with funding from the Center
for Reproductive Rights, which revealed that a less combative tone was preferable amongst middle-ground
voters).
821 Interview with Ailbhe Smyth, Co-chair, Together for Yes (June 16, 2018).
822 See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
823 See e.g. Pat Leahy, Women’s council appeals to ‘middle ground’ in abortion debate IRISH TIMES (November 13, 2017),
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/women-s-council-appeals-to-middle-ground-in-abortion-debate1.3289391.
824 Interview with Eileen O' Flinn, activist on behalf of Irish Travellers and women's rights, June 4, 2018.
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pregnancy as a result of rape (52%).825 Furthermore, when asked when they
decided how to vote, 75% said they always knew; 8% said following the Savita
Halappanavar case; 1% said following the Citizens' Assembly; 1% said
following the Oireachtas committee, and 12% said during the Referendum
campaign.826
This chapter examined how human rights-based activism for abortion law
reform in Ireland helped Irish advocates unravel one of the most restrictive
abortion laws in the world. Playing a formative role, the strategic decision of
the IFPA in the early 2000s to focus on international human rights advocacy
initiated the first proactive campaign for women’s abortion rights in Ireland.
Somewhat unique to Ireland, the international legal system provided a venue
for legal challenge in a situation where the domestic legal system precluded
legal action for abortion law reform. Though limited in terms of its
recognition of substantive abortion rights, the outcome of the litigation
campaign the European Court’s 2010 decision in A, B, and C v. Ireland forced
legislative action at home, compelling the Oireachtas to clarify the legal
framework around access to abortion where a woman’s life was at risk (the
PLDPA). The death of Savita Halappanavar in 2012 was an unexpected, yet
watershed, moment for the abortion rights movement and gave significant
momentum to the emerging national mobilization against the abortion ban.
The international human rights advocacy that followed both her death and
the PLDPA was influential less in terms of its legal force, but by attracting
new actors, creating opportunities for coalition building, and enhancing the
legitimacy of the movement (particularly from 2012-2017), human rights
activism had important structural impacts on the movement itself. And
during those years, framing abortion as a human right helped shift both
parliamentary and public discourse on abortion to discuss abortion denial as
a potential violation of women's rights —a marked difference from the
abortion debates in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s described in Chapter 1.
While this case study evidences significant institutional and analytical
benefits that human rights strategies offered to the pro-choice movement, it
suggests that the actual scope of international human rights law had the
potential to constrain the liberalization of Ireland’s abortion law. In
protecting access for abortion in just a subset of cases, for a subset of women,
international human rights standards did not reflect the full extent of the prochoice struggle, nor the diversity of women who sought its protection. The
next chapter, the final in this dissertation, probes the doctrinal underpinnings
of this gap in human rights protection.
825 David McCullough, Exit poll indicates large majority vote to change abortion laws (updated May 30, 2018)
https://www.rte.ie/news/politics/2018/0526/966120-eighth-amendment-referendum/.
826 See, e.g., Ian McShane, Thirty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution Exit Poll (May 25, 2018), RTÉ & BEHAVIOUR &
ATTITUDES, https://static.rasset.ie/documents/news/2018/05/rte-exit-poll-final-11pm.pdf.
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CHAPTER 3: GENDER BLIND: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON
ABORTION
Chapter 2 of this dissertation set out current international human rights
law standards on abortion: the doctrine recognizes that in certain
circumstances, denying women access to abortion can violate a woman’s right
to life, right to health, right to be free from cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment, right to privacy, freedom from discrimination in the context of the
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right to health and freedom from socio-economic discrimination. In practical
terms, this jurisprudence recognizes that States have a duty to decriminalize
abortion and legalize abortion access in three situations: where a woman (and
usually a number of medical or state officials) can show that abortion is
necessary to preserve her life or health; where the pregnancy is the result of
rape; or where the pregnancy has a fatal anomaly. Forged through impressive
advocacy by reproductive rights groups, these doctrinal developments have
been groundbreaking in numerous concrete ways. Across the world,
lawmakers and judges have invoked these law standards to liberalize nationallevel laws and policies on abortion. 827 A number of international and
multilateral organizations and agencies have referenced human rights
standards in the technical guidance and recommendations they provide to
States on women’s health828 and empowerment. Chapter 2 studied how
international human rights law was a powerful lever for Irish abortion rights
activists to drive political, social, and legal change — a phenomenon that is
not limited to this jurisdiction.
Chapter 2 concluded, however, on a sober note that pointed to the limits
of this jurisprudence. The international human rights framework provided
formative legitimatizing, mobilizing, and institutional resources to the Irish
abortion rights movement, but it was not a panacea. The case study
highlighted that the scope of international legal protection for abortion rights
fell short, far short of the emancipatory goals of the Irish movement. If Irish
lawmakers had directly mirrored human rights law when legislating for
reform, only a slightly improved abortion law would have followed the repeal
of the 8th amendment. Rather than legal availability upon request within the
first 12 weeks of pregnancy, women may only have been entitled to an
abortion within the health-life-rape and FFA exceptions. As before repeal,
women outside of those categories could have resorted to ordering abortion
pills online or going abroad to access abortion, but that would hardly have
been a revolutionary change for "Mná na hEireann."829

827 Courts in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, South Korea, the UK, and Nepal have directly relied upon
these standards in decisions to liberalize abortion laws; See, e.g., Stefano Gennarini, Court in Argentina Cites UN
‘Experts’ To Establish ‘Right’ to Abortion, LIFESITE (January 9, 2014), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/court-inargentina-cites-unexperts-to-establish-right-to-abortion. Lawmakers in Spain, Ireland, Northern Ireland,
Rwanda, Uruguay, and Peru have also invoked international standards to decriminalize abortion.
828 WHO, SAFE ABORTION: TECHNICAL AND POLICY GUIDANCE FOR HEALTH SYSTEMS 1‒2 (2d ed. 2012); See
also UNFPA, Sexual And Reproductive Health And Rights: An Essential Element Of Universal Health Coverage: Background
document for the Nairobi summit on ICPD25 – Accelerating the promise (2019) 34
https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/UF_SupplementAndUniversalAccess_30-online.pdf
(outlining that “[o]ne essential legislative reform is to widen the grounds on which abortion is permitted” to
ensure a “a comprehensive approach to sexual and reproductive health rights.”).
829 “Mná na hEireann" translates from Irish to English as "Women of Ireland." In popular lexicon, it is associated
with a rallying cry for Irish women ever since its use by former President of Ireland, Mary Robinson, who, in her
victory speech, gave special mention to Irish women “who instead of rocking the cradle, rocked the system.”
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As well as being limited in terms of the substantive rights offered, a closer
look at human rights law jurisprudence on abortion830 tellingly reveals a
narrow understanding of the socio-political importance of abortion rights.
Delinking abortion, for the most part, from gender equality, the doctrine fails
to interrogate the gendered purposes and effects of abortion restrictions. One
line of jurisprudence treats abortion regulation as a cultural issue of “domestic
morality” that domestic powers can regulate with a significant degree of
deference.831 Under this model, abortion's status as a human right receives
scant attention, and the gender discrimination inherent to abortion
restrictions receives no attention at all. In other decisions, the law has been
willing to recognize that denial of abortion rights by 'third parties, such as
hospitals, doctors, or judges, interferes with women's rights. While these are
welcome decisions in many regards, it enables the state to escape
accountability for giving such the third parties power over women's decisions.
In addition to failing to contest the gendered roots of abortion denial,
human rights law tends to obscure the gendered impacts of restrictive
abortion regulation. By conceptualizing abortion denial primarily as an
interference with the right to health, the right to privacy, and the right to be
free from ill-treatment, human rights law has made powerful inroads in
recognizing many of the human rights abuses women suffer when denied
abortions. But this analysis appears to have come at the expense of sufficient
recognition of the inequalities caused by abortion restrictive regulation. Even
when the law recognizes the discriminatory impacts of abortion restrictions,
the inequality is addressed as one of unequal access to healthcare, rather than
the rejection of women's agency, autonomy, and equal position in society.832
To be sure, abortion access is a reproductive health issue, and denial of a
wanted abortion impedes a woman's right to health. Relatedly, abortion
rights implicate many aspects of an individual's private life that should not be
intruded upon by state actors. And without doubt, the experience of forced
pregnancy can cause suffering that reaches the threshold of cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment. But recognition of these harms should not be
divorced from the understanding that abortion denial impairs the status of
women as equals.
Finally, the human rights law understanding of abortion—again, as
currently applied—is wanting from a gender perspective because the
jurisprudence trades in narratives of women as powerless, tragic victims. A
primary example is its “exceptions-based” approach to abortion. Affirmative
830 In analyzing human rights law’s approach to abortion rights, the chapter primarily examines human rights
law decisions, rather than recommendations emanating from UN Treaty Monitoring Body concluding
observations. However, where the doctrinal approach of a human rights body differs in its decisions from its
approach in concluding observations, the difference is acknowledged.
831 A, B, & C v. Ireland, supra note 12, at ¶ 227.
832 See infra note xx and accompanying notes.
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abortion rights are recognized only in conditional (quite tragic) cases —
where there is danger of maternal mortality, where the pregnancy is nonviable, or where the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest. The agentic
women who choose abortion for reasons unrelated to the aforementioned
tragedies are excluded from the law’s protection. In this way, the law creates
a hierarchy of rights-holders (and abortions) whereby only women who can
engender compassion and sympathy are considered to be rights-holders.
Moreover, the positioning of women as powerless victims risks inscribing the
patriarchal vision of women as vulnerable beings whose suppression is
natural.833 As this chapter will discuss, human rights law’s uneasy relationship
with women’s agency extends to playing a role in erasing it.834 In the seminal
A, B, &C case at the European Court of Human Rights, when assessing
whether Ireland had violated A and B’s human rights, the majority relied, in
part, on the fact that the women overcame national barriers to abortion
access to dismiss the claimants. The women's success in extricating themselves
from the unjust laws of their state meant that their state had not really violated
their human rights and had acted proportionately. Put differently, their
display of agency stripped the women of their status of rights-holders.
Conditioning women’s recognition as rights holders on their powerlessness,
the human rights law itself could be accused of suppressing women’s agency.
This chapter, the final in this dissertation, critiques human rights law from
a feminist perspective. Before the doctrine is scrutinized, the chapter builds
its case for recognizing abortion as an issue of gender equality. First, it invokes
different strands of feminist legal scholarship that condemn anti-abortion
regulation as grounded in harmful gender stereotypes835 and contextualizes
these theories by revisiting the Irish abortion story. Examining the history of
Irish abortion law and the experiences of women under its rule, the chapter
demonstrates that Ireland’s near-total abortion ban was designed to enforce
gender stereotypes related to women’s roles as mothers and wives.
Second, building on feminist approaches that foreground women’s
experiences, the chapter analyzes the discriminatory impacts of abortion
restrictions. Examining the social meaning of Ireland’s abortion regime and
the law’s concrete impacts on women, the chapter demonstrates how the 8th
rejected the autonomy of abortion-seeking women and punished them
through exile and stigma. The analysis of women's experiences takes care to
emphasize that generations of Irish women withstood those burdens of
shame, rejection, and stigma to travel abroad for abortion or take pills at
home. In this way, the Irish abortion story adds to feminist thought on
abortion by conceptualizing Irish women’s experiences of restrictive abortion
See infra note xx accompanying text.
See infra notes 1065-1068 and accompanying text.
835 Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments supra note 24, at 833-34; Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010).
833
834
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regulation, not only as an injury but also as an exemplar of women’s agency.
Considering how generations of Irish women withstood the burdens of shame
and rejection to travel abroad for abortions or take pills at home, those who
suffered can also be seen as defiant and active dissenters.
Third, the chapter argues Ireland's abortion law and policy doubly
suppressed women's agency by purposefully censoring women's rejection of
the state's gendered dictates. By casting women who had abortions as
criminals or exemplars of shame, Ireland's abortion regime did its best to push
women's defiance underground.
Part 1 of this chapter presents the theory case for recognizing abortion as
an issue of gender equality.
Part 2 details the main ways in which human rights law on abortion fails
to identify or challenge the gendered nature of abortion restrictions. This
analysis is informed by the longstanding "feminist international law
critiques."836 and a reinterpretation of the feminist challenge to international
law's public/private divide.837 Operating as a veil to keep women's
experiences of human rights abuse beyond legal intervention, the chapter
argues that the public/private divide manifests in abortion jurisprudence by
hiding gendered roots and harms of abortion restrictions.
Part 3 levels another feminist international law critique at abortion
jurisprudence: the law’s reproduction of harmful stereotypes of women as
inherently vulnerable and powerless. Analyzing the cases when the law does
recognize women’s experiences of abortion restrictions as human rights
violations, the critique suggests that this recognition is dependent upon
women fitting a mold of female powerlessness. 838
Part 4 concludes the chapter by sketching how nascent jurisprudential
developments indicate that human rights law is capable of scrutinizing
national regulations from an anti-stereotyping perspective and of reckoning
with subordinating harms of abortion restrictions.
A. Abortion law in Ireland from a feminist perspective
1. Purpose-based equality arguments for abortion rights
As with most issues of gender discrimination, equality arguments for
abortion rights are rejected by those committed to formalistic conceptions of
836 Of course, feminists, whether in scholarship or activism, are not uniform in perspective, and this analysis
privileges certain trends among feminist approaches.
837 See infra note _ and accompanying text.
838 See infra note _ and accompanying text. See also, Jayne Huckerby, Feminism and International Law in the Post—
9/11 Era, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 533 (2016) (demonstrating how women's political agency is denied in discourse
on counter-terrorism and human rights).
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equality. Their view contends that because men and women are not similarly
situated in matters of reproduction, anti-abortion laws do not treat men and
women different.839 By contrast, feminist approaches to equality undercut
attempts to justify discrimination against women on the basis of biological
difference.840A starting point for many feminists arguing for abortion rights
as necessary for women’s equality is the straightforward argument that
because women are the sole targets of abortion regulation to the exclusion of
men, anti-abortion laws amount to prima facie or de jure sex and gender-based
discrimination.841
Examining whether regulations have been shaped, at least in part, by
gender stereotypes is one of the tools that feminists have used to expose the
role of gender in abortion restrictions. Analyzing the history of American
abortion law and politics, feminist legal scholar Reva Siegel demonstrates that
abortion restrictions in the US are grounded in and foster gendered
stereotypes of women as mothers.842Siegel illustrates that in the nineteenth
century, calls to restrict abortion access were led by physicians, whose stated
goal was to regulate women – women’s bodies, women’s decisions and
women’s roles in society.843 The physicians argued that women were
corporeally bound for motherhood844 and should therefore be restricted from
accessing abortion. And when the physicians’ arguments converged with
prominent antifeminist discourses about women’s traditional familial roles,
anti-abortion discourse was endowed with overlapping accounts of women's
obligations as mothers—accounts that successfully supported anti-abortion
campaigns.845
Progressing into the 20th century, Siegal demonstrates how those antiabortion movements replaced their overt role-based claims about women’s
place in society with a discourse centered upon protecting the right to life of
the unborn.846 Notwithstanding the muting of the women-as-mothers dictate,
Siegel contends that abortion restrictive policies remain animated by the
stereotype.847 Even if anti-abortion regulation is driven in part by a desire to
See, e.g., Paula Abrams, The Tradition of Reproduction, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 453, 456 (1995).
See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 Yale L.J. 1281, 1308–24 (1991).
841 See, e.g., Rebecca J. Cook & Susannah Howard, Accommodating Women’s Differences Under the Women’s AntiDiscrimination Convention, 56 EMORY L.J. 1032 (2007) [hereinafter Cook, Accommodating Women’s Differences]; Simone
Cusack & Rebecca J. Cook, Combating Discrimination on Sex and Gender, in International Protection of Human Rights: A
Textbook 205, 214–15 (Catarina Krause & Martin Scheinin eds., 2009); Sheelagh McGuinnes and Heather
Widdows, Access to basic reproductive rights: global challenges in The Oxford Handbook of Reproductive Ethics (Leslie
Francis ed. 2017); Writing from the U.S. perspective, see, Cass Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special
Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29 - 44 (1992).
842 See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 20, and accompanying text.
843 Id. 301.
844 Id. 319-321.
845 Id. See also, LINDA GREENHOUSE & REVA B. SIEGEL, BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE
ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING (2010). See also JANET FARRELL BRODIE,
CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1994).
846 See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments, supra note 24; See also, Neil Siegel, supra note 24.
847 Id
839
840
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safeguard “the unborn,” she argues, the harms of forced motherhood—the
social, physical, emotional, and economic implications of bearing and rearing
a child—are so significant that the State could only force women to withstand
such injuries if it considers motherhood to be the natural order of things for
women848 using an instrument of public power to compel motherhood is not
merely about protecting fetal life, she says, but is also about gender scripting.
2. The gendered roots of Ireland's abortion restrictions
Siegel’s thesis resonates across the Atlantic. As described in Chapter 1 of
this dissertation, those who led the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign (PLAC)
in 1983 presented the 8th amendment as a necessary legal intervention to
block Irish Courts from changing recognizing a right to abortion in the Irish
Constitution.849 Because the Supreme Court in McGee850 had inferred a right
to contraception from a right to marital privacy (from Article 40.3.1 and
Article 41.1.1)851 PLAC asserted that the Court could potentially recognize a
right to abortion in the same source. They argued that a constitutional
guarantee for unborn life could prevent such judicial activism. However, the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence was clear that the Court did not consider it
possible to interpret the Irish Constitution as containing a right to abortion.
In fact, the Supreme Court was explicit in McGee that the right to
contraception did not extend to limiting family size by abortion.852
Moreover, the 1861 Offenses Against the Person Act made intentional
miscarriage a felony; abortion carried a life sentence of penal servitude and
anyone who assisted with an abortion was guilty of a misdemeanor. Both
constitutionally and legislatively, the "unborn" was safe.
The absence of a possibility that abortion could be legalized in Ireland
suggests that the proponents of the 8th amendment had additional motives
beyond legal protection for the "unborn." A number of scholars assert that
the 8th amendment was part of an ongoing nation-building project that the
State had pursued since its formation in the 1920s.853 Having gained
independence from the British Empire in 1922 to become the 'Irish Free
State, Ireland sought to distinguish itself from its former colonizer.
Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 20, 371-380.
See, e.g., Chapter 1, supra note 50-51.
850 McGee, supra note 27.
851 [1974] IR 284; Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 40.3.1 ("The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far
as practicable, by its law to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen." Article 41.1.1 states, "The state
recognizes the family as the natural, primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution
possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law.").
852 See McGee, supra note 27, (Walsh J stated that “any action on the part of either the husband and wife or of the
State to limit family sizes by endangering or destroying human life must necessarily not only be an offence against
the common good but also against the guaranteed personal rights of the human life in question.”).
853 For this argument, see Ruth Fletcher, Post-Colonial Fragments: Representations of Abortion in Irish Law and Politics, 28
J.L. & SOC'Y 568 (2001); Lisa Smyth, Feminism and Abortion Politics, 25 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 335 (2002); LISA
SMYTH, ABORTION AND NATION (2005).
848
849
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Unfortunately for Irish women, the burdens of this identity-building fell to
them.854 While the 1922 Free State Constitution—the State's first
Constitution—guaranteed equal rights and equal opportunities to all its
citizens "without distinction of sex," within a couple of years of its founding,
Ireland's laws, policies, and practices entrenched the primacy of the
patriarchal family as the measure of the new State.855 Within a decade of its
founding, Ireland’s national policies included a ban on divorce,856 the
criminalization of the importation of contraceptives,857 and limits on the
ability of married women to participate in the public workforce.858 No law
was more glaring in its affirmation of women’s familial role than Article 41.2.2
of the 1937 Constitution. Expressly asserting that the "common good"
depends upon a woman's "life within the home," the State defined women's
capacity to contribute to the new nation to performance of the maternal
role.859
Evidence suggests that the enactment of the 8th amendment in 1983 was
a forceful attempt to maintain this status quo and protect it from a nascent
threat. In the late 1970s, the global movement for the emancipation of
women finally reached Irish shores. A small group of campaigners became
vocal on issues of gender inequality, demanding action on violence against
women, employment discrimination, discrimination against single mothers
and their children, and access to contraception.860 The campaign for the
latter received a significant boost from the 1974 Supreme Court decision in
McGee, which recognized a constitutional right to contraception for married
854 Notably, the demarcation of gender roles in nation-building is not specific to Irish nationalism; this practice is
common in postcolonial states. Scholars have demonstrated how observing differentiated gender roles enables
formerly oppressed male subjects to assert masculinity and right to power See ASHIS NANDY, THE INTIMATE
ENEMY: LOSS AND RECOVERY OF SELF UNDER COLONIALISM DELHI (1983).
855 See, e.g., Sandra McEvoy, The regulation of sexuality in the Irish Free State in MEDICINE, DISEASE AND THE STATE IN
IRELAND, 1650– 1940, (Eoin Malcolm eds. 1999) at 253–266.
Additionally, it is likely that the Catholic Church was aided in its assumption of a prominent national role due to
the limited capacities of the new State. Though less explored in scholarship relating to Ireland, the power vacuums
that are common to emerging (and fragile) States are often filled by non-State actors; from armed groups to
religious orders, non-state actors can gain significant political and social influence by providing services, finances,
and even employment. For an example of this in the Syrian context, see Yassin al-Haj Salih, The Syrian Shabiha and
Their State, 16 MIDDLE EAST ARTICLES, (2012), https://lb.boell.org/en/node/1355.
856 Divorce was constitutionally prohibited until 1995. It is now permitted, subject to strict requirements. See
Family Law Act 1995 (Act No. 26/1995), http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1995/en/act/pub/0026/.
857 See McGee, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
858 Women in state employment were required to quit their positions upon marriage, and the Minister for Industry
and Commerce had the power to limit the number of women employed in any industry. Conditions of
Employment Act 1935, § 16, (Act No. 2/1936),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1936/act/2/enacted/en/html. See also, Caitriona Beaumont, Women,
Citizenship and Catholicism in the Irish Free State, 1922-1948, 6 WOMEN’S HIST. REV. 563 (1997) [hereinafter,
Caitriona Beaumont, Women, Citizenship, and Catholicism] (describing how girls attending convent schools were
taught the importance of obedience, modesty, and chastity).
859 Article 41.2.1° states that: In particular, the State recognizes that by her life within the home, woman gives to
the State a support without which the common good cannot be achieved.
Article 41.2.2° sets out that: The State shall, therefore, endeavor to ensure that mothers shall not be obliged by
economic necessity to engage in labor to the neglect of their duties in the home.
860 See, e.g., Sandra McEvoy, The Catholic Church and Fertility Control in Ireland, supra note 67.
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couples861 and from subsequent legislative reform that enabled married
couples to request contraceptives on prescription.862 It was a modest
increment in facilitating access to contraception that was nevertheless met
with significant concern amongst conservative factions of Irish society.
As the Government legislated to implement McGee and legalize
contraception for married couples in 1979, politicians suggested this move
would force a deluge of social reforms on the country, including on abortion.
"As soon as we have contraception, there will be abortion, divorce,
euthanasia, and all the evils of venereal disease," argued Fianna Fáil's Michael
F. Kitt.863 Another deputy, Oliver J. Flanagan, alleged that some
contraceptives were actually abortifacients in their method of operation and,
in the same breath, suggested that Irish society now suffered from a lack of
respect for authority for the State, parents, and church.864 Outside the Dáil,
conservative Catholic groups echoed Kitt and Flanagan's concern about the
loosening grips on Irish traditional society. Catholic Family Life attested that
"abortion cannot be divorced from contraception," while members of Parent
Concern a later picketed the Well Woman Centre on Dublin's Lower Leeson
Street with posters that read "Parents! Contraception means promiscuity and
abortion!"865 In a sign of things to come, the Irish Family League later
distributed a leaflet advocating an amendment that would enshrine a ban on
abortion in the Constitution.866
The following year, the PLAC formed and argued that the existing
legislative criminalization of abortion was not enough of a guarantee against
legal abortion in Ireland. The only way to Ireland against abortion, they
claimed, was via a “pro-life” constitutional amendment that would require
the State to protect the unborn.867 It also provided an opportunity to strike
back against and quash the burgeoning advocacy and action on women's
liberation. Using an anti-abortion amendment to the Constitution as their
vehicle, the PLAC succeeded in reasserting women’s role as mothers in the
State’s basic law for a second time.868 Indeed, those who were involved in
moving the referendum forward were so successful in strengthening the
notion of women as mothers that the word “mother” is used in place of
“woman” in the language of the amendment:

See McGee, supra note 27.
Health (Family Planning) Act 1979, (Act No. 20/1979).
863 274 Dáil Deb. (July 11, 1974), Control of Importation, Sale, and Manufacture of Contraceptives Bill, 1974: Second Stage
https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1974-07-11/3/.
864 Id.
865 See, e.g., EMILY O'REILLY, MASTERMINDS OF THE RIGHT.
866 Id.
867 See, e.g., Siobhán Mulally, The abortion debate: re-partitioning the State in GENDER, CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
RECLAIMING UNIVERSALISM, at 142.
868 See, e.g., Paula Hanafin, Defying the Female: The Irish Constitutional Text as Phallocentric Manifesto 11 TEXTUAL
PRACTICE 249 (1997).
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The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate
that right.
Additionally, evidence from the referendum debates suggest the desire to
protect “the unborn” was inconsistent. During the campaign in 1983, antiamendment activists contested the purported interest of anti-abortion activists
in protecting unborn life.869 To be consistently "pro-life," they argued, the
Pro-Life Amendment Campaign would also campaign to end legal
discrimination against children born outside of marriage, who at the time
were considered 'illegitimate' under Irish law and had no legal status.870 In
stark contrast, John O'Reilly, the man who first conceived of PLAC's "prolife" amendment, argued that the amendment was necessary to tackle what
he deemed to be "anti-life practices," including contraception and, notably,
the rising number of children conceived out of marriage.871 The birth of
children to unmarried women could undoubtedly be considered as
contravening for the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign, the desire to protect
unborn life extended only to unborn life that would within exist within the
patriarchal family; the beacon of Ireland's identity upon which women's
conformity depended.
Analysis of abortion law and politics after 1983 illustrates that the State’s
approach to abortion remained animated by gender stereotypes. The X-case
and the subsequent 1992 referendum established two abortion-related rights
for Irish women: the right to obtain an abortion where there was real and
substantial risk to a woman’s life and the travel for an abortion. Some
commentators considered such legal developments to be significant progress
for Irish women because the State was acknowledging the potential need for

Women’s Right to Choose Campaign (WRCC), 1982 as quoted in Sandra McEvoy, supra note xx.
e.g., Illegitimate Children (Affiliation Orders) Act, 1930 (Pub. Stat. No. 17/1930),
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1930/en/act/pub/0017/index.html; Additionally, historical research and human
rights reports establish that the State’s policy on “illegitimacy” involved the incarceration of thousands of infants
and children in Mother and Baby Homes and other institutions; illegal adoption, including the ‘sale’ of children,
and high infant mortality rates; See also, UN DOC A/HRC/40/51(2018) Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the
Sale and Sexual Exploitation of Children on her Country Visit to Ireland,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Children/Pages/CountryVisits.aspx.
871 See, e.g., Fintan O’ Toole, Why Ireland Became the Only Country in the World to Have a Constitutional Ban on Abortion, IR.
TIMES (August 26, 2014) http://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/why-ireland-became-the-only-country-in-thedemocratic-world-to-have-a-constitutional-ban-on-abortion-1.1907610 (“For O’Reilly “pro-life” was the opposite
of “anti-life”, a term which incorporated the availability of contraception and (weirdly) the rising number of babies
born out of wedlock”). Recently released evidence also points to extremely high mortality rates among 'illegitimate
children who were raised in so-called 'Mother and Baby Homes.' A Commission of Investigation of Mother and
Baby' homes was established in 2015 following allegations about the deaths of 800 babies and the manner in
which they were buried in one of the homes. See S.I. No. 57/2015—Commission of investigation (mother and baby homes
and certain related matters) Order 2015.
869

870See,
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abortion872 In reality, however, the State was acting in accordance with the
same gendered ideology that had dominated in 1983. The right generated by
X allowed women to end their pregnancies if they could prove that there was
a substantial risk to their lives. But the dying woman did not challenge the
norm of motherhood; her abortion was "life-saving treatment."873 and she
would not want a “termination” if it were not for her tragic circumstances.
The travel amendment provided an option for women to end their
pregnancies but required women to leave the jurisdiction to do so. Thus,
women who resisted their prescribed role as mothers were sent away, leaving
the nation’s patriarchal gender order intact.
Similarly, analysis of anti-abortion discourse surrounding the passage of
the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013 (PLDPA) reveals the
harmful gender stereotypes driving anti-abortion advocates. As described in
Chapter 1, the PLDPA 2013 was the first piece of legislation to give effect to
a woman’s right to therapeutic abortion. The Act provided a statutory
framework based on the 8th amendment and the X-case (legality of abortion
if the woman’s life was at risk) as required by the European Court of Human
Right’s judgment in A, B & C,874 and was spurred into urgency following the
death of Savita Halapanavar. Notwithstanding that the Act did not liberalize
Irish abortion law in any way, an intense and highly polarized debate
accompanied the parliamentary process. Taking issue with the proposed
decriminalization of abortion in circumstances where a woman's life was at
risk owing to suicide, anti-abortion advocates mobilized around two claims.
Firstly, as in recent decades in the U.S., Irish anti-abortion campaigners
characterized their attempts to restrict abortion as a way of 'protecting
women from abortion.875 Expressing alleged concern for women, they argued
that abortion fuels depression, anxiety, and suicidal thoughts among women
because women regret their decisions to end their pregnancy. Asserting that
"there is nothing so devastating as guilt to the depressed mind," Lucinda
Creighton, then a Government minister, claimed that abortion "may push[es]
someone to contemplate suicide."876 Deputy Billy Timmons echoed
Creighton’s claim, arguing that rather than protecting the right to life of the
woman, by enabling abortion access, the bill would “potentially put women's
872 See, e.g., Laury Oaks, Abortion is Part of the Irish Experience, It Is Part of What We Are, 25 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F.
315 (2002).
873 Catholic teaching differentiates between abortion and medical treatments, which do not directly and
intentionally seek to end the life of the "unborn baby." See Statement by the Four Archbishops of Ireland in Response to the
Decision Today by the Government to Legislate for Abortion http://www.catholicbishops.ie/2012/12/18/statementarchbishopsireland-response-decision-today-government-legislate-abortion.
874 Id.
875 See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion
Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008).
876 See, 805 No. 1, Dáil Deb., Deputy Lucinda Creighton (July 1,
2013),http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail2013070100
011?opendocument.
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lives at risk.”877 Invoking Norma McCorvey, the applicant in Roe v. Wade who
went on to join anti-abortion campaigns many years afterwards, other TDs
alleged that it was axiomatic that a woman would regret ending their
pregnancy.
Outside the Dáil Chambers, anti-abortion activists embraced the
argument that abortion, rather than the coercive continuation of an
unwanted pregnancy, posed a risk to women’s lives. The Pro-Life Campaign
parked a van less than 10 minutes away from the Dáil (and directly outside
the doors of the Dublin Rape Crisis Centre) with a sign reading “[t]he
abortion bill won’t make women safer.” Women Hurt – an anti-abortion
group modelled upon U.S. based Catholic group ‘Rachel's Vineyard’ for
women who believe they had been harmed by abortion — lobbied politicians
and held vigils. Spreading the message that their members had experienced
deep guilt and regret after terminating their pregnancies in England, they too
took advantage of the space, albeit narrow, that had opened for women’s
voices in the abortion debate.878
The narrative that women who terminate pregnancies experience regret
from which they must be protected was likely an import from across the
Atlantic; in the U.S., the notion that women suffer "post-abortion syndrome"
akin to depression and PTSD has been in play since the mid-1990s. And
though there is no evidence that abortion leads to mental illness.879, the idea
that abortion hurts women has gained significant legal salience. In 2007,
Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing the majority opinion
Gonzales v. Carhart , upheld a federal ban on physicians from performing intact
dilation and extraction of fetuses - an abortion procedure performed later in
pregnancy - on the grounds that if a women was enabled to choose this
procedure, it was likely that her mental health would later suffer owing to the
guilt she would feel at having had such an abortion.880 Agreeing with a friend
of the court brief that relied on statements from women who claimed to regret
their abortions rather than any medical evidence of mental harm associated
with having an abortion,881 the Justice concluded that “it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to

877See, e.g., 808 No. 3, Dáil Deb., Deputy Billy Timmons (June 27, 2013),
https://www.oireachtas.ie/ga/debates/debate/dail/2013-06-27/7/.
878 Stand For Life Vigil - Dungarvan - Bernadette Goulding (March 5, 2013)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X2AxQsJK-Gw&ab_channel=JasonBrower.
879 A review of global scientific evidence by the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges in the UK found that “the
rates of mental health problems for women with an unwanted pregnancy were the same whether they had an
abortion or gave birth.” Academy of Medical Royal Colleges, Induced Abortion Mental Health (2012)
https://www.aomrc.org.uk/reports-guidance/induced-abortion-mental-health-1211/.
880 Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S.Ct. 1610 (2007).
881 Brief of Sandra Cano at 22-24, Gonzales v. Carhart 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (the Former “Mary Doe” of Doe v.
Bolton, and 180 Women Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner.).
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abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and
loss of esteem can follow.”882
In addition to imposing a ban on dilation and extraction, the narrative
that women considering abortion need protection from their own decisions
underpins a number of legislative restrictions in the U.S. and beyond;
compulsory waiting periods, third-party authorization, and compulsory
ultrasounds all curtail women's autonomy under the guise of protecting
women. As Reva Siegel and other feminist legal scholars have explained, such
contentions about women's health and women's choices rely upon claims
about women's nature — women are destined to be mothers and will be
harmed if they don't fulfill their natural role.883 The reasoning holds that law
must restrict abortion because if a woman decides to terminate a pregnancy,
she will suffer at having rejected her natural duty to care for her offspring.
Pathologizing women's decisions to get abortions as "misled, coerced or
abnormal"884 anti-abortion campaigners contend that it is in a woman’s own
interest that the law reject her decision.
For the anti-abortion legislators who argued against the Protection of Life
During Pregnancy Bill in Ireland, rather than resounding the Irish
legislature’s legacy of misogyny on issues affecting women, the womanprotective arguments enabled politicians to justify their anti-choice positions
as born from legitimate concern for women, vulnerable women in particular.
Deputy Michael Healy Rae proclaimed that many of the women who came
to him to discuss their isolation, low self-esteem, and nightmares postabortion had "not been warned about the mental effect of an abortion."885 In
the main national broadsheet, a high-profile psychiatrist queried how law
could recognize the capacity of a "mother" to consent to an abortion given
that such a woman would be "emotionally overwhelmed to the extent that
her judgment is impaired."886
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1634.
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J.
1694, 1696 (2008); Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective
Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008) [hereinafter, Reva Siegel, The Right’s Reasons]; Chris Guthrie,
Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret, 81 CAL. L. REV. 877, 882 (2008). Historian Karissa
Haugeberg has shown how the argument that abortion hurts women date to the 1960s and the early years of the
abortion reform movement. This line of advocacy, however, existed primarily amongst workers in crisis pregnancy
centers set up by Catholic women to persuade women in their communities not to end their pregnancies. The
argument gained prominence following the supreme court decision to uphold the right to abortion in Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The wider anti-abortion movement adjusted their advocacy
accordingly to argue that what women really needed was to be protected from abortion, KARISSA HAUGEBERG,
WOMEN AGAINST ABORTION: INSIDE THE LARGEST MORAL REFORM MOVEMENT OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (WOMEN, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY IN AMERICAN HISTORY) (2017).
884 Reva Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, id., at 1687.
885 See, e.g., 808 No. 2 Dáil Deb., Deputy Michael Healy Rae, Parliamentary Debates, (June 26, 2013)
http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail2013062600009?op
endocument#G01900.
886 Enda Hayden, Threat of suicide cannot be basis for abortion law, IRISH TIMES (May 6, 2013)
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/health/threat-of-suicide-cannot-be-basis-for-abortion-law-1.1318249.
882
883
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The second argument against the PLDPA warned that the legislation
would “open the floodgates” to “abortion on demand.”887 In contrast to the
depiction of the vulnerable woman needed to be rescued, the abortionseeking woman was now perceived as deviant and deceitful. The Act's
opponents claimed that having a suicidality exception to the abortion ban was
a slippery slope because abortion-seeking women could lie about being
suicidal and manipulate health practitioners into approving their abortion. In
the Dáil, Deputy Denis Naughton asserted that “if a woman states that she is
suicidal, a doctor has no option but to believe her. There is no way to disprove
the claim.”888 In other words, if abortion was legalized in cases of risk to life
owing to suicide, the law would leave doctors in a situation where they would
have to trust women, and even worse, abortion-seeking women. To avoid this
scenario, anti-abortion advocates argued, the law must exclude suicidality
from the legitimate grounds for abortion in the first place.
Though the anti-abortion campaigners failed in their efforts to prevent
the PLDPA from passing, the narratives about the dishonesty and
irrationality of abortion-seeking women pervaded the legislation, particularly
the procedural process to access abortion in situations of suicidality. In such
cases, the law created an obstacle course whereby a woman was required to
demonstrate to three medical practitioners that there was a 'real and
substantial risk' to her life.889 If she failed to obtain a joint certification from
all three medical practitioners, the decision had to be reviewed by a further
three practitioners.890 Suggesting that without being certified by at least three
medical practitioners, a woman would lie about having suicidal thoughts, the
law depicted and treated abortion-seeking women as unworthy of trust.
3. Effects-based equality arguments for abortion rights
In addition to the feminist technique of examining whether abortion
restrictions are grounded in stereotypical notions of women, to support the
theory that abortion restrictions amount to gender-based discrimination,
887 808 No. 2 Dáil Deb.,Joe McHugh TD, (June 26, 2013),
http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail2013062600046#T
T00200 (“the precedent in California, in France and in the United Kingdom is alarming. The figures are
alarming. People are genuinely concerned that if this legislation is introduced, the floodgates will open."); See also,
Fiona de Londras & Laura Graham, Impossible Floodgates and Unworkable Analogies in the Irish Abortion Debate, 3 IRISH J.
LEGAL STUD. 54, 61-62 (2013); Clare Murray, The Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013: Suicide, Dignity and the
Irish Discourse on Abortion, 25(6) SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 677 (2016).
888 See, e.g., 808 No. 3 Dáil Deb., Deputy Denis Naughten, (June 27, 2013),
https://www.oireachtas.ie/ga/debates/debate/dail/2013-06-27/7/.
889 PLDPA, (Act No. 35/2013) at § 9 (1)(a)(ii). See also Veronica O' Keane, Ireland’s Abortion Law Turns Healthcare into
Obstacle Course, AMNESTY IRELAND https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/01/irelands-abortionlawturns- healthcare-into-obstacle-course/.
890 PLDPA, (Act No. 35/2013) § 10. Notably, in the first year of the act, medical teams sanctioned just three
abortions owing to risk of suicide; See GOV’T OF IR., REP. ON THE PROTECTION OF LIFE DURING PREGNANCY
(2014), http://health.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/annual-report-2014-Protection-of-Life-DuringPregnancy1.pdf.
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feminists scrutinize the effects of abortion restrictions on women. Asserting
that no aspect of male-only healthcare is restricted by law is one basis on
which feminist scholars, particularly those writing from an international law
perspective, impugn abortion restrictions as discriminatory.891 Another
iteration of this differential treatment argument is that law does not require
men to sacrifice their bodily autonomy for "the use and control by others,"
whereas abortion bans can compel women to continue unwanted pregnancies
and give birth.892
Other argues that denying a woman's right to choose is an equality issue
because laws that reject women's autonomy impair women as a class. Though
advocating for autonomy presupposes the protection of individual decisions,
893 the social consequences of invalidating women’s reproductive decisionmaking are significant.894 Communicating that women are not valued as
moral agents in the State, anti-abortion laws devalue women, as a group, in
society.
Often, this latter critique of the limits anti-abortion laws place on women's
autonomy is translated as an issue of privacy rather than equality. This is due,
in large part, to the fact that in Roe, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
constitutional right of privacy was “broad enough to encompass a woman’s
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”895 However, Roe also
prompted a greater understanding of abortion as an equality issue – albeit
outside the Court. Because the Court in Roe essentially shared a woman’s
abortion decision with the abortion provider,896 feminists rallied to retake the
891 Rebecca Cook, Accommodating Women’s Differences, supra note x at 1039. This was one of the principal equality
arguments used by the Irish abortion rights movement; access to sexual and reproductive healthcare for men
incurred no criminal punishment as compared to abortion access for women; See, FIONA DE LONDRAS &
MAIREAD ENRIGHT, REPEALING THE 8th (2018); Trade Union Campaign to Repeal the 8th Amendment, Model
Trade Union Motion, https://uniteyouthdublin.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/tu4repeal-leaflet.pdf; 784 No. 2,
Dáil Deb., Alan Shatter (November 27, 2012),
http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/Debates%20Authoring/WebAttachments.nsf/($vLookupByConstructedK
ey)/dail~20121127/$File/Daily%20Book%20Unrevised.pdfopenelement (arguing that there is no impediment to
men seeking and obtaining any required medical intervention to protect not only their lives but also their health
and quality of life).
892 See, e.g., Judith Jarvis Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, supra note 19; EILEEN L. MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE
ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO CONSENT (1996); Arunima Sarkar, Articulating Various Facets of Female
Reproductive Laws: Issues and Challenges, 2 INDIAN J. OF LEGAL PHIL. 168, 174 (2014) (describing abortion rights as
freedom from the “servitude” of bearing an unwanted child).
893 Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988) (explaining how liberal legal theory's focus
on individualism and autonomy reflects a male perspective); See also Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1016-28 (1984); See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §
15-10, at 1353 (1988).
894 See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States: Politics and Policy, 18 INT'L J. L. POLY & FAM.
305, 313 (2004); Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 409, 417–18 (2009) [hereinafter Sanger, Decisional Dignity] Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work
and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L. REV. 567, 613-14 (2010).
895 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 125, 153 (1973).
896 See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 995, 1020 (1984) (arguing that Roe
gives doctors undue power over abortion decisions); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1185, 1199-200 (1992) (“The idea of the woman in control of her destiny and her place in society was less
prominent in the Roe decision itself, which coupled with the rights of the pregnant woman the free exercise of her
physician’s medical judgment).
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“right to choose” for women.897 Recognizing that decisions about abortion
can implicate a broad range of decisions that are critical to a woman's
freedom—decisions about education, career, family, relationships, and health
— feminists, scholars, and judges asserted that respecting a woman's decision
about whether to bear a child is fundamental to women's socio-political
equality.898 Now embedded within larger feminist campaigns, protection for
women’s decisional autonomy in the abortion context was championed as a
matter of gender equality.899
Articulating the toll that motherhood takes on women’s right to
participate and flourish in the marketplace and public sphere is another way
that feminists have uncovered the subordinating harms of abortion denial.900
Though women's participation in the workplace has risen dramatically in the
past 50 years, long-standing gender stereotypes related to family and work
result in women assuming the bulk of child-care and domestic responsibilities.
Such responsibilities create time deficits for women that can inhibit their
participation and progress in the paid labor force, education, and politics. In
the U.S., for example, more than half of women who are prime age for work
(25- to 54-year-olds) who are outside the labor force list caregiving as their
reason for nonparticipation.901 And the trend extends worldwide; women and
girls commit substantially more time than men to unpaid care work, which
undermines the possibility of economic, political, and social equality between
the genders and entrenches women's disproportionate vulnerability to
poverty across their lifetime.902 Diana Foster Green's landmark 'Turnaway
897 For an analysis of the “right to choose” slogan in the American women’s movement, see ROSALIND POLLACK
PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN’S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUALITY, AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
(1990) [hereinafter, Petchesky, Abortion and Woman's Choice]; For early scholarship that articulated decision making
autonomy as an aspect of equality, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1308 (1991); Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body, supra note 20.
898 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (legal challenges to undue
restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center
on a woman's autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature."). Feminist
scholars may also have been motivated to counter the narrative that the 'right to choose' was a right for selfish
mothers to pursue their own self-interest as contended by some, including anti-abortion activities. For example,
prominent feminist scholars Joan Williams, Ruth Colker, and Majorie Schultz critiqued the right to autonomy as a
basis for women's abortion rights for being excessively individualistic and engendering rhetoric about selfish
mothers and unnurtured children. See Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1559, 1584 (1991); Joan Williams, Mothers’ Dreams: Abortion and the High Price of Motherhood, U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 818 (2004); Robin West, Forward: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43, 79 - 85 (1990); Ruth Colker,
Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011 (1989); Majorie Schultz
(arguing that autonomy rhetoric and exclusively “women-regarding positions” undermine pro-choice arguments
because it presents abortion decisions as about a woman’s self-interest alone).
899 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (legal challenges to undue
restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center
on a woman's autonomy to determine her life's course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.").
900 Id.
901 See, e.g., Audrey Breitwieser, et al, The recent rebound in prime-age labor force participation, BROOKINGS (August 2,
2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/08/02/the-recent-rebound-in-prime-age-labor-forceparticipation/.
902 See, e.g., DEBBIE BUDLENDER, TIME USE STUDIES AND UNPAID CARE WORK ( 2010 ); Claire C. Miller, Children
Hurt Women’s Earnings, but Not Men’s, N.Y. TIMES (February 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/upshot/even-in-family-friendly-scandinavia-mothers-are-paid-less.html;
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study' on the outcomes of women who received the abortions they sought and
those who were compelled to carry their unwanted pregnancy to term,
provides recent empirical evidence of the economic costs incurred by women
when their reproductive autonomy is rejected; Foster Green's study finds that
women who were 'turned away' and denied abortion have higher odds of
poverty six months after denial than women who received abortions.
Additionally, women who are denied abortions are more likely to be in
poverty for four years subsequent to being denied an abortion.903
Escalating this critique, feminists demonstrate how such harms
disempower women as a class: by foreclosing opportunities for women to gain
power in social, political, and economic life, abortion restrictions limit the
ability of women, in the aggregate, to compete with men for power.904 In turn,
the practice of gender — the construction of social differences, namely power
inequalities, between men and women—is reproduced.905 Moreover, as
intersectionality theory recognizes that gender is only one potential axis of
discrimination and that discrimination against women is often combined with
and compounded by oppression based on race, class, sexuality, and
ethnicity.906 For women who are marginalized in society— women with
minority racial, ethnic, or religious identities, women with low incomes,
migrant women—the gendered impacts of abortion denial are compounded
by economic, racial, religious, caste, citizenship status, and other social
inequities.907 As the founders of the reproductive justice movement have laid
bare, for women of color, control over their lives and bodies is challenged not
only by gender but by systemic poverty and racism.908 Human rights
advocates document the racial and socioeconomic disparities that plague
access to reproductive rights, even where abortion and other reproductive
health services are legal.909 As such, the denial of abortion rights can entrench
See also, Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Group on Discrimination against Women in Law and Practice,
HRC/A/68/293, https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N13/422/71/PDF/N1342271.pdf?OpenElement.
903 DIANA FOSTER GREEN, THE TURNAWAY STUDY: TEN YEARS, A THOUSAND WOMEN, AND THE
CONSEQUENCES OF HAVING—OR BEING DENIED—AN ABORTION (2019).
904 See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Equality and Choice: Sex Equality Perspectives on Reproductive Rights in the Work of Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, 25 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 63 (2013); Reva Siegel, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE
NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 103 (Jack. M. Balkin
ed., 2005).
905See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 184 (1989) (“In women’s
experience, sexuality and reproduction are inseparable from each other and from gender.”).
906 See generally, Kimberly Crenshaw et al, Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications, and Praxis (2013)
38 SIGNS 785.
907 For the compounded harms on native women in the USA, see Alan J. Shelfer, Indigent Women and Abortion:
Limitation of the Right of Privacy in Maher v. Roe 13 (2) TULSA L. J. 287 (1977). A discussion of the heightened barriers
that women endure in accessing reproductive freedom can be found in DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE
BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997).
908 Loretta J. Ross et al., Just Choices: Women of Color, Reproductive Health, and Human Rights, in POLICING THE
NATIONAL BODY: SEX, RACE, AND CRIMINALIZATION 147 (Jael Silliman & Anannya Bhattacharjee eds., 2002);
Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1411 (2009).
909 See, e.g., Centre for Reproductive Rights & National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health, Nuestra Voz,
Nuestra Salud, Nuestro Texas: The Fight for Women’s Reproductive Health in the Rio Grande Valley (2013)

154

social and economic inequalities for marginalized women in addition to
inscribing power inequalities based on gender.
4. The gendered harms of Ireland’s abortion law
The impacts of Ireland’s legal abortion ban fueled gender subordination,
albeit through different means than those just described. The majority of Irish
abortion-seeking women went to the United Kingdom and other European
countries to end unwanted pregnancies, and in the decade before the ban was
overturned, a substantial number of women ended pregnancies with abortion
medications at home.910 These women did not suffer the inequalities of forced
motherhood censured by feminist legal scholars and pro-choice advocates.
The law had a different vice: when women asserted moral authority over their
lives and choose abortion, they were either exiled from the State or
criminalized. For rejecting the State's normative ideas about gender, women
were punished through expulsion, rejection, and significant burdens of
stigma.
At the outset, it should be acknowledged that a significant number of Irish
women were, in fact, subjected to harms of forced pregnancy and childrearing
by the 8th amendment; abortion travel is beset by social inequality. For
unemployed women or women earning low wages, the freedom to travel was
often illusory. Traveling to England for an abortion cost between €2,000 and
€3,500 on average.911 Some women were forced to obtain loans from illegal
money lenders to fund their abortions; others reported temporarily entering
prostitution to raise the necessary finances.912 Additionally, for asylumseeking women, the constitutional freedom to travel did not apply. To leave
the country, asylum seekers must apply to the Irish Department of Justice for
a temporary travel document and a re-entry visa to return to Ireland, a
process that is complicated, costly, and sometimes arbitrary. And as in all
jurisdictions that restrict abortion, the subordinating harms of forced
pregnancy and motherhood in Ireland were compounded by discrimination
based on class and ethnicity.913
Nonetheless, every year, at least 4,000 Irish women crossed borders to
exercise their right to choose, and another approx.1,000 women ordered
http://nuestrotexas.org/pdf/NT-spread.pdf. (campaign to highlight the discriminatory policies that impede
immigrant women’s access to reproductive health care); Brief for National Latina Institute for Reproductive
Health et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016) (No. 15274.)
910 See, e.g., Chapter 1.
911 Christine Zampas, She is Not a Criminal, supra note 11.
912 As reported in Citizens’ Assembly, First report and recommendations of the Citizens’ Assembly: The Eighth Amendment of the
Constitution https://ptfsoireachtas.s3.amazonaws.com/DriveH/AWData/Library3/CAdoclaid290617A_110031.pdf .
913 See, e.g., Abortion Rights Campaign, Submission to the Citizens Assembly (2017) www.abortionrightscampaign.ie.
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abortion pills to take illegally at home.914 These women escaped coerced birth
and parenting. But as subjects who challenged the dominant gender order,
they were punished.
Feminist human rights law scholars and practitioners have explored how
the criminalization of abortion.915 and other restrictions on access916 generate
intense stigma about abortion-seeking women and abortion itself. By
presenting abortion as wrong and deserving of severe punishment, abortion
and abortion-seeking women are stigmatized as immoral and deviant by antiabortion laws. The impacts include imposing burdens of shame, secrecy, and
exclusion.917 As an “attribute that is deeply discrediting,” stigma is capable of
spoiling or tainting one’s identity and discounting them in society.918 Marked
as “others,” those who are stigmatized may become subject to boundaries or
barriers to the communities to which they would otherwise belong.919
Moreover, from a policy perspective, the stigmatization cycle is reinforcing;
when stigma perpetuates the notion that abortion is an immoral practice, this
can reinforce the continued criminalization or restriction of the practice.920
In the Irish context, the burdens of abortion stigma on abortion seekingwomen manifested in two main ways. Firstly, many women felt compelled to
conceal their abortions.921 Even though women who traveled had done
nothing illegal, women reported feeling "like criminals" over the course of
their journey and upon return, such that they hid their experiences.922 Not
only did very few women publicly discuss their abortion journeys—few
disclosed their abortion histories to anyone beyond a select band of
confidantes; in 2012, Ireland’s Crisis Pregnancy Program reported that
“approximately 1 in 4 women experiencing a crisis pregnancy that ended in

914 Evidence indicates that a significant number of women and girls, who may not have been able to travel,
illegally took the abortion pill in Ireland in a clandestine manner in Ireland. See Aiken, Online Telemedicine, supra
note 6.
915 See, e.g., Rebecca J. Cook, Stigmatized Meanings of Criminal Abortion Law in ABORTION LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE: CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 346 (Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna N. Erdman, & Bernard M. Dickens
eds., 2014).
916 Anu Kumar & Leila Hessini, Conceptualizing Abortion Stigma 11(6) CULTURE, HEALTH & SEXUALITY 625 (2009);
Anne Norris, et al. Abortion stigma: a reconceptualization of constituents, causes, and consequences 21(3) WOMEN’S HEALTH
ISSUES 49, 54 (2011).
917 Id.
918 See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 3 (1963).
919 Brian Link et al. Conceptualizing Stigma 27 ANNU REV SOCIAL. 63, 65 (2001).
920 See, e.g., Anand Grover (Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Right of Everyone to the
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health), Interim Rep. 11 ¶ 35 (2011),
transmitted by Note of the Secretary-General, U.N. DOC. A/66/254 (August 3, 2011) (http://www.acpd.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/SR-Right-to-Health-Criminalization-of-SRHR-2011.pdf. (The stigma caused by
restrictive abortion laws induces a ‘chilling’ climate of fear and shame that impacts on both those who seek
abortions services and those who carry out the procedure.); Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 410 (2013) (commenting on the role of abortion disgust in lawmaking on abortion in
the USA).
921See, e.g., Zampus, She is Not a Criminal, supra note 11 at 86; Irish Family Planning Association, Briefing on Abortion
Stigma 2014, https://www.ifpa.ie/sites/default/files/abortion_stigma_pack_jan_2014_final.pdf.
922 Id.
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abortion did not tell their sexual partner.”923 For those who traveled, upon
return to Ireland, many women lied to medical practitioners back in Ireland
about their abortion histories for fear of the censure such a revelation might
provoke. Women reported feeling isolated from their usual communities of
support:
You don't talk about it. You can't even tell your amazing
mother or your amazing family. This landscape of silence and
stigma has distanced me from my family, and I am not ok with
that.924
[I]t's an awful feeling, knowing that the only help you can
receive is across an ocean. How alone do you think I felt? The
pain and humiliation is something I still carry with me.925
In the second instance, it is submitted that the law operated to produce a class
of devalued persons. By being forced to travel for abortions or have an
abortion at home in fear of criminalization, the State rejected women for
acting as moral agents. In addition to the acute burdens of indignity and
stigma experienced by individual women, such devaluation of women’s
autonomy impaired the status of women in the country.926 Socially, abortionseeking women were branded as outsiders. Though different in many
important ways, parallels can also be drawn between the law’s banishing of
abortion-seeking women and the State’s treatment of unmarried mothers in
the 20th century. From 1922 to 1996, over 10,000 women and girls—
predominantly unmarried mothers, the daughters of unmarried mothers, and
pregnant, unmarried women—were sent by their families, the Church, and
the State to institutions known as Magdalene Laundries or Mother and Baby
Homes.927 In Magdalene Laundries, women were segregated from society,
923 Crisis Pregnancy Programme, Report No. 24, Irish Contraception and Crisis Pregnancy Study (2012) 105. For more on
the stigmatizing impact of criminal abortion laws, see Paula Abrams, Abortion Stigma: The Legacy of Casey, 35
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 299, 319 (2014); A Hessani Kumar, Conceptualising Abortion Stigma Culture, 11 (6) HEALTH &
SEXUALITY 625 (2009); Maeve Taylor, Abortion Stigma: a health service provider’s perspective, in THE ABORTION PAPERS
IRELAND 217, (Aideen Quility ed., 2016); Kristen M. Shellenberg, Social Stigma and Disclosure about Induced Abortion:
Results from an Exploratory Study, 6 (1) GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH (2011); Eileen V. Fegan. 'Subjects ' of
Regulation/Resistance? Postmodern Feminism and Agency in Abortion- Decision-Making, 7 FEM. L. STUD. 241; Joanna
Erdman, The law of stigma, travel, and the abortion-free island 33 (1) COL. J. GENDER & L. 29 (2016).
924 Susan Cahill, My abortion was not remotely traumatic ... I have no regrets, IRISH TIMES (February 21, 2016)
https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/people/susan-cahill-my-abortion-was-not-remotely-traumatic-i-haveno-regrets-1.2542740.
925 Submissions to the Citizen’s assembly, https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/Submissions/Eighth-Amendmentof-the-Constitution/.
926See, e.g., Eithne Luibhéid, Sexual Regimes, and Migration Controls: Reproducing the Irish Nation-State in Transnational
Contexts, 83 FEMINIST REV. 60 (2006).
927See, e.g., GOV’T OF IR., INTER-DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE TO ESTABLISH THE FACTS OF STATE
INVOLVEMENT WITH THE MAGDALENE LAUNDRIES (2013),
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deprived of their liberty, and forced to work without pay.928 In Mother-andBaby Homes, women who had become pregnant out of wedlock were hidden
from the public before they gave birth, after which their babies were adopted
- often illegally.929 Though run by religious orders, these institutions were
supported financially by the State.930 The State had an interest in hiding the
women whose alleged sexual immorality transgressed the country’s
patriarchal order; sexual activity out of wedlock—and the illegitimate child
as evidence of such—contravened the primary role of women of marriage
and motherhood.931 And while being forced to travel for an abortion is very
different to incarceration in state institutions, in both cases, women who
deviated from gendered expectations were forced out of sight.
On the other hand, what is often overlooked in accounts of women’s
experiences of inequality, including in the abortion context, is that women
exercise resistance in significant ways. As well as being victimized, women
actively dissent. Women who were denied abortions by Ireland’s laws were
injured, but many took action to determine their own lives. Under the weight
of a legal regime that sought to control them, and in the face of significant
burdens of stigma, Irish women developed radical practices of resistance.
Secretly and subversively, Irish women overcame the burdens of travel and
criminalization in their thousands every single year. Or they self-sourced and
self-administered their own abortions at home and helped other women to do
the same.932 Women shared information and resources, used networks of
friends, diaspora, and strangers,933 to both travel abroad and to obtain
medication abortion at home.934 And even before travel and telemedicine
were the dominant means for Irish women to have abortions, evidence
suggests that significant numbers of Irish women took pills, potions, or
purgatives to induce miscarriage and control their fertility.935 Women took
risks to fulfill their reproductive decisions, and most women felt high levels of
conviction in the choice they made and the action they took.
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/MagdalenRpt2013 [hereinafter Magdalenes Report] (confirming that
more than a quarter of the women held in the laundries were sent directly by the State).
928 Id.
929 See, e.g., Maeve O’Rourke, et al., CLANN: Ireland’s Unmarried Mothers and their Children: Gathering the Data: Principal
Submission to the Commission of Investigation into Mother and Baby Homes (October 15, 2018) http://clannproject.org/; see
also, Padraic Halpin, UN rights body criticizes Ireland on abortion, church homes, REUTERS, (July 24, 2014),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-ireland/u-n-rights-body-criticizes-ireland-on-abortion-church-homesidUSKBN0FT1EX20140724.
930 See, e.g., Magdalenes Report, supra, note 952 (confirming that more than a quarter of the women held in the
laundries were sent directly by the State).
931 See, e.g., Caroline Fischer, Gender, nation, and the politics of shame: Magdalen laundries and the institutionalization of feminine
transgression in modern Ireland 41(4), SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE AND SOC’Y 821, 843 (2009).
932 See also, Cara Delay, Pills, Potions, and Purgatives: Women and Illegal Abortion Methods in Ireland, 1900-1950 (draft on
file with author).
933 Interview with Mara Clarke, Abortion Support Network, Irish Times Women’s Podcast.
934 LORETTA ROSS, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION (2017), 11; See also, Cara Delay, Pills, Potions,
and Purgatives: Women and Illegal Abortion Methods in Ireland, 1900-1950 (draft on file with author).
935 Cara Delay, From the Backstreet to Britain: Women and Abortion Travel in Modern Ireland, Forthcoming in TRAVELLIN’
MAMA: MOTHERS, MOTHERING, AND TRAVEL, (Charlotte Beyer et al eds., 2018).
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Through a practice of both self-direction936 and solidarity with other Irish
women asserted their agency, even though the Irish State denied this
autonomy by attempting to make it invisible. Abortion exile, illegality, and
the climate of fear and stigma they engendered drove women to conceal the
actions they took to in resistance to the State. Women were required to
"cover"937 their defiance of the State’s gendered ideology and their active
resistance of gender dictates was forced underground.
In revisiting the Irish abortion story from a feminist perspective, this
section has uncovered the gendered nature of the laws that denied women’s
abortion rights in Ireland. The 8th amendment systematically rejected
women’s agency and attempted to institutionalize gender roles that
subordinate women to men. The movement for abortion rights in Ireland
(documented in Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation) struggled in order to
upend this system of gender inequality. In seeking abortion rights in Ireland,
women demanded that their State affirm their life choices and divest itself of
laws that claimed authority over women’s decisions.
As illustrated in Chapter 2, embracing human rights law as a strategy
offered vital resources to advance the abortion rights’ movement at different
junctures in the road to repeal. But when it came to undoing the legacy of the
8th amendment and legislating for reform, international legal standards on
abortion could not accommodate the affirmative recognition of women’s
moral autonomy that the movement sought. As currently applied,
international human rights law recognizes as rights-holders only the subset of
women who seek abortions because their life and health is at risk; or because
they have been raped, or because their pregnancies have a fatal fetal
abnormality. Women who seek abortion rights on the basis of their choices
rather than on the grounds of tragedy are excluded from the law’s protection.
The next section investigates this shortcoming in human rights protection
and identifies a deeper problem with the law’s jurisprudence. Drawing on
feminist international law critiques of human rights law and the feminist
analysis of abortion in Ireland just outlined, the second half of this chapter
examines how the relative invisibility of gender analysis limits recognition of
abortion rights and obscures the root cause of abortion rights violations.

936 The term ‘self-direction’ is borrowed from Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on SelfDirection, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 829 (1998) (describing self-direction as the direction of one's own course,
including the identification of particular goals and the implementation of particular projects and life plans).
937 See, e.g., KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS (2007) (describing
“the demand to ‘cover’ . . . is the symbolic heartland of inequality—what reassures one group of its superiority to
another”).
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B. International law on abortion from a feminist perspective
1. International law’s public/private divide
The international legal system for the protection of human rights emerged
at a particular historical moment, namely, the aftermath of the atrocities of
the Second World War.938 Over the course of almost two decades in the
middle of the last century, States debated and eventually adopted the two
seminal UN Human Rights Covenants: the United Nations Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(CESCR). Though these two Covenants both expressly recognize "equal
rights of men and women,"939, from a women's rights perspective, the texts
are almost more remarkable for what they do not say about women. Absent
from the Covenants, for example, are protections from myriad harms that
markedly impact and often determine women's lives; inequities such as
unpaid domestic work, forced pregnancy, or intimate partner violence are
missing from the normative standards. In the early '90s, feminist international
law scholars launched a robust critique of international human rights law's
failure to adequately account for women's human rights. Dominant amongst
their concerns was the claim that international human rights law reproduces
the "public/private divide" of the liberal state.940 This refers to the longstanding feminist theory that the liberal state structurally privileges men and
masculinity over women and femininity by dividing the world into public and
private spheres; in accordance with this division, the state applies liberal
principles of rights and justice in the 'public' sphere but excludes the 'private'
sphere — that of the home, the family and the community—from
intervention.941 The problem from a feminist perspective is that both
historically and empirically, women's lives are more likely to be relegated to

938 From 1948 until the late 1960s, the United Nations finalized and adopted the two main UN human rights
covenants: the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) and Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (CESCR) Covenants. Regional organizations during this period similarly drafted agreements
listing internationally guaranteed human rights. For more on the development of the modern architecture for the
international legal protection of human rights, see PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2003) and SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY
(2010).
939 Art. 3, ICCPR; Art 2, ICESCR.
940 The leading, early feminist international law critique of the public/private divide in international law is found
in Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright's seminal 1991 article, Feminist Approaches to International Law, Hilary
Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613
(1991); See also, Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 379, 383 (1999); Karen
Engle, International Human Rights and Feminism: When Discourses Meet, 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 517 (1992); Celina
Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, 6 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 87, 100 (1993); Donna Sullivan, The Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law, in
WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 126 (Julie Peters & Andrea
Wolper eds., 1995); Christine Chinkin , A critique of the Private/Public Divide, 10 (2) EJIL, 387, 388 (1999).
941 As described in CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1989).
See also Carol Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE
281, 281 (Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus eds., 1983).
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the private sphere, the realm from which rights and justice are excluded.942
Moreover, feminists maintain that by demarcating the private as a sphere of
non-intervention, the state allows pre-existing power relations to go
unchallenged in the private; and that these power relations have historically
favored men.943 In this way, feminists indict the public/private divide as a
sinister tool that the state uses to both perpetuate and hide structures that
sustain male dominance.944
In arguing that international human rights law reproduces the publicprivate dichotomy, feminist international law scholars identified different
features of the human rights system that operate to exclude, marginalize and
diminish women’s interests. International human rights law’s traditional
design as means of protecting citizens against the totalitarianism of States was
one such feature.945 For women's human rights protection, the state-centric
structure left a significant gap because 'non-state' or 'private' actors, such as
family members or private organizations such as religious groups, are often
the perpetrators of the abuses women suffer.946 Feminists emphasized that in
spite of profuse evidence that women worldwide suffered at the hands of their
husbands, relations, and communities, international law disregarded this
suffering and focused instead on violence carried out by the state (usually
against men).947 The contrast between the law's ambivalence to women's pain
at the hands of private actors and its interventionist response when men are
victims of non-state violence (e.g., slavery, racial discrimination, and acts of
genocide) was further evidence that the public/private divide was a tool to
sidestep women's suffering.948 As in the liberal state, this policy of non942 See, e.g., Frances Olsen, The Sex of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 691, 692 (3d ed.,
1998).
943 As described by Nicola Lacey, Theory into Practice? Pornography and the Public/Private Dichotomy, 20 J. OF L. AND
SOC’Y 93, 97 (1993).
944 CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989) 117 (“the liberal state
coercively and authoritatively constitutes the social order in the interests of men as a gender—through its
legitimating norms, forms, relation to society, and substantive policies”).
945 See, e.g., Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the International Law
Commission on the Work of its Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. DOC.
A/56/10 (2001); See also, Christine Chinkin, A Critique of the Private/Public Divide, 10 EJIL, No. 2, 387 388 (1999);
Catherine MacKinnon, Theory is not a Luxury, in RECONCEIVING REALITY, 90.
946 Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western Imperialism and Uncritical
Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 67 (1993); Charlotte Bunch, Transforming Human Rights from a
Feminist Perspective in WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, at 11 (discussing widespread violence against women);
Julie Mertus, State Discriminatory Family Law and Customary Abuses in WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, 135, 137,
140 (Julie Peters and Anne Wolper eds. 2005) (discussing the role of global family law in perpetuating domestic
abuse); Rebecca Cook, International Human Rights and Women’s Reproductive Health in WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN
RIGHTS, 256- 260 (Julie Peters and Anne Wolper eds. 2005).
947 Rhonda Copelon, Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as Torture, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN, 116
(Rebecca Cook ed., 1994); Catharine Mackinnon, Are Women Human? in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993).
948 See, e.g., Catharine Mackinnon, Are Women Human? in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 3 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993) (questioning why the international community was able to immediately
adapt international law to ignore the public-private divide when “on September 11th, nonstate actors committed
violence against mostly nonstate (non-governmental and civilian) actors,” but had failed to act to counter the
violence being continuously committed by the same organization against women within the borders of
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intervention in the private sphere legitimates existing power relations, which
inevitably favor men.
Though international human rights law has since evolved to condemn the
state for many harms perpetrated by non-state actors, including harms
against women such as domestic violence949 sexual harassment,950 and
trafficking951 according to the feminist international law critique, the
public/private divide remains salient in myriad ways. Feminist scholars
caution that violations perpetrated by so-called 'non-state actors against
women are still not taken as seriously as State infringements on the rights of
men; blame is still laid at the hands of individuals rather than patriarchal
gender structures and values that entrench women' inequality.952
Moreover, the dichotomy’s persistence can be detected among the issues
that international human rights law accepts as ‘internal’ to states and
therefore beyond international law’s reach.953 Scholars and activists alike
contend that governments are less likely to be held accountable to their
international human rights commitments in situations where violations
impact so-called 'cultural,' 'traditional' or 'religious' affairs in a State.954
Usually justified as a means of respecting differences between cultures vis-àvis the universalistic strategy of the international human rights framework,
both States and scholars alike have argued in favor of relativism that permits
deviance from international norms on ethical, moral, and cultural issues since
the inception of the international framework.955 Feminist scholars underline
that it is usually abuses towards women that are reduced to questions of
custom while the injustices endured by men engender international human
rights condemnation.956
As such, the feminist critique of international human rights law laments
human rights law's deference to culture as a legitimate form of relativism that
protects gender oppressive cultures. Non-western feminist scholars, however,
Afghanistan); See also, Karima Benounne, Remembering the other’s others: Theorizing the approach of International law to
Muslim Fundamentalism, 41 COLUM. HUM. RES. REV. 635 (2010).
949 See, e.g., Opus v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 33401/02, ¶¶ 158–76 (2009) (domestic violence); Eremia v.
Moldova, Eur. Ct. H.R. No. 3564/11, ¶¶ 48–66 (2013) (rape) I.G. & others. v. Slovakia, Eur. Ct. H.R. No.
15966/04, ¶¶ 112–26 (2013) (forced sterilization).
950 See, e.g., Opuz v. Turkey, 2009-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 107.
951 See, e.g., Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (1990).
952 ALICE EDWARDS, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 219–29 (2011);
see generally, Agnès Callamard, The Human Rights Obligations of Non- State Actors, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF
PLATFORMS 191, 204 (Rikke Frank Jørgensen ed., 2019).
953 See, e.g., Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human
Rights Law, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 100 (1993).
954 See, e.g., Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western Imperialism and
Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 69 (1993).
955 For a defense and account of the doctrine of cultural relativism in international human rights law, see Jack
Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 4 (6) HUM. RTS. Q. 400 (1989).
956 Celia Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in International Human Rights Law,
6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87, 97 (1993) (questioning "why white supremacy belongs to the 'community while male
supremacy belongs to the individual).
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took pain to adjust this critique and reject the essentialist tendencies among
some feminists and policymakers.957 to characterize whole cultures as bad for
women. Problematizing the assumption in both human rights law and in
feminism that culture is a static monolith, they emphasized that cultures and
religions are negotiable, dynamic practices that are rarely unified.958
Non-western feminists also highlighted the imperialist bias of the western
feminist cultural relativist critique by pointing to the preoccupation with socalled ‘cultural practices’ affecting non-Western women (as well as minority
and immigrant women in the West), while failing to appreciate the ways in
which cultural and religious norms limit women's human rights in the
‘developed’ world.959 They noted how the customs which human rights law
has deemed inherently oppressive—female circumcision, honor-crimes, child
marriage, and polygamy960—are drawn from non-Western religious or
customary practices, but the habitual discriminatory rites of Christians,
including those that reject women's leadership capacities, enforce
heterosexuality, and limit women's access to reproductive choice, escape the
label of 'harmful practices.'961 Reminding everyone that patriarchy governs
societies north and south, non-western feminists illustrated the reticence of
the West to understand that the norms which define gender relations in
western countries are just as ‘cultural’ as those in the ‘third-world.’962 Under
this view, deference to custom and culture in international human rights law
risks reifying patriarchy in the global north and global south alike.

957 See, e.g., Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad For Women? in (Joshua Cohen, Matthew Howard & Martha
C. Nussbaum eds., 1999); Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western
Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 69 (1993).
958 See, e.g., Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307 (1994); Ratna
Kapur, Postcolonial Erotic Disruptions: Legal Narratives of Culture, Sex, and Nation in India, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
333 (2001).
959 For the Non-western feminist critique of western feminism’s tendencies to condemn non-western cultures as
gender oppressive (without proof), and to present non-western western women as powerless within these cultures,
See, e.g., Chandra Mohanty, Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse 89 in THIRD WORLD
WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM (Chandra Mohanty ed., 1992); Ratna Kapur, Revisioning the Role of
Law in Women’s Human Rights Struggles in THE LEGALISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES, (Saladin Meckler-Garica and Basak Cali eds.. 2006); Leti Volpp, Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior,
12 YALE J.L. & HUM. RTS. 89 (2000);
Vasuki Nesiah, The Ground Beneath Her Feet: “Third World” Feminisms,” 4(3) J. OF INT’L WOMEN'S STUD. 30; Anne
Orford, Feminism, Imperialism and the Mission of International Law, 275 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 18 (2002).
960 For example, the 2014 Joint CEDAW-CRC General Recommendation/Comment on Harmful Practices
CEDAW/C/GC/31. CRC/C/GC/18 condemns a litany of abuses known to be more common in Africa, the
Middle East, and Asia, including, but not limited to, honor crimes, FGM, child marriage, and polygamy.
961 See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003); Ratna Kapur, Postcolonial Erotic
Disruptions: Legal Narratives of Culture, Sex, and Nation in India, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 333 (2001); Karen Engle,
After The Collapse of The Public/Private Distinction: Strategizing Women’s Rights, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 143 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993); Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian
Women and the “Cultural Defence,” 17 HARV. WOMEN‘S L. J. 57, 78; See also, SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 11-16 (2006).
962 See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Introduction: Locating Culture, Identity and Human Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 201 (1999).
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2. The public/private divide in abortion law jurisprudence
Operating as a veil to keep women’s experiences of human rights abuse
beyond legal intervention, the reproduction of the public/private divide in
human rights law can explain, in part, human rights law’s failure to address
the gendered aspects of abortion regulation. The divide is visible, albeit in a
more complex form, in two ways. First, human rights law insulates the
gendered roots of policies and practices that deny women abortions from
review. Second, by treating abortion primarily as an issue of healthcare rather
than an issue of gender inequality, the doctrine conceals many of the
subordinating harms of anti-abortion laws.
a. The Hidden Roots
Current human rights law approaches shield the state from scrutiny of the
gender-based discrimination underlying abortion restrictions in two ways.
First, human rights law treats anti-abortion laws as an issue of culture over
which human rights law has a limited supervisory role. Second, international
human rights law mischaracterizes the root causes—or perpetrators—of
abortion denial to indirectly limit its review of the state's perpetration of
gender inequality.
Europe's regional human rights system explicitly categorizes abortion
regulation as a matter of "domestic morality," with the result that the law
limits its oversight of any human rights violations occasioned by national
abortion restrictions. In Bruggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany963
the European Commission asserted that Germany’s criminal restrictions on
abortion implicated aspects of a woman’s right to private life but did not find
in favor of women who challenged the anti-abortion regulation.964 Adopting
a relativist approach, the Commission concluded that since that all
European Convention member states had their own “heated debates” and
“own legal rules” on abortion, Germany could not be liable for violating the
women’s right to privacy.965 Because European States governed abortion in
accordance with their own national norms, the Court recused itself and
nullified the human rights violations suffered by the applicants.
Similarly, in A, B & C v. Ireland966 (a case that has been discussed many
times in this dissertation) the European Court of Human Rights addressed
the impugned harms of Ireland’s abortion regulation within the sphere of
Article 8 (the right to private life); and reasoned that by preventing applicants
‘A’ and ‘B’ from getting a legal abortion in Ireland, the country’s abortion
Bruggemann and Scheuten, supra note 81 at ¶ 50.
Id. ¶ 50.
965 Id. ¶ 53.
966 A, B, & C v Ireland, supra note 12.
963
964
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law did, in fact, interfere with the women’s right to privacy. But the Court
shifted its attention away from the impairment the women’s rights by
classifying abortion as an issue of “domestic morality”967 on which the state
was entitled to almost total deference. Asserting that Ireland's interference
with the women's privacy rights fell within the European Convention's
permissible grounds968 for limiting the right to private life, namely the
protection of morals, the state's responsibility for respecting women's rights
evaporated. Reasoning that the Irish Government's "direct and continuous
contact with the vital forces of their country" empowered the state to ascertain
the content and requirements of national morals, the Court accepted that the
human rights implications of criminalizing women who get abortions was a
legitimate means of protecting national mores.969
Notably, the state's assertion that the purpose of the 8th amendment was
the protection of national norms about abortion engendered no scrutiny; the
Court accepted—without question—that the 8th amendment was designed to
protect “the profound moral views of the Irish people which demanded strong
protection for prenatal life.”970 But as set out in Part 1, if considered through
a gendered lens, the value of unborn life was not the only ideology underlying
the 8th amendment; the law expressed a vision of Irish women as bearers and
mothers of the Irish race and attempted to enforce this role through punitive
sanction.
Moreover, as feminist international law scholars have underscored, there
is a danger in resorting to cultural explanations for women's subordination;
invocations of culture, tradition, and custom, particularly by those in power,
often make it seem as though violations of women's rights are intractable and
almost natural features of their societies.971 But feminists argue that imposing
religious, moral, or cultural beliefs on others through law or public policy is a
political act, not an exercise of cultural rights.972 And in the abortion context,
not only was the regulation misrepresented as an issue of national morality,
but in doing so, the European Court also rejected the moral autonomy of the
thousands of women who travelled abroad every year to end their
pregnancies.
Id. at ¶263 - 264.
According to the text of European Convention, States can limit “personal freedoms” (Articles 8-11 of the
Convention, including the right to private life), where “necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
967
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ABC, supra note 12 at ¶ 232.
Id.at ¶227.
971 See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399 (2003).
972 See, e.g., Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights), Report, U.N. DOC A /67/287;
Farida Shaheed, Violence Against Women Legitimised by Arguments of “Culture”—Thoughts from a Pakistani Perspective, in
DUE DILIGENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO PROTECT WOMEN FROM VIOLENCE 241 (Carin Benninger-Budel
ed., 2008).
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By not imposing responsibility on States for violations committed in
service of 'national morality, the European Court ignores the inequalities
engendered by anti-abortion laws. But as described in Chapter 2,
international human rights law does not entirely absolve States from
responsibility in the context of abortion; current doctrine holds States
accountable for not applying their own domestic laws on abortion access.
Following the human rights law principle that human rights must not be
“theoretical or illusory” and must be accessible,973 human rights bodies have
upheld women’s access to abortion in situations where national law already
legalizes access in certain circumstances but where third parties deny women
that access. For example, in four abortion cases at the European Court of
Human Rights—Tysiac v. Poland, P & S v. Poland,974 R.R. v Poland,975 and Ms.
C in A, B, and C v Ireland—and two of the abortion cases at the Human Rights
Committee—LMR v Argentina976 and KL v. Peru977—the respective human
rights bodies held that the States in question had violated a woman's right to
private life—and in some cases, her right to be free from cruel, inhuman, and
degrading treatment—in contexts where the woman's circumstances
qualified her for an exception-based abortion, but her rights were denied by
individuals or institutions (such as individual doctors or hospitals).978
While closing the implementation gap between legal rights and practically
enforcing them is usually a welcome development in human rights law, the
result is that human rights bodies opt to underscore exemption-based
abortion laws rather than examine such laws from a human rights or gender
perspective. From a gender perspective, the scope of review is unduly narrow.
In each case, human rights bodies found against the respective state on the
grounds that the state was obliged to provide procedural safeguards or
regulatory guidance clarifying legal exemptions to national abortion bans to
protect women’s rights. Matters distinct from the underlying criminal
abortion laws—the “procrastination of the health professionals”979 or
inadequate regulatory guidance980— occasion scrutiny by the human rights
bodies at the expense of the state's role in legitimizing the denial of
reproductive choice through its own legislation.
On one hand, courts (and quasi-courts in this instance) can be forgiven
for confining their review to narrow grounds, but in most of the
aforementioned cases, human rights bodies were directly called upon to
See, e.g., Tysiąc, supra note 392 at ¶113.
P & S v. Poland, supra note 569.
975 R.R. v. Poland, supra note 472.
976 LMR v. Argentina, supra note 507 at ¶7.2.
977 KL v. Peru, supra note 543.
978 See also Joanna Erdman, The Procedural Turn: Abortion at the European Court of Human Rights, in Abortion Law in
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES: CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 121 (Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna Erdman &
Bernard Dickens eds., 2014).
979 See, e.g., R.R. v. Poland, supra note 472 at ¶159. See also, Tysiac, supra note 392 at ¶180.
980 Id.
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974
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address state action on abortion beyond the state's duty to enforce its own
law. In LMR—where a hospital refused to provide an abortion even though
the woman’s pregnancy fell within the rape exemption of the national
abortion ban—the applicant requested, as part of her claim, that the Human
Rights Committee urge Argentina to review its domestic legal framework for
abortion and to decriminalize abortion access.981 Notwithstanding the direct
call to scrutinize the state's anti-abortion legislation, the Human Rights
Committee confined its review to the illegal and arbitrary interventions by
judicial officials and medical professionals.
Similarly, in Tysiac — the Polish case where a woman's health was risked
by her pregnancy, but her doctors would not issue her the necessary
certification for her to get a health-based legal abortion982 — the European
Court avoided the applicant's facial challenge against Poland's abortion
restrictions. Without explanation beyond noting "the circumstances of the
applicant's case and in particular the nature of her complaint," the Court
confined its review to Poland's "positive obligations" to implement its national
abortion law.983 The European Court did the same in the A, B & C case;
though the applicants’ challenged Ireland’s abortion ban, the only State
action that received full review was the failure to implement national law.984
Again in RR, the European Court asserted that the hospital’s failure to
provide diagnostic testing and an abortion violated the woman’s rights and
that insofar as the state was liable, it was on the grounds that Poland lacked
procedures and regulations to ensure that RR was able to make "an informed
decision as to whether to seek an abortion or not in good time."985
Notwithstanding the role of RR's doctors in frustrating her access to
diagnostic tests that would have sanctioned of her abortion, fundamentally,
the reason that RR could not get an abortion was because her pregnancy
exceeded the state's legal time limit on abortion (20-weeks).986 Instead of
impugning Poland, the Court presented individual actors as the perpetrators
of RR’s forced pregnancy and childbirth.
To be sure, in terms of requiring States to implement domestically
recognized abortion rights, commentators suggest that international human
rights law can do important work in protecting women from arbitrary refusal
of care by health professionals.987 As with the human rights law approach of
categorizing abortion as an issue of 'domestic morality,' scrutiny of state
LMR v. Argentina, supra note 507, ¶ 3.11.
Tysiac, supra note 392 ¶18.
983 Id. at ¶ 107
984 A, B, & C v. Ireland, supra note 12.
985 Id.at ¶203.
986 Id. at ¶204.
987 See also Joanna Erdman, The Procedural Turn: Abortion at the European Court of Human Rights, in Abortion Law in
TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES: CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 121 (Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna Erdman &
Bernard Dickens eds., 2014).
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measures that control women is displaced. The power dynamics that restrict
women’s access to abortion go unperturbed.
Departing from the sex and gender-blind approaches of the
aforementioned litany of cases, the CEDAW Committee, and more recently,
the Human Rights Committee has displayed a willingness to examine the
discriminatory basis of abortion denial in its jurisprudence. In a decision that
was considered as a potentially innovative juridical resource for reforming
abortion laws,988 the CEDAW Committee’s decision in LC989 characterized
the denial of reproductive rights as a discriminatory restriction on a woman’s
right to health under Article 12 of CEDAW (the duty to eliminate
discrimination against women in the field of health care).990 As in the
preceding cases, per national law, the plaintiff should have been able to access
an exception-based legal abortion (in this case, under Peru's risk to life
exemption). The Committee recognized LC's suffering upon being denied an
abortion and condemned it as discrimination.991 In articulating the source of
her discrimination, the Committee described LC’s mistreatment as stemming
from ‘her status as a pregnant woman.’992 Thereby submitting that LC had
been discriminated against because of her reproductive capacity.
While it is welcome that the CEDAW Committee held that LC was
discriminated against as a woman, the fact that women have a different
reproductive capacity to men does not explain why States deny women the
right to abortion. States restrict women from accessing abortion because the
state decides it appropriate to deny women access and designs limits
accordingly. Invariably, the logic behind such restrictions include gendered
judgments about whether women's authority over reproduction can be
usurped and what burdens can be imposed on women.993 Moreover, when
discrimination is conceived as rooted in the biological differences between
women and men, the required form of redress is moderated. The state's
responsibility in ending any sex or gender discrimination becomes one of
"accommodating women's differences"994 and achieving de facto equality.
Rather than upending socially engineered gender hierarchy, the state is asked
to respond to differences between the sexes.
To a certain extent, the CEDAW Committee appears to have attempted
to recognize the gender dynamic in LC: as well as citing her status as a
988 See, e.g., Charles Ngwena, A Commentary on LC v Peru: The CEDAW committee's first decision on abortion, 57(02) J. OF
AFRICAN L. (2013).
989 LC v. Peru, supra note 374.
990 Id.at ¶ 7.5
991 Id. at ¶ 7.7.
992 Id. at ¶ 8.15.
993 See, e.g., Neil Siegel and Reva Siegel, Equality Arguments for Abortion Rights, 60 UCLA L. REV. 160 (2013); Anita
Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection Fix for Abortion Law: Reflections on Citizenship, Gender and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POLY 419, (1994).
994 Rebecca Cook, Accommodating Women’s Differences, supra note 17.
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pregnant woman as the reason for her ill-treatment, the Committee reasoned
that LC had been denied access to a legal abortion because of "the stereotype
that protection of the fetus should prevail over the health of the mother."995
Though the phenomenon identified by the Committee as a stereotype is not,
in fact, a stereotype, the reasoning is welcome for its indication that the
Committee understood the role played by gendered expectations in denying
women abortion rights.
The landmark cases of Mellet996 in 2016, and the almost identical case of
Whelan v Ireland997 in 2017, are the only international human rights decisions
in which a human rights body (the Human Rights Committee) has explicitly
held that criminalizing and prohibiting abortion violates international human
rights law; and that, at least in certain circumstances, States must make
abortion legal. To recap, both Mellet and Whelan challenged Ireland’s abortion
ban in situations where pregnancies have fatal fetal abnormalities.
As stated elsewhere in this dissertation, the Committee's decisions in these
cases marked a significant development in abortion law jurisprudence
because the underlying legal framework, not just the state's failure to
implement its own law, was impugned for its non-compliance with the
ICCPR. Successes notwithstanding, the Human Rights Committee pursued
a strange line of reasoning to reach its finding of discrimination. Engaging in
a formalistic comparative analysis, the Committee compared how Ireland
treated the applicants 'as women who decided to terminate their non-viable
pregnancies' to the state's treatment of 'women who had non-viable
pregnancies but decided to carry the fetus to term.998 The women who did
not choose to end their pregnancies continued to receive the full protection
and care of the public health system in Ireland, and all medical needs were
covered by health insurance, while women who decided to abort non-viable
pregnancies had to travel for care abroad at their own expense.999 This
differential treatment was judged to violate the right to equality before the
law on the basis of both socio-economic and sex under Article 26, ICCPR.1000
While acknowledging that the criminalization of abortion inflicts socioeconomic burdens on women who are forced to travel for abortions is
welcome, the Court's holding is limited in a number of ways. There was no
explanation for how the differential treatment between the two sets of women
amounted to 'sex discrimination. And the finding of discrimination related to
a small cross-section of women—women with non-viable pregnancies—

LC v Peru, supra note 374 at ¶11.3.
Mellet, supra note 35.
997 Whelan, supra note 35.
998 Mellet, supra note 35 at ¶ 7.1; Whelan, supra note 35 at ¶ 7.1
999 Mellet, supra note 35 at ¶ 7.3; Whelan, supra note 35 at ¶ 7.4
1000 Mellet, supra note 35 at ¶ 7.1; Whelan, supra note 35 at ¶ 7.1
995
996

169

rather than all of the women who faced widespread discrimination in
accessing abortion in Ireland. Blind to the implications of the abortion law
for women as a class, the majority decision was blind to gender.
Notably, the concurring opinions of Professor Sarah Cleveland in Mellet
and Whelan took a different approach to make a finding of sex discrimination.
Rejecting the Irish Government’s claim that there can be no invidious
discrimination in relation to a pregnant woman because “her physical
capacity or circumstances in a state of pregnancy are inherently different to
that of a man”1001Cleveland cited the CEDAW Committee's approach in LC
to make a finding of sex-based discrimination.1002 Observing that there was
no equivalent burden on men’s access to reproductive health care in
Ireland,1003 and that the state had not justified this differential treatment,1004
she asserted that the inability of Irish women to get abortions legally in Ireland
amounted to sex discrimination under international human rights law.1005
Again, while it is welcome that Ireland's abortion law was impugned as
discriminatory on the basis of sex, the traps of physiological sex-based
reasoning could have been realized in this case. In the first instance,
Cleveland identified the "protection, on an equal basis, in law, and in
practice, the unique needs of each sex"1006 as among the state's responsibilities
towards women in the abortion context - a limited approach to ending gender
subordination. And as with LC, Mellet and Whelan did not suffer abortion
denial because their biology was different to men’s; the state's criminal
abortion laws prevented women from having abortions in Ireland. These
were laws that were motivated and sustained by gender stereotypes. However,
Cleveland's individual opinion contains the seeds of positive developments
and could signal a new phase in the Committee's abortion jurisprudence.
Distinct from other human rights-based approaches to abortion to date,
Sarah Cleveland added to the biological sex-difference approach and
recognized that Ireland’s abortion law differentiated between men and
women “based on gender stereotypes” in a way that gave “rise to gender
discrimination.”1007 For Cleveland, the ICCPR’s right to equal protection
and protection against gender discrimination forbid “traditional stereotypes
1001 Mellet supra note 35 at ¶ 4.13. For more on the risks of emphasizing the different biology of men and women,
See Katharine T. Bartlett, Comment, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1532, 1732
(1974) (“That women may and do become pregnant is the most significant single factor used to justify the
countless laws and practices that have disadvantaged women for centuries.”); See also, Wendy Williams, The Equality
Crisis: Some Reflections. On Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REV. 175 (1982); Wendy Williams,
Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325380 (1984-1985).
1002 Sarah Cleveland, Annex II at ¶ 11.1
1003 Id. at Annex II ¶11.3.
1004 Id.
1005 Id.
1006 Id. at Annex II, ¶ 7.
1007 Id. at Annex II ¶ 16.
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regarding the reproductive role of women.”1008 Additionally, in a stark
departure from the approach of the European Court of Human Rights,
Cleveland dismissed the state's argument that the abortion restrictions
reflected domestic morality and emphasized that justifications for abortion
restrictions based on "tradition, history and culture" could not justify gender
discrimination or gender stereotypes.1009
Interventions in the aforementioned concurrences in Mellet and Whelan
aside, when presented with the denial of abortion rights, human rights bodies
have thus far insulated states’ perpetuation of gender inequality from review.
A correct interpretation of anti-abortion laws requires engagement with the
gendered roots of laws that deny women’s reproductive autonomy and an
understanding of the mechanisms through which this manifestation of
discrimination sustains itself. By contrast, in obscuring the role of gender bias
in abortion law and policy, international human rights law hides the
discriminatory purposes of anti-abortion laws and contributes to their
maintenance.
b. The Hidden Harm
In 2011, the then UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health, Anand
Grover, powerfully articulated that laws criminalizing abortion lead to higher
numbers of maternal deaths and poor mental and physical health outcomes
while "infring[ing upon] women's dignity and autonomy by severely
restricting decision-making by women in respect of their sexual and
reproductive health."1010 This marked the first time that abortion was
explicitly conceived as part of the right to health by the mandate of the UN
Special Rapporteur and was perceived as a milestone. As noted in Chapter
2, the CESCR Committee followed suit in 2016 and explicitly embraced
access to abortion as part of the right to health in General Comment 22.1011
In a world where an estimated 8-15% of maternal deaths are associated with
unsafe abortions, conceiving of abortion access as critical to women’s health
seems both urgent and indisputable.
But this framing is complex. When abortion is principally conceived as a
matter of health and medical treatment, the critical importance of
reproductive control to a woman’s equality is overlooked. KL v Peru is
expositive of this approach. Rather than engaging the applicant's claim that
the state had interfered with her right to make autonomous decisions about
Id.
Id. at Annex II ¶ 15.
1010 Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health, supra note 462, ¶21.
1011 CESCR General Comment 22 on the right to sexual and reproductive health, supra note 349.
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reproduction and parenthood, the Committee held that the "state interfered
arbitrarily in her private life by denying her the opportunity to secure medical
intervention."1012 While “medical intervention” is one way to characterize her
request, KL’s reason for wanting an abortion was to be free of an unwanted
pregnancy — a decision and desire that implicates much more than medical
needs. As described in Part 1, the decision to carry a pregnancy to term can
impact every aspect of a woman’s life – her education, her career, her
relationships, her economic status, and, more broadly and her ability to live
the life she chooses.1013 The state's attempt to take that decision away from
women represents a fundamental rejection of women's status as equal citizens.
But by confining its assessment to a medical view of pregnancy, the
Committee lets the state off the hook for its discriminatory treatment of
women.
Such health-focused reasoning is also reflected in the CEDAW
Committee’s approach to abortion in individual decisions and concluding
observations: as described, the Committee addresses abortion as an aspect of
healthcare—“medical services that only women need”—the denial of which
is discriminatory under the CEDAW Convention.1014 A majority of the
Human Rights Committee applied this reasoning in Mellet and Whelan,
holding that Ireland’s abortion law violated the women’s right to privacy by
arbitrarily interfering with their decision “as to how best cope with a nonviable pregnancy.”1015 For Mellet and Whelan, however, the state's intervention
impacted more than their medical decisions. In their time of need, the state
criminalized the women's response to pregnancies with fatal fetal anomalies
and exiled the women from the state. Such dignitary harms receive no
airtime, and the state's responsibility was reduced to providing the equal
medical treatment.
Moreover, in practice, the health paradigm can result in a medical model
for abortion, where abortion becomes a matter of physician (or hospital)
authority rather than a matter of women's rights.1016 The litany of cases in
this dissertation reveal numerous controversies involving doctors and hospital
KL v. Peru, supra note 453 at ¶ 6.4.
also Jennifer Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to Abortion, (2010) 45 HARV.
CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 330; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Postscript to Struck by Stereotype, 59 DUKE L.J. 799,
800 (2010); Anita Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection fix for abortion law: reflections on citizenship, gender and the constitution,
18 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY 419, (1994).
1014 See, e.g., Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations: Oman,
¶41, U.N. DOC. CEDAW/C/OMN/CO/1 (2011); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, Concluding Observations: Paraguay, ¶31, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PRY/CO/6 (2011).
1015 Mellet, supra note 35 at ¶7.8; Whelan, supra note 35 at ¶ 7.7.
1016 This has been realized worldwide, with endless cases and controversies involving doctors and hospital boards
refusing to carry out legal abortions or creating additional barriers. Some of these cases have reached the IHLR
courts, including Tysiac, supra note 392. RR v Poland ,supra note 472; K.L. v. Peru, supra note 453 at ¶ 6.4; L.M.R. v.
Argentina, Committee, supra note 507; Kristin Lucker and others have commented on the conflict between the
vision of feminist abortion rights groups mobilizing on behalf of women and the goal of medical professional to
ensure professional autonomy.
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boards refusing to carry out legal abortions or creating additional barriers to
women’s access. But to date, the law has not vested the abortion decision in
the woman alone. In some cases, it has even buttressed the physician’s role.
In LMR v Argentina,1017 the applicant claimed that the state arbitrarily
interfered in her private life by making a decision concerning her life and
reproductive health on her behalf.1018 In finding in her favor, the Human
Rights Committee again downplayed LMR’s claim to a right to make
decisions about her life. Instead, the Committee held that Argentina had
violated LMR’s right to privacy by interfering in an issue that “should have
been resolved between the patient and her physician.”1019
It is recognized that focusing on the impact to a woman's life and health
is not as contentious as is her right to make decisions about her own body and
life plan and that in the battlefield of abortion lawfare, muting controversy
can seem imperative.1020 But by diverting attention away from the impacts of
abortion restrictions on women's autonomy and freedom from
discrimination, health-based claims ignore why abortion restrictions exist in
the first place: the conditions of inequality that enable the state to control such
aspects of women's lives. Even in parts of the world with high maternal
mortality rates from unsafe abortion, recognizing the ways that abortion
restrictions violate the right to health are not enough. The underlying causes
of morbidity and mortality from unsafe abortion are not blood loss and
infection but, rather, laws and policies borne of apathy and disdain toward
women.
3. The Victim Trap
The feminist critique of international law also problematizes the law’s
reinforcement of stereotyped understandings of women as powerless and
vulnerable victims.1021 Without denying that, in reality, women are frequently
victims of abhorrent levels of human rights abuse; a number of scholars have
contested the law's reliance on overly generalized depictions of women as
disempowered victims, which may not be liberating. On one level, the trope
imperils the application of human rights law to women who do not conform
LMR v. Argentina, supra note 507 at ¶ 7.2 (UN Human Rights Committee 28 Apr. 2011).
Id.at ¶ 3.2.
1019 Id.at ¶ 3.2.
1020 See, e.g., Joanna Erdman, The Politics of Global Abortion Rights 22(2) BROWN J. OF WORLD AFF. 39; Lindgren,
Yvonne, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring Healthcare to the Abortion Right 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385 (2013) (arguing that
recognizing abortion as healthcare may create broader appeal for the right by casting it in a gender-neutral
context).
1021 See, e.g., Dianne Otto, Lost in translation: Re-scripting the sexed subjects of international human rights law in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 320 (Anne Orford eds. 2006). (Otto contends that the stereotyped
understandings of women in international human rights law takes three main forms: female subjectivities as wife
and mother, the woman who is the 'formal equal' of men in the public sphere (but not the private), and the
"victim" subject who is produced by colonial narratives of gender and women's sexual vulnerability).
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with traditional gender scripts of victimhood that emphasize vulnerability,
passivity, and respectability. Securing human rights protection for sex
workers, women with minority sexual orientations and/or gender identities,
and women who are members of minority religious or belief communities (but
who do not reject their religion identity) has been, and continues to be,
wrought with tension and backlash, if not outright rejection.1022 On another
level, scholars caution against the woman-as-victim narrative because it
presents women as objects in need of protection rather than subjects of
affirmative rights.1023 For post-colonial feminists, this paternalistic vision of
women is reminiscent of the imperialist practice of portraying colonial
subjects as ignorant and vulnerable “others.”1024 Recognizing that such
narratives provided colonists with partial explanations for maintaining power
over their colonial subjects, feminists question whether containing women’s
presence in international law within the prism of ‘victimhood’ could operate
to “keep women in their place.”1025
Notably, most of the cases surveyed in this dissertation involve an extreme
or tragic situation: women impregnated as a result of rape; women with
pregnancies that are either nonviable; or women whose health and life are at
risk. Often, but not always, the plaintiffs are young girls or are challenged
with circumstances that gives rise to heightened suffering, such as disability
or bereavement. In each of these "exceptional cases," the woman is viewed as
a victim in need of the law's protection. Indeed, the greater her victimhood,
the more protection the law owes her. This trend can be attributed to the
legal strategy of advocates who correctly consider tragic cases to be likely
winners before adjudicators. But there is an inherent tension to this approach:
by confining its recognition of abortion rights to 'exceptional' cases, human
rights law remains blind to the rights of the majority of abortion-seeking
women. As well as instituting a protection gap for women's rights, this
doctrine reinforces narrow conceptions of the deserved abortion and the
1022 See, e.g., Ratna Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native” Subject in International/PostColonial Feminist Legal Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2002).
1023 Id.
1024 See, e.g., Vasuki Nesiah, Toward a Feminist Internationality: A Critique of US Feminist Legal Scholarship (1993) 16 HARV.
WOMEN’S L. J. 189 (explaining that “a discourse about the experience of oppression often participates in the
imperially charged agenda of defining “Third World” women as victims of oppression”); See Anne Orford,
Feminism, Imperialism and the Mission of International Law, 71 NORDIC J. OF INT’L L. 275, 290 (2002); Saba Mahmood,
Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival, 16 CULTURAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 202 (2001); See also, Brenda Cossman, Turning the Gaze Back on Itself: Comparative Law, Feminist Legal
Studies, and the Postcolonial Project, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 525, 528 (1997).
1025 See, e.g., Vasuki Nesiah, Toward a Feminist Internationality: A Critique of US Feminist Legal Scholarship,16 HARV.
WOMEN’S L. J. 189 (1993) (explaining that “a discourse about the experience of oppression often participates in
the imperially charged agenda of defining “ Third World” women as victims of oppression”); See also Anne
Orford, Feminism, Imperialism and the Mission of International Law 71 NORDIC J. OF INT’L L. 275, 290 (2002); Ratna
Kapur, The Tragedy of Victimization Rhetoric: Resurrecting the “Native” Subject in International/Post-Colonial Feminist Legal
Politics, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2002); Saba Mahmood, Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile Agent: Some
Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival, 16 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 202 (2001); See also Brenda Cossman,
Turning the Gaze Back on Itself: Comparative Law, Feminist Legal Studies, and the Postcolonial Project, 1997 UTAH L. REV.
525, 528 (1997).
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deserving woman.1026 Only the women who have “innocently suffered” are
recognized by human rights law.1027 As young girls who had been raped, LC,
KL, LMR, RR, and P could elicit recognition of their suffering. And as women
who had only chosen abortions because their pregnancies would not survive,
Mellet & Whelan were not rejecting motherhood. In fact, both women framed
their decisions to get abortion as motivated, in part, by their desire to protect
their unborn fetuses.1028By contrast, women who have consensual sex and
want abortions to control their lives fail to engender compassion, and as such,
fall beyond the law's protection. Their abortion decisions cannot be excused
as a response to rape or a natural motherly instinct. Echoing the themes of
responsibility and irresponsibility that play a prominent role in rhetoric
opposing reproductive choice, human rights law further entrenches abortion
in a moralistic rather than rights-based framework.
Additionally, even when a woman falls within one of the exceptional and
tragic cases, the law does not afford women with the primary decision-making
authority over their reproduction. Even the most ‘deserving’ women remain
subject to the State’s final say on whether she falls within one of the exceptions
for a legal abortion.
Furthermore, it seems that only particular tragedies are compelling
enough for human rights law. In practice, the discriminatory impacts of
exceptions-based abortion laws are felt most acutely by women in lower socioeconomic groups. Women with financial resources are more likely to be able
to access private clandestine providers who will fudge the criteria for a legal
abortion for a price or will travel to states with fewer restrictions.1029 Without
these options, women from lower socio-economic backgrounds are more
likely to endure unsafe abortions,1030 and are more likely to face legal penalties
for obtaining illegal abortions.1031 Being poor and desperate to end a
pregnancy to the point that you will risk your life and health to get an abortion
is apparently not tragic enough a situation for human rights law to rescue you.
To be sure, human rights law's increasingly progressive jurisprudence on
abortion has delivered long-awaited recognition of the abuse women suffer
when they are denied access to abortion. In this regard, Yadh Ben Acor's
description, in his concurring opinion, of the harm perpetrated by Ireland's
abortion law stands out:
1026 See Lisa M. Kelly, Reckoning with Narratives of Innocent Suffering in Transnational Abortion Litigation, in ABORTION
LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVEs 303, 317–18 (Rebecca J. Cook, Joanna N. Erdman & Bernard M.
Dickens eds., 2014).
1027 Id.
1028 Mellet, supra note 35 at ¶2.8; Whelan, supra note 35 at ¶ 2.1.
1029 See, e.g., Andrea Hunnes et al., Induced Abortion According to Socioeconomic Status in Chile 33(4) J. OF PEDIATRIC AND
ADOLESCENT GYNECOLOGY 415 (2020); Haina Zafar, Low Socioeconomic Status Leading to Unsafe Abortion-related
Complications: A Third-world Country Dilemma 10(10) CUREUS 2018.
1030 Susheela Singh, Abortion Worldwide 2017: Uneven Progress and Unequal Access, GUTTMACHER (2018).
1031 See Natalie Sedacca, Abortion in Latin America in International Perspective: Limitations and Potentials of the Use of Human
Rights Law to Challenge Restrictions 32 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 109 (2017).
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[T]hrough its binding, indirectly punitive, and stigmatizing effects,
the prohibition of abortion in Ireland targets women by virtue of
being women and places them in a particular situation of
vulnerability.1032
Similarly, in holding that Peru had violated KL's rights to privacy and freedom
from cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, the Human Rights
Committee stressed KL's "special vulnerability as a minor girl."1033
Emphasizing that LC was "a minor and a victim of sexual abuse," the
CEDAW Committee agreed with the claimant that Peru had violated her
right to health.1034 In recognizing the applicants’ suffering in P. & S. v Poland,
the European Court described P as a “vulnerable and distraught teenager in
a difficult life situation.”1035 Similarly, in concluding that the State was
responsible for the violation of the claimant's right to be free from cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment in P & S v. Poland1036 the European Court
emphasized the claimant's "great vulnerability," this time arising from her age
and status as a rape victim.1037
On one level, by recognizing aspects of a victim’s identity and
circumstances that exacerbate their suffering, the doctrine offers valuable
insights into how human rights violations can be compounded by age and
other status. The emphasis on the victim’s vulnerability, however, runs the
risk that ‘vulnerable’ becomes a fixed attribute for women, with little
discussion of the social and political—gendered—reasons that give rise to
such vulnerability.1038 "Woman" in international law is conceived as being
innately vulnerable, whereas, in reality, women are forced into contexts that
unjustifiably heighten their vulnerability to human rights abuses. In abortion
rights' jurisprudence, as currently applied,1039 the vulnerability lens does not
address the underlying structural causes of women's vulnerability in the
abortion context. A woman's suffering appears to be attributed to her age, her
history of being an assault victim, or her status as a bereaved mother. While
it is likely that such experiences exacerbate a woman's distress, the root cause
of a woman's suffering when refused abortion access is the underlying legal

Mellet, Annex 1 at ¶3.2.
KL v Peru, supra note 453 at ¶ 6.5.
1034 KL v Peru, supra note 453 at ¶ 8.15.
1035 P. & S. v. Poland, No. 57375/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶13.1 (2012).
1036 Id.
1037Id. at ¶162.
1038 See, e.g., Finnoula Ní Aoláin, Women, Vulnerability, and Humanitarian Emergencies, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1
(2011) (describing the social nature of the vulnerabilities experienced by women in the context of humanitarian
emergencies).
1039 Id. (proposing a different framework for vulnerability that takes account of its gendered processes).
1032
1033
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framework that cedes her reproductive autonomy to the State and/or to
doctors.
It also seems counterproductive when international human rights law
provides accounts of women’s victimhood that are near totalizing. In P & S,
the European Court held treatment of P was degrading in that it aroused
"fear, anguish, and inferiority capable of […] debasing [her].1040 The
Committee Against Torture observed that a woman who is compelled to
continue a pregnancy after rape experiences “constant exposure to the
violation committed against her,” which leads to traumatic stress and longlasting psychological problems.1041 Attesting that "[w]omen who are legally
prevented from accessing abortion services are powerless.…," scholar Ronli
Sopris explicitly relies on the idea that women are helpless victims when
arguing for abortion rights.1042 Trading in stereotypes of women as passive
and defenseless, women’s status as victims is further entrenched. Framed as
passive containers of their abuse, it seems as though there is no escape.
As a consequence, when women escape, survive or resist, the law has
trouble recognizing them as victims. In certain cases, the women who
extricate themselves from their disempowered position and overcome barriers
to abortion access are stripped of their status of victims in human rights law.
In A, B, & C v. Ireland, the European Court recognized that the State had
infringed A and B's right to private life, but the fact that the two women
traveled abroad to get abortions meant that the State would not be held
accountable for violating their human rights.1043 In other words, by
overcoming the burdens that Ireland placed on them—by exercising their
agency—the women lost their status as rights-holders. No longer fitting the
passive victim trope, the women who defied Ireland’s abortion regime were
dismissed by human rights law.
C. Implications for doctrine
It is relevant to consider whether the current framework of international
human rights law could accommodate the dissertation’s proposition that
abortion rights should be conceived of as gender equality rights. To date,
there have been some gestures in this regard.
As a general principle, non-discrimination guides the way each human
right is to be respected, and as a substantive right, equality and nonP & S v Poland, supra note 569 at ¶158.
Concluding Observations of the Comm. Against Torture: Nicaragua, ¶16, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/NIC/CO/1
(2009); see also Conclusions & Recommendations of the Comm. Against Torture: Peru, ¶23, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/PER/CO/4 (2006) (recognizing the physical and mental pain associated with being compelled by the
law to seek an illegal and unsafe abortion as a form of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment).
1042 RONI SOPRIS, REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM, TORTURE AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS:
CHALLENGING THE MASCULINISATION OF TORTURE, 184 (2013).
1043 A, B, and C v Ireland, supra note 12, at ¶230-240.
1040
1041
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discrimination provisions are omnipresent in the framework of the United
Nations human rights system and most regional systems. To recap from
Chapter 2, among the many formulations of the right to non-discrimination
in international law, Article 2 of the ICCPR establishes the prohibition
against discrimination, proscribing "distinctions, exclusions, or restrictions"
of any kind in the exercise of any rights promulgated by the Convention, on
a number of protected grounds, including on the basis of sex.1044 This is
reinforced by Article 3 of the ICCPR, which explicitly addresses gender
equality by stating that States must ensure the equal rights of men and
women. Similarly, Article 3 of CEDAW mandates states to guarantee
women's equal enjoyment of Convention rights and fundamental freedoms as
compared with men. International human rights law also provides a
freestanding right to equality before the law for all persons and equal
protection of the law, in Article 26 of the ICCPR.1045
Notably, international human rights law recognizes that sex-based
discrimination amounts to gender-based discrimination.1046 which is
understood as discrimination arising from the socially constructed roles,
behaviors, activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate
for the different sexes, "resulting in hierarchical relationships between women
and men and in the distribution of power and rights favoring men and
disadvantaging women."1047 Furthermore, the CEDAW Convention is
explicit in Article 5(a) that harmful gender stereotypes are among the forms
of gender discrimination that States must address. Elaborating on this
responsibility in General Recommendation no. 28, the CEDAW Committee
outlined that “inherent to the principle of…gender equality is the concept
that all human beings, regardless of sex, are free to make choices without the
limitations set by stereotypes, rigid gender roles, and prejudices."1048
Taken together, the right to equality and the right to nondiscrimination
in human rights oblige States to refrain from carrying out actions that create,
1044 See also, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., Report of the Human Rights Committee: General Comment No. 18, ¶7,
U.N. Doc. A/45/40 (November 11, 1989) [hereinafter General Comment No. 18] Similar accessory provisions
against discrimination can be found in most other human rights instruments, including the ICESCR, CRC, the
IMWC, the ICRPD, and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 562.
1045 No such general provision for equal protection is found in the European Convention. However, Protocol No.
12 to the European Convention, promulgated in 2005, extends the non-discrimination principle beyond the scope
of conventional rights by providing for a general prohibition of discrimination, which applies to any right set forth
by law.
1046 See, CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 28: The Core Obligations of States Parties Under Article 2 of the
Convention on the Eliminations of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28,
¶ 5 (Dec. 16, 2010) [hereinafter CEDAW, General Rec. No. 28]) (stipulating that ‘although the Convention only
refers to sex-based discrimination . . . [it] covers gender-based discrimination against women.)
1047 CEDAW, General Rec. No. 28, supra note 89, at ¶5. The "Istanbul Convention," a legally binding treaty in
Europe, adopts a very similar definition as follows: "gender" shall mean the socially constructed roles, behaviors,
activities, and attributes that a given society considers appropriate for women and men. See, Convention on
Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, November 5, 2011, C.E.T.S. No.
210 ¶ 3(c)): [hereinafter Istanbul Convention].
1048 CEDAW, General Rec. No. 28, supra note 189.
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whether directly or indirectly, gender-based discrimination, a category which
is broad enough to encompass freedom from gender roles and the burdens
such roles place on women's autonomy. The obligation encompasses positive
obligations such that to protect and fulfill these rights, States must adopt
measures to reverse or change discriminatory situations in their societies on
the basis of the idea of equality and the principle of nondiscrimination.
Recent views emanating from the Human Rights Committee have
demonstrated the Committee’s willingness to include protection against
harmful gender stereotypes within the meaning of “equal protection” under
the ICCPR.1049 Even at the European Court of Human Rights—an
institution often partial to a formal conception of equality—several judgments
have impugned harmful stereotypes regarding groups such as the people
living with HIV,1050 people with intellectual disabilities,1051 and the Roma
community1052 as violations of non-discrimination.
As outlined in this Chapter, both the purpose and effects of abortion
restrictions violate women's right to equality and non-discrimination in
human rights law. On the one hand, abortion restrictions contravene the
nascent anti-stereotyping principle in international equality law.1053 because
they are rooted in a gendered ideology that prescribes normative roles for
women. On the other, the burdens that abortion restrictions place on
women’s autonomy perpetuate discrimination based on gender. As Yadh Ben
Acor articulates in his concurrence in Mellet, through its "punitive and
stigmatizing effects," abortion restrictive regulation "targets women, by virtue
of being women." 1054 And because laws denying an individual's ability to
obtain an abortion not only deny autonomous choices but also devalue an
entire group of people, abortion restrictions have equality implications for
women's status in society more broadly.
Arguably, the implications of abortion policies on women’s autonomy can
— and to an extent have been — conceptualized as violations of the right to
privacy in international law.1055 The interplay of both equality and autonomy
was explicitly articulated in the concurring opinion of Mellet; noting that
Ireland's abortion restrictions reduced Amanda Mellet to "an instrument of
procreation" constitutes discrimination and infringes at once her freedom of
See, e.g., Prof. Sarah Cleveland in Mellet & Whelan supra note 12.
Kiyutin v Russia (2011) Application No 2700/10, Merits, March 10, 2011. Regarding HIV-based prejudice, see
also I.B. v. Greece, App. No. 552/10, (October 3, 2013).
1051 Kiss v Hungary Application No 38832/06, Merits (May 20, 2010).
1052 DH & Ors v. the Czech Republic App. No. 57325/00, (Grand Chamber final judgment) (November 13,
2007).
1053 See, Alexandra Timmer, Judging Stereotypes: What the European Court of. Human Rights Can Borrow from American and.
Canadian Equal Protection Law, 63(1) AM. JOUR. OF COMPARATIVE L. 239 (2015).
1054 Mellet & Whelan supra note 12.
1055 See supra, Chapter II, Section iv. See also HRC General Comment 36 on the Right to Life outlining that while
state restrictions on abortion are permissible, they must not arbitrarily interfere with women's privacy. Human
Rights Committee, General Comment 36, supra note 71, at ¶ 8.
1049
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self-determination and her right to gender equality and personal
autonomy."1056 But for both substantive and pragmatic reasons, this
dissertation contends that international human rights law should locate the
abortion right in human rights law’s protection for equality and nondiscrimination on the basis of gender.
As a matter of strategy, for advocates, in particular, international law
provides States with little room to justify discriminatory laws and practices
against women. While non-discrimination is not an unqualified right, only in
very limited circumstances can sufficient "objective and reasonable criteria"
be invoked to justify exemptions from general laws and standards for
combatting discrimination.1057 Strict scrutiny must be applied, and the
burden of proof rests with the State. Such a high level of scrutiny for the
justification of distinctions does not apply to the right to privacy.1058

Mellet, Annex I, at ¶¶7, 9.
See, H.R. Comm., General Comment No.18: Non-Discrimination, 37th Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1
(November 10, 1989) and H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 28: Article 3 (Equality of Rights Between Men
and Women), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000).
1058 UN human rights law prohibits arbitrary interference with one's privacy while doctrine under the European
Convention of Human Rights, States are afforded significant difference in limiting an individual's privacy rights
"in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
1056
1057
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CONCLUSION
On January 18, 2018, Michael Martin, then the leader of the opposition in
Ireland, stunned the country (in particular his own socially conservative party)
by backing repeal of the 8th amendment. In an impassioned speech to the
Dáil, Martin spoke of how despite always having described himself as "prolife," he had come to recognize the profound concerns which people had with
the 8th amendment.1059 "Women known to the public only by letters of the
alphabet" had exposed the cruelty of the law, he said, before commenting
that "if we are sincere about respecting their choices, we must act."1060
As is now well-known, Ireland did act. The Government proposed a
referendum to repeal the 8th amendment, and the Irish people voted,
overwhelmingly, for its removal. While the strength of the public's support for
repeal—over two-thirds of those who voted favored reform—suggests that
reform had been a long time coming, the triumph for abortion rights activists
in 2018 contrasts sharply with the recalcitrance they confronted in decades
past. Pro-choice activists had fought against the draconian law since its
inception, but as described in Chapter 1, their efforts were chronically
overpowered by anti-abortion campaigns and government impasse. Antiabortion forces successfully pushed injunctions against family planning
clinics, secured prosecutions against students for distributing abortion
information, and even attempted to stop a 14-year-old rape victim to stop her
traveling to England for a termination. Consumed with resisting even more
restrictions on abortion access, pro-choice advocacy was almost exclusively
defensive.
Taking a case on behalf of three women who had been denied abortions
in Ireland to the European Court of Human Rights marked a new era. As
described in Chapter 2 of the dissertation, this was the first time in the
trajectory of Irish abortion politics that pro-choice actors proactively
challenged Ireland's abortion law. And though the Court rejected the human
rights claims of all but one of the litigants, the A, B, & C case produced both
direct and indirect gains for the movement. The limited win for C forced the
government to pass legislation in 2013 to clarify when a woman could access
a life-saving abortion—an action the movement had sought for years. But the
real strategic value came from the process surrounding the new law rather
than the policy is produced. Placing abortion in the public and political
domain as a woman's rights issue, the hearings for the implementation of A,
B, & C initiated a change in the contours of public discourse on abortion.
1059 Michael Martin, Speech by Micheál Martin On Debate On Report Of Committee On 8th Amendment, (January 18, 2018)
https://www.fiannafail.ie/speech-by-micheal-martin-on-debate-on-report-of-committee-on-8th-amendment-18thjan-2018/
1060 Id.
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Beginning a move towards the eventual public understanding of abortion as
a right rather than a sin or crime, this discourse captured new audiences at
different levels. Established human rights NGOs, who had shied away from
engaging the thorny issue of abortion reform, launched public campaigns for
abortion rights. Grassroots pro-choice activists who had long been shunned
and stigmatized gained legitimacy in the public eye. And younger women
who experienced public deliberations on their reproductive freedom for the
first time organized in outrage at what they heard.
Similarly, the movement’s iterative human rights challenges to the 8th
using UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies engendered both legal and political
benefits. During the four years preceding the May 2018 referendum, abortion
rights advocates targeted the UN human rights processes every year to
highlight the conflict between Irish abortion law and international human
rights standards. Securing recognition of these claims by international human
rights bodies provided important legal precedents with which the movement
could criticize the State while also helping to educate the public on the harms
of Ireland’s abortion law. And by facilitating collaboration and networking
among disparate groups and providing a training ground for new advocates,
human rights processes helped increase the organizational power of the Irish
abortion rights movement.
But as Chapter 2 explains, as the abortion rights movement gained more
and more power, international human rights law ran out as a resource. By
mid-2017, the question in Irish abortion politics was no longer whether the
government would hold a referendum to reform the 8th, but what shape that
legal reform would take.1061 As some politicians began to propose legislation
that would permit women to have abortion in the so-called "hard cases" of
rape, women's health, and fatal fetal abnormalities, many abortion-rights
advocates emphatically argued that excluding women who choose abortion
for other reasons was untenable.1062 Within this context, human rights law
lost much of its former utility. Because human rights law protects abortion
rights in limited cases—to protect a woman's life and health, following rape,
and to terminate pregnancies with fetal anomalies—international standards
contradicted the movement's demand for "free, safe and legal" abortion for
all women.
With the benefit of hindsight, we know that the abortion rights
movement was vindicated in its rejection of proposals for more modest
reform: when the public voted for Repeal of the 8th, they also voted for
prospective regulation guaranteeing access to abortion without restriction as
Fiona de Londras, Politicians left with nowhere to hide on abortion, THE IRISH TIMES (April 26, 2017)
See supra note _ and accompanying text. See also, Pat Leahy, Varadkar rejects ‘hard cases’ suggestions from No campaign
THE IRISH TIMES (May 23, 2018) https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/varadkar-rejects-hard-casessuggestions-from-no-campaign-1.3504835
1061
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to reason up to 12th weeks of gestation. Replacing a near-total ban on
abortion, Repeal was a stunning victory for abortion rights and a decisive
repudiation of gender inequality it serviced.
As Chapter 3 explains, the 8th amendment was a bulwark of gender
inequality in Ireland. The amendment was not introduced to criminalize
abortion in Ireland – this was already unequivocally the status quo. Rather,
the campaign for an anti-abortion amendment was motivated, in large part,
out a desire to safeguard the traditional role of Irish women as child-bearers
and rearers.1063 Concerned by the State’s legalization of access to
contraception in the late 1970s, social conservatives were vexed that the
nations patriarchal order may come undone. To gain ground against any
other gestures towards women’s equality, they launched a constitutional
campaign to reassert Irish women’s role as mothers. Proposed as the “prolife” amendment, the law guaranteed “the right to life of the unborn” with
equivalence to the right to life of the “mother”. Without much difficulty, antiabortion campaigners secured the support of the political elites to hold a
referendum on the amendment, and shortly after, they won the support of
the voting public.
As a consequence of the anti-abortion campaign’s success, the 8th
amendment and its gendered ideology controlled Irish abortion law for 35
years. Criminalizing access in all cases except where a woman’s life was at
risk, only the dying woman was permitted to shirk her role. The notion of
women as child-bearing vessels was so strong even in cases where the
pregnancy was not viable; the law required a woman to continue her
pregnancy. Rejecting women's decisions about pregnancy, the law treated
women as reproductive instruments rather than as autonomous, rightsholding citizens.
Chapter 2 describes how women challenged this gender hierarchy
through public campaigns for law reform, but in Chapter 3, we see how
women's lived experiences under the law also contested the State's dictates.
Every year, thousands of abortion-seeking women "traveled" (as it
euphemistically became known) or bought abortion pills illegally online.
Despite the law's attempts to control their decisions, women persistently
asserted their agency. But, for rejecting the State's normative ideals for
women, they were punished. Criminalized or expelled from the State for
making their own decisions about motherhood and pregnancy, women
endured significant burdens of exclusion, stigma, and shame.
Assessed in light of the Irish abortion story, international human rights
law seems devoid of an understanding of the gendered implications of
abortion restrictions. This happens in three main ways. First, the gender
1063

Chapter 3, section II.
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biases that animate anti-abortion law receive little scrutiny in human rights
law jurisprudence. By treating abortion as a matter of cultural morality—and
thus an issue on which States are entitled to wide deference—the European
Court abdicates its power to review the discrimination caused by abortion
restrictions. In parallel, the doctrine tends to narrow its review of
discriminatory State action by holding individuals, rather than law and
policy, accountable for the wrongs inflicted upon women. Blind to gender,
international human rights law is ‘blind’ to the source of the problem.
Second, the jurisprudence appears critically inattentive to the ways that
anti-abortion legislation injures women's autonomy or impairs women's status
more broadly. The doctrinal approaches pursued—recognizing abortion as
an aspect of the right to freedom from cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment, the right to health, the right to privacy, and to a limited extent, the
right to non-discrimination— presents the harms of abortion denial as an
encroachment upon women’s health, rather than women’s socio-political
freedom. Underplaying the gendered nature of women’s injuries when denied
abortions, the law fails to understand women’s interests as sufficiently
systematic and political so as to implicate rights guarantees.
Third, human rights law’s conception of women runs the risk of devaluing
women’s agency in much the same way as restrictive abortion laws. By
conditioning its recognition of abortion rights to cases of rape, fetal
abnormality, or to where necessary to protect a woman's life or a woman's
health, the law institutes a hierarchy of rights-holders. And the less agency a
woman displays, the more likely she is to be recognized as worthy of rights.
Common to all threads of this critique is international law’s failure to be
sincere about “respecting women’s choices.” The insincerity excludes most
abortion-seeking women from the law's protection. But it also tracks in the
doctrine's failure to interrogate the real reasons for why women are denied
abortions. Blind to the invidious gender stereotypes and disdain for women’s
autonomy that drive anti-abortion legislation, current doctrine could be
impugned for sanctioning gender inequality.
This dissertation concludes by warning that international human rights
law's struggle to meaningfully engage gender may have implications beyond
abortion rights; in the current political environment where regressive
actors—also known as "anti-rights"1064 or "anti-gender" actors—are waging
legal and political campaigns against gender equality, human rights law's
relative inability to give sustained treatment to gender may even be urgent.
The anti-rights actors who call on States to roll back human rights protections
for women and LGBT+ persons forcefully allege that gender is an ideology
1064 See, e.g., Observatory on the Universality of Rights, Rights at Risk: The Observatory on the Universality of Rights Trends
Report 2017, https://www.awid.org/publications/rights-risk-observatory-universality-rights-trends-report-2017
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that is set upon harming families, children, freedom of religion or belief, and
even women's "sex-based" rights. And such attempts to rollback myriad
rights, including rights to abortion and contraception, same-sex marriage,
parental rights for same-sex couples, self-determination rights for genderdiverse persons, access to assisted reproductive technologies, and to
comprehensive sexuality education, are increasingly breaking ground.1065
Attempts to mitigate these movements without addressing gender will not be
sufficient to the task.

1065 See UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief (2020)
A/HRC/43/48.
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